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Abstract 
This thesis argues that a crucial resource of Critical Theory, the diagnosis of social 
pathologies, is being rendered impotent through its troubling and unnecessary marriage 
with a restrictive, recognition-derived approach to social theory. There is a growing 
literature arguing that contemporary Critical Theory has become philosophically, 
politically and social-theoretically unsound, increasingly blind to the meritorious insights 
of earlier generations of Frankfurt School scholars. This thesis argues that exactly such 
a development can be traced within contemporary social pathology scholarship. As a 
means of rejuvenating the Critical Theoretical tradition, this project serves to outline the 
utility of the many framings of social pathology which have been needlessly, and 
problematically, displaced by the ascendant recognition-based approaches to 
diagnosing social pathologies. This thesis seeks to champion a ‘polycentric and 
multilateral’ approach to social pathology scholarship, pointing beyond the myopically 
recognitive nature of contemporary Critical Theory. 
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Introduction 
On the Importance and Relevance of Social Pathology Scholarship 
On the origins and import of this research 
Why Social Pathology? 
Long before I encountered the concept of social pathology I had been intuitively fascinated by 
‘deeper’, more ‘foundational’ social critiques. In my teenage years, as a socialist from a working-
class family, society simply seemed ‘crazy’ or ‘illogical’ to me. I would read about the grotesque 
inequalities of wealth, the self-indulgent fancies of billionaires, man-made global warming, the 
continued presence of racial and gender inequalities, neo-colonial wars, even the persistence of 
the House of Lords … to my unschooled mind, the best word to describe this was ‘bonkers’. So, 
as a precocious (at times insufferable) college student, I would puzzle over Rousseau and 
Nietzsche, not always understanding it, but feeling there was ‘something’ there which was 
‘weightier’ than the prescribed liberal readings of my textbooks. During my undergraduate 
degree I became fascinated by Hegel and Adorno for similar reasons, and with comparable semi-
comprehension. It was only during my Master’s, that these thoughts developed any clear form, 
and I slowly became aware that there was a rich theoretical literature on the explicit 
commonality across these authors: that of ‘social pathology’. 
This realisation largely came through reading Axel Honneth, who, at time of writing, is 
director of the Institute for Social Research, the symbolic home of the so-called ‘Frankfurt 
School’ of Critical Theory. Indeed, from one perspective, the reader might engage with this thesis 
as borne out of a ‘love-hate’ relationship with Honneth’s output, and his increasing divergence 
from earlier generations of Critical Theory (Honneth, 2000, 2004a, 2007a, 2010, 2014a). Two of 
Honneth’s lesser known texts were central to drawing me into the literature on social pathology 
diagnosis. Honneth’s (2004a) ‘A social pathology of reason: on the Intellectual legacy of Critical 
Theory’ and his (2014a) ‘The diseases of society: Approaching a nearly impossible concept’ 
seemed to articulate with superb clarity the importance of diagnosing social pathologies and 
expertly illuminated what this tradition has represented. Yet, simultaneously, Honneth’s own 
substantive scholarship seemed increasingly restrictive, even reactionary. The more I studied 
them, Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition (1995) and particularly his Freedom’s Right (2014) 
seemed entirely incommensurate with the theoretical insights and political urgency of earlier 
generations of Critical Theory. Honneth thus annoyed me, he seemed to ‘get it’, but not to ‘do 
it’ when it came to diagnosing social pathologies. 
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Mid-way through the first term of my doctoral research, Michael J. Thompson’s The 
Domestication of Critical Theory was published. I found myself in broad agreement with his 
argument: contemporary Critical Theory was a far cry from the political and philosophical 
radicalism of earlier generations. Thompson’s (2016) powerful argument, that Critical Theory 
has suffered a process of ‘domestication’, fitted perfectly with my own, protean thoughts on 
social pathology scholarship. Having read Thompson’s text repeatedly the central idea of this 
thesis became settled, to show how contemporary scholarship on social pathology has led to a 
domestication of this crucial area of Critical Theoretical research.  
From these foundations the ideas which developed into this project began to crystallise: 
diagnosing the central irrationalities of the social conjecture, the ‘social pathologies’, remains a 
crucial, if not the crucial task for Critical Theory, yet contemporary Critical Theorists were failing 
to do it adequately. Largely, this seemed to be due to the turn to a needlessly restrictive, and 
philosophically questionable, recognition-derived framework for conducting social theory and 
social research; an approach furthered largely by Honneth’s Critical Theory.   
Yet, while demonstrating the limitations and the domesticated nature of contemporary 
pathology diagnosis was an important goal, like Thompson, I was keen to go further. I wanted 
to point towards possibilities for renewal and to draw out the occluded potential for social 
theory and social research residing in the myriad framings of social pathology that have been 
lost in the recognition turn. My project was thus to have two objectives: to demonstrate the 
limitations of the dominant recognition-derived approaches to social pathology scholarship, 
and, perhaps more importantly, to articulate the potency of the multiple framings of social 
pathology once central to Critical Theoretical scholarship, which have been needlessly jettisoned 
in the recognition turn. This latter task helps to point towards resources that could be united as 
part of a broader, non-recognition-restrictive approach to conducting foundational, social 
pathology diagnosing critique. 
One important clarification is required from the start of this project: this is not a trans-
historical critique of recognition and its role in social theory and social philosophy. Rather, while 
I agree entirely with Thompson’s critique of the neo-Idealism present within the dominant form 
of recognition scholarship today, this is not to suggest that all recognition-derived social theory 
is impotent. Instead, it is the contemporary Honnethian form of recognition theory, which is 
neo-Idealist and restrictive, and thus damaging to theoretical inquiry. This project has no quarrel 
with the broader recognition tradition in social theory and social philosophy, indeed the left-
Hegelian roots of the Critical Theory project are explicitly triumphed and are pointed to as one 
amongst several means for potential rejuvenation. As I draw out in the penultimate chapter of 
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this thesis, a drastically reformulated recognition approach could perhaps feature as part of a 
broader, ‘polycentric’, pathology diagnosing endeavour (Fraser and Honneth, 2001). Yet, in 
keeping with McNay (2008), Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2001) and Thompson (2016, 2017, 
2019), as I draw out throughout this thesis, for recognition theory to play any such a role in 
Critical Theoretical scholarship, it must cede claims to a monopoly on interpretative capacity 
and must drop all pretensions to the ontological primacy of the recognition dyad. A 
reformulated, nuanced recognition approach could indeed play a useful subordinate role in a 
more radical and rejuvenated Critical Theory, but substantial changes are required.  
Thus, the answer to ‘Why study social pathology?’ is two-fold: first, the diagnosis of social 
pathologies offers the resources to conduct a potent critique of the social world, which, as I shall 
establish, enables the theorist to transcend the limited liberal framings of ‘justice’ and 
‘legitimacy’ (Neuhouser, 2012). Equally, and as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, 
the potency of this tradition is being ‘domesticated’ (Thompson, 2016). I thus felt drawn to 
conducting research on this topic, as I wanted to make an intervention to expose how this 
important area of Critical Theory was being debased, and to reaffirm the utility and critical 
insight of a potent, unrestricted, pathology diagnosing engagement with the social world. 
 
The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory 
The Institut für Sozialforschung [Institute for Social Research], home to the ‘Frankfurt School’, 
was founded in 1923 as an autonomous research institution affiliated with the University of 
Frankfurt am Main.1 Originally uniting mainly orthodox Marxist economists, the institute 
developed an idiosyncratic interdisciplinary critique, uniting aspects from German Idealism, anti-
positivist sociology and psychoanalysis (Jay, 1996). Horkheimer’s programmatic essay 
'Traditional and Critical Theory’ (1937) is perhaps the clearest ‘manifesto’ for the research 
project, explicitly articulating the methodological and political commitments of the institute. It 
is commonplace for academics to talk of ‘generations’ of Critical Theory, with a first generation 
of Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm inter 
alia, a second generation around Jürgen Habermas, a third generation of Axel Honneth and Claus 
Offe inter alia, and today one may even hear of a fourth generation orbiting Rainer Forst.   
                                                          
1 For a detailed and accessible group biography of the Frankfurt School theorists, see Stuart Jeffries’ Grand Hotel 
Abyss (2017). For a more rigorous academic history, see Martin Jay’s The Dialectical Imagination (1973) or David 
Held’s Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (2013). For a brief introduction, see Stephen 
Bronner’s (2011) Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction.    
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As Honneth (2000, 2004a, 2007b, 2007c) has argued, across these generations Critical Theory 
has long been concerned with the diagnosis of social pathologies. This in part comes from the 
‘deeper’ more ‘foundational’ nature of its critique (Neuhouser, 2011) which focuses not solely 
on justice, legitimacy and democracy, but on social rationality and the aims to which society 
functions (Horkheimer, 1937; Honneth, 2000, 2007b; How, 2003). Drawing on its left-Hegelian 
heritage, Critical Theory engages with the contradictions latent within the manifest forms of 
social reason (Marcuse, 1969). It is worth stressing that for first-generation Critical Theorists 
‘reason’ is metaphysical, existing both in the forms of social organisation and in the cognitive 
capacities of the social subject (Marcuse, 1969).   
Borne out of these left-Hegelian roots, Critical Theory evinces a unique fusion of theory and 
praxis. Through their social critique, Critical Theorists seek to overcome the contradictions 
present within the social order, both cognitive (through ideology critique) and social-structural 
(through identifying the sites of domination and extraction in the objective social world) 
(Strydom, 2011). For Critical Theorists, the diagnosis of social pathologies marks a distinct 
knowledge interest but also an explicit investment in social praxis. Through diagnosing social 
pathologies, Critical Theory is how consciousness ‘fights back’ (Jeffries, 2017).  
The explicitly political, forward-looking nature of Critical Theory is further evinced through 
its unique methodological commitment to immanent-transcendence (Delanty, 2011; Strydom, 
2011). As I shall draw out in Chapter Five, Critical Theorists seek to identify in the paradoxes of 
the present the latent higher forms of reason which are already existing, dormant within the 
social conjecture. The focus on immanent-transcendence enables Critical Theorists to conduct 
normatively undergirded critique of the objective social order, pointing to the potential of a 
more rational future society, while focusing their analysis firmly on the contradictions of the 
immanent present. Honneth has argued that such an approach is best framed as normative, 
disclosing and diagnostic (Honneth, 2000). Delanty argues that through immanent 
transcendence, 
Critical Theory thus gave expression to a moral vision of the future possibilities of society as deriving 
from a process of social transformation driven forward by its internal dynamics (Delanty, 2011: 72). 
As Guess (1981) writes, through immanent-transcendence, with its focus on internal 
contradictions, Critical Theory provides the methodology for its own self-criticism and thus 
(theoretically) inculcates a predilection for critical reflexivity. Both with a focus on the Critical 
Theorist herself, and within society more broadly, the methodology of immanent-transcendence 
retains its clear left-Hegelian inflection and seeks both ‘the transformation of the individual’s 
psyche’ (ideology-critique) and ‘institutional change’ (Delanty, 2011: 72).    
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In addition to its explicitly forward-looking orientation, Critical Theory is distinguished by a 
hyper-awareness of its positionality: within ideology, within a capitalist, irrational system. As 
Horkheimer drew out in his signal essay, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, the project can further 
be understood as ‘critical’, as unlike the ‘savants’ of conventional theory, the Critical Theorist is 
conscious of their location within broader, physical and metaphysical social and knowledge 
systems, and is aware that their intellectual contribution seeks an explicit objective praxis qua 
social change. To this end Horkheimer stressed that Critical Theory should be ‘neither “deeply 
rooted” like totalitarian propaganda nor “detached” like the liberal intelligentsia’ (Horkheimer, 
1982: 223-4). Such an ‘inside/outside’ duality was to be furthered through a flexible, 
interdisciplinary research programme, with an eliding, shifting focus, while remaining concerned 
with rationality and the ideological obfuscations of objective structural logics (Bronner, 2002, 
2011). In this regard, Critical Theorists are thus most clearly unified by the themes of their 
research, and their political investment in an emancipatory rational society, rather than their 
application of research methodologies (Guess, 2004). Critical political economists such as 
Pollock and Grossman, and Critical legal scholars such as Neumann and Kirchheimer, worked on 
highly disparate research subjects, yet were united by the broader critique of social irrationality 
and by identifying the possibilities for immanent-transcendence. This interdisciplinary edge was 
further sharpened by Marcuse and Fromm who brought the left-Hegelian-Marxian sociological-
philosophical approach into dialogue with social psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis 
(Delanty, 2011: 71-2).  
There are two further themes central to the Critical Theoretical project, which partially unite 
the otherwise disparate cadre of quasi-Marxian academics: an explicit critique of the dominance 
of instrumental reason (Schecter, 2010) and a methodologically avowed anti-positivism 
(Osborne and Dews, 1987; Held, 2013). While both of these methodological and research 
interests are to some extent derivative of the German Idealist roots of the research project 
(Rush, 2013: 188), they continue to lead to the identification of new areas of social research. For 
example, today the critique of instrumental rationality is increasingly informing the Critical 
Digital Humanities (Berry, 2014; Fuchs, 2018).   
While ‘Third’ and ‘Fourth’ generations of Critical Theory have moved away from their left-
Hegelian foundations and explicitly embraced Apelian pragmatics and analytic philosophy 
(Frega, 2014), the focus on diagnosing social pathologies remains a central unifying concern 
across Frankfurt School scholarship (Honneth, 2007b; Chapter One). The framing of ‘social 
pathology’ is perhaps uniquely potent in that it captures both the distorting effects of ideology 
and the ‘objective social problems’ that ideology serves to obscure (Strydom, 2011). With this 
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powerful dual purchase, ‘social pathology’ serves as both a highly efficient signifier, and a potent 
conceptual lens, through which Critical Theorists can identify the maladies of the social world.   
  
Why research social pathology now? 
With the ascendancy of increasingly restrictive, intersubjective approaches to social theory, the 
left-Hegelian-Marxian radicalism of earlier generations of Critical Theory is waning (Thompson, 
2016). This has drastically impeded the Critical Theoretical diagnosis of social pathologies. As 
introduced above, Michael J. Thompson’s (2016) polemic has catalysed a broader discussion on 
the ‘domestication’ of the Critical Theoretical project, which has divided the academy. Few 
would deny that Critical Theory has changed substantially in both its social-theoretical and 
political inflections over the last three decades. Siding with Thompson, I argue that recent 
developments in Critical Theory have marked a retreat from a direct confrontation with the 
primary source of social domination: the logics and rationalities central to capitalism. 
Accordingly, contemporary Critical Theory no longer informs progressive scholarship more 
broadly as it did in previous generations.2 With increasingly contested philosophical foundations 
(critiqued as neo-Idealist) and an ever-closer alliance with capitalist norms and institutions,3 
Third (and Fourth)4 generation Critical Theory is in a profound identity crisis. These tendencies 
can be evinced tout court through recent developments in social pathology scholarship. 
While completing this thesis I was privileged to be a guest editor of a European Journal of 
Social Theory special issue on social pathologies and recognition. The contributions to the issue 
demonstrate both the timeliness of this research and the increasing polarisation of the debate. 
While papers from Thompson (2019) and Canivez (2019) served to further problematise the turn 
to recognition theoretical approaches to social pathology scholarship, various contributions 
served to extend the recognition approach, entirely oblivious to, or wilfully not engaging with, 
these increasingly prevalent critiques. Schaub and Odigbo (2019) evidence the drive to further 
radicalise the recognition approach, submitting that even the hunger of those waiting at 
foodbanks is best-theorised as an outcome of consumptive need misrecognition. Their paper 
made no acknowledgement that there is a mountainous literature opposing restrictive 
recognition-theoretical scholarship. To those critical of solely recognition approaches, such a 
                                                          
2 For example, neither Wolfgang Streeck’s How Will Capitalism End, nor Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century draw extensively on contemporary Critical Theory. 
3 See Chapter One of Thompson’s (2016) The Domestication of Critical Theory.  
4 Third and fourth generation Critical Theory exist contemporaneously. While Forst’s appeal continues to grow, 
Honneth’s recognition-derived approach has achieved such dominance, within and beyond Critical Theory, that his 
account remains the central paradigm for critical social theory.  
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framing may seem dogmatically wedded to the intersubjective paradigm, serving little to no 
explanatory value (McNay, 2006; Thompson, 2016). This is not to flag the co-authors Schaub and 
Odigbo for special criticism: on the contrary, this example is given as it is highly indicative of the 
debate more broadly. While the special issue was a success in bringing competing approaches 
to social pathology diagnosis within a singular volume, the edition indicates the increasingly 
siloed nature of the debate. In part, my seventh chapter serves as a response to the collected 
articles: showing how an ‘inverted’, radically reshaped, recognition paradigm could potentially 
be of some limited use as part of a broader Critical Theoretical approach.  
In short, there is a battle raging in Critical Theory. For Michael J. Thompson, destabilising the 
hegemony of the neo-Idealist paradigm is an essential first-step in rejuvenating the Critical 
Theory tradition. My distinctive contribution is to focus explicitly on how pathology diagnosing 
critique has been impeded by the restrictive, neo-Idealist recognition-turn. By drawing out the 
artificial constraints of the recognition-derived approach to social pathology scholarship, and by 
highlighting the efficacy of displaced framings of pathology diagnosing social critique, this thesis 
responds to Thompson’s call to challenge the domesticated state of contemporary Critical 
Theory while extending Thompson’s scholarship through a new focus on pathology diagnosis 
and a targeted critique of recognition theory.5     
 
On the Nature and Scope of this Project 
What this thesis seeks to demonstrate 
In its current form as a doctoral thesis this project is sharply restricted to 80,000 words, so must 
make an incisive, targeted intervention. I thus outline exactly what the project seeks to achieve, 
and perhaps more importantly, what has been deliberately excluded from consideration, while 
held ripe for further study.  
While Critical Theory is, by definition, interdisciplinary, and this thesis draws upon aspects of 
intellectual history, gender theory, philosophy, political economy and psychoanalytic theory, 
this is ultimately a submission in social theory. The departures into other subject areas are thus 
excursions to further the two central social theoretical points of this thesis, which are: 
a) That the dominant form of recognition-derived social pathology scholarship is both 
social-theoretically restrictive and philosophically untenable and, 
                                                          
5 Thompson’s critique of the neo-Idealist tendencies of contemporary critical theory focuses on both Habermasian 
and Honnethian Critical Theory (as well as, to a lesser extent, Forst, inter alia). This project does not engage 
extensively with Habermas. My focus is on more contemporary debates, and thus the neo-Idealist tendencies in 
Honneth’s work are afforded greater scrutiny.  
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b) That a plurality of potent, yet currently side-lined approaches for conducting social 
pathology diagnosis are lying dormant, due to the near total hegemony of recognition 
derived framings. 
While the first submission is relatively self-contained in terms of the necessary content, the 
second was substantially more open-ended.  While I ultimately opted to champion the breadth 
of social pathology diagnosing approaches proffered by Rousseau (Chapter Four), the 
pathologies of reason approach most associated with left-Hegelianism (Chapter Five), and the 
under-appreciated pathologies of normalcy approach presented by Erich Fromm (Chapter Six), I 
could just as readily explored the work of Jürgen Habermas, Theodore Adorno, Sigmund Freud 
or Walter Benjamin, inter alia. Equally, there could have been an entire chapter dedicated to 
Michael J. Thompson, or Axel Honneth. While it proved impossible within the constraints of a 
doctoral thesis to engage in the desired detail with the breadth of theorists who make important 
contributions to the discussion, the above all appear briefly and tangentially if not in more 
substantive analysis.   
 
What this project is not 
As a work of social theory, this project does not approach the study of social pathology from an 
explicitly philosophical angle, therefore many of the central concerns in the philosophical study 
of social pathology are absent. For example, there is only a limited discussion, in Chapter One, 
on the debates surrounding social organicism. Similarly, there is limited to no discussion on the 
growing literature on Dewey’s insights for social pathology scholarship through his approach to 
‘social life’ (Laitinen and Särkelä, 2019). Neither is there space for engaging with the extended 
philosophical literature on the classical origins of social pathology in Plato and Aristotle. Equally, 
this project does not seek to intervene in the debates around Antonovsky’s (1996) conception 
of salutogenesis.6  
While these concerns are of great interest and may have been central to any philosophical 
project engaging with social pathology scholarship, this thesis approaches Critical Theoretical 
scholarship from an explicitly social-theoretical perspective. While the above concerns would be 
of importance to a research project with a more pronounced philosophical inflection, they are 
not sufficiently proximate to my submission to merit inclusion herewith.  
                                                          
6 Antonovsky’s work originated within the field of medical sociology. In contrast to pathogenesis, which focuses on 
the factors that cause disease, salutogenesis focuses on factors that support human health and wellbeing. There is a 
growing scholarship which seeks to balance the two concerns (Mittelmark, 2016).   
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Finally, I wish to comment on the decision not to engage with Smith’s (2017) Society and 
Social Pathology, which, prima facie would appear important for this project. While Smith’s book 
is to be championed for its commitment to rigorous interdisciplinarity and for its rich 
incorporation of both qualitative and quantitative data, the project sits too far from both critical 
social theory and the current Frankfurt School debates on social pathology for it to feature 
within this strictly limited project. Smith’s analysis is too distant from the politically potent 
debates surrounding social pathology and sits largely as a collection of interesting secondary 
textual analyses. There is little-to-no engagement with the dominant debates and literatures 
which the rest of this project situates itself. This is not to state that Smith’s text is not worthy of 
further analysis, but will, due to limitations of space, have to wait along with the provocations 
on social pathology within the works of Habermas, Antonosky and Davis, for a future project.    
 
Structure and Content 
Beyond this introduction, the thesis consists of seven chapters and an extended conclusion.  
Chapter One: Social Pathology Diagnosis and Recognition: Very Different Beasts 
My opening chapter lays the foundations for the broader project by interrogating the central 
assumptions implicit in the thesis. It commences with a critical discussion of the merits of social 
pathology scholarship, framed through a brief historical sketch. While this theme is considered 
throughout the project, this first chapter offers a clear, non-partisan framing through which to 
conceptualise the approach more broadly. Having done so, the chapter then argues that 
pathology diagnosing social critique is philosophically justifiable and carries significant 
explanatory potential. The distinctive importance of social pathology diagnosis to the Critical 
Theory tradition is then elaborated. I then outline the approaches’ distinctiveness from 
recognition theory. The second section of this chapter outlines how recognition has its own 
distinct heritage in social theory and philosophy and has no essential commonality with 
pathology diagnosing social critique. Honneth’s radicalisation of recognition is introduced, while 
its continuing divergence from the core themes of pathology diagnosing critique is underscored.  
 
Chapter Two: Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition: A Critique 
The second chapter outlines the political, philosophical and social-theoretical limitations of the 
dominant Honnethian recognition approach, which has come to impede social pathology 
scholarship. This chapter introduces the work of Michael J. Thompson (2016, 2019) and brings 
his critique of neo-Idealism into dialogue with Nancy Fraser’s (2011) and Lois McNay’s (2008) 
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existing critiques of Honneth’s recognition theory. As returned to in Chapter Seven, I argue here 
that the dominant recognition framing has substantial weaknesses and that without 
fundamental ontological and political changes this approach is best exercised from Critical 
Theoretical scholarship. Through the acritical return to the noumenal-idealist realm as the 
originary site of the social world (Bollenbeck, forthcoming), restrictive recognition theorists have 
negated Marx’s (1961) foundational Copernican insight: that social existence precedes, and 
substantially determines, consciousness, which crucially impacts upon subjects’ capacities to, 
and proclivities for, engagement in recognition relationships.  
 
Chapter Three: Recognition Theory and Social Pathology: A Troubling Marriage 
This third chapter charts how contemporary social pathology theorists have embraced 
Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition. I outline how such a move has been furthered through 
the Jyväskylä’s School’s embrace of Honneth’s scholarship (1995, 2008, 2014a, 2014b) and by 
Christoper Zurn’s (2011) influential ‘second-order’ reading of Honneth’s work. Extending 
Freyenhagen, I argue that both Zurn and Honneth are responsible for social pathologies 
increasingly being theorised as existing solely ‘in the head’ of the subject (Freyenhagen, 2015: 
44), at variance with the broader Critical Theory tradition (Delanty, 2011; Strydom, 2011). The 
chapter then problematises Honneth’s (2014) framing of ‘misdevelopments’, which is held to 
trap pathology diagnosis within the recognition register and further expedites Critical Theory’s 
retreat from a direct engagement with capitalist logics and irrationalities. This chapter seeks to 
expose the problematically restrictive nature of the dominant, Honneth-Zurn inspired approach 
to social pathology scholarship. A section from of this chapter (between 1500-2000 words) has 
was published in the European Journal of Social Theory during  the course of this research.   
 
Chapter Four: Rousseau: The Social Pathologist Par Excellence 
Having assessed the dominant recognition approach to social pathology scholarship (Chapters 
Two and Three), the following three chapters reconstruct alternate approaches to pathology 
diagnosing critique which have been needlessly displaced by the recognition paradigm. The first 
of these chapters, Chapter Four, engages with Rousseau’s oeuvre complète. Five distinct 
framings of social pathology are located within Rousseau work. While Neuhouser (2012) has 
demonstrated the centrality of pathology diagnosis to Rousseau’s Discourse on Political 
Economy (1758), this chapter engages with Rousseau’s work as a totality, identifying penetrating 
forms of pathology diagnosing critique across his autobiography, his operas, his pedagogy and 
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his musicology, in addition to his political economy and foundational social theory.7 It is 
particularly gratifying to discover a plethora of framings of social pathology within Rousseau’s 
work which are incompatible with the recognition account. That the recognition theorist par 
excellence transcended the recognition register to present his social critique is a telling 
indictment of the shockingly myopic nature of contemporary recognition-derived Critical 
Theory. 
 
Chapter Five: The Pathologies of Reason: Left-Hegelianism and Social Pathology 
Chapter Five focuses on the left-Hegelian tradition and the competing framings of ‘pathologies 
of Reason’ circulating within the broader critical discussion. While for Honneth (2004: 338), it is 
the left-Hegelian critique of deficient (cognitive and socially manifest) rationality which 
constitutes the ‘explosive charge’ of Critical Theory, the accompanying literature is formidably 
complicated (Marcuse, 1969). What is held to constitute a pathology of reason is increasingly 
contested (Honneth, 2007a). This chapter thus seeks to achieve three objectives: (a) to 
reconstruct the dominant understandings of pathologies of reason in circulation and to draw 
out their essential commonalities, (b) to demonstrate how these insights are of utility for Critical 
Theory, and, (c) to identify how these resources are needlessly excluded by the dominant 
recognition-derived approach to Critical Theory.   
 
Chapter Six: Reconstructing Erich Fromm’s ‘pathology of normalcy’ 
While Fromm does not offer a singular text outlining a clear vision of social pathology, through 
engaging closely with his output one can reconstruct a sophisticated understanding of social 
pathology based on the economic and psycho-social mechanisms which serve to perpetuate the 
pathologies of the present. For Fromm (1963, 1983, 2010), the challenge is to expose how social 
pathologies are normalised, how subjects come to accept the ‘insanity’ of the social world. This 
chapter seeks to rehabilitate Fromm’s approach to social pathology diagnosis and aims to show 
how his valuable insights are needlessly excluded by the dominant recognition paradigm to the 
detriment of Critical Theory. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Situating Rousseau’s project within such contemporary subject demarcations is of course anachronistic, and is 
therefore done apologetically, solely for its explanatory merit as a convenient typology.  
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Chapter Seven: Rethinking Recognition 
Drawing out of the preceding three chapters, an inverted recognition approach is presented as 
a possible contribution to a future, broader, ‘polycentric’ social pathology diagnosing approach 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2001). Crucially, for recognition to play any such role, recognition-
theorists’ claims to the ontological primacy of the intersubjective dyad would need to be 
discarded, as would any argument in favour of a monistic social theory. In contrast to the 
hegemonic ‘pathologies of recognition’ framing, I contend that utilising a more nuanced 
recognition perspective could be useful as one route amongst many for exposing the full breadth 
of social pathologies. In my suggested, inverted recognition engagement, a focus on recognition 
relationships is of possible utility as a means of exposing some of the deeper social pathologies 
which exist beyond the recognition register. This submission is offered as a means of retaining 
the insights of recognition theory, while transcending the needlessly restrictive and 
philosophically problematic foundations of the dominant recognition-monist approach. I stress 
that my suggested re-imagining of recognition exists as one amongst many approaches for 
exposing and conceptualising the pathologies of the social world. In part it is offered to start 
bridging the chasm between Honnethian recognition theorists and those who retain a stronger 
investment in a polycentric and dialectical Marxian Critical Theory.  
 
Conclusion: Social Pathology Diagnosis and the Future of Critical Theory 
The thesis finishes with an extended conclusion. My central social-theoretical submission is 
reasserted within a discussion of broader debates in contemporary Critical Theory. I present this 
thesis as a contribution towards the critique of domesticated, contemporary ‘Third’ and ‘Fourth’ 
generation Critical Theory. My social theoretical submission is then positioned relative to its 
future possible application for social research. The final lines speak of the importance of having 
rigorous, polycentric pathology diagnosing foundations for future Critical Theoretical 
scholarship. 
 
A Final Consideration  
Critical Theorists diagnose social pathologies to advance the progressive transformation of the 
irrational social order. This thesis sits as part of the broader campaign to renew the radicalism 
of the Critical Theory tradition, and to reinvigorate the political-transformative objectives of the 
broader research project. As this thesis will submit, Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition is 
a clear impediment to this objective. Instead of focusing on the objective contradictions in the 
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capitalist social world, and the ideological artifice that obscures them, Honnethian Critical 
Theory focuses on developing ever more ingenious ways to convince social subjects that 
capitalist society already offers the potential for emancipation and a flourishing existence 
(Honneth, 2014b: 8, 46). In Freedom’s Right (2014), Honneth substituted the immanent-
transcendent methodology, with its appreciation of Hegelian latency, for a metaphysically 
absent conservative presentism. The dominant approach to social pathologies is unjustifiable: 
social pathologies are not solely located ‘in the head’ of the subject, rather there are 
irrationalities within the objective social order which require incisive theoretical analysis and 
urgent political transformation (Strydom, 2011). The diagnosis of social pathologies has long 
offered a crucial tool to engage in deeper, more penetrating social critique; a means of looking 
beyond the dominant social mores and to expose contradictory social logics (Honneth, 2004). 
By reasserting the critical potential of the pathology diagnosing tradition, which ironically 
Honneth (2000, 2003, 2004a, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2014a) himself has outlined better than 
anybody, I hope Critical Theorists can once again point towards the more rational society latent 
within the contradictions of today’s capitalist social conjecture (Delanty, 2011; Strydom, 2011).  
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Chapter One 
Social Pathology Diagnosis and Recognition: Very Different Beasts  
Introduction 
This thesis argues that the diagnosis of social pathologies is rapidly being rendered impotent 
through its troubling marriage with Honneth’s restrictive recognition approach to social theory. 
But when one steps back for the shortest moment it is immediately apparent that this 
submission is loaded with assumptions which require interrogation. This first chapter seeks to 
do just that, to lay the foundations for the broader thesis by investigating the theoretical 
commitments which undergird the central argument. This chapter thus engages with integral 
questions such as: What is social pathology diagnosis and is it something worth saving? Is social 
pathology diagnosis central to Critical Theory? Isn’t the language of ‘pathology’ problematic in 
itself? In today’s conditions of normative crisis can we even state that society has pathologies 
with any certainty? Equally, what is meant by ‘recognition’? Perhaps both ‘social pathology’ and 
‘recognition’ share some foundational theoretical assumptions or insights, therefore their 
increasing fusion in the literature is not merely contingent and undesirable, but positive and/or 
inevitable? How is Honneth’s approach to recognition distinct from the understandings of 
recognition which preceded it? 
This chapter engages with these questions by outlining the distinct historical development of 
social pathology diagnosis and recognition. The central argument flowing through this chapter 
is that recognition and social pathology offer fundamentally divergent approaches to study the 
social world: they help develop different knowledge interests and have distinct philosophical 
and social-theoretical foundations.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. First, by drawing on Honneth (2000, 2004a, 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c, 2014a inter alia) and Neuhouser (2012), I argue for the distinctive importance of 
social pathology diagnosing critique for Critical Theory. This section outlines the development 
of social pathology scholarship from its ancient origins in Plato to Honneth’s contemporary 
analyses, and demonstrates the complex tapestry of ideas that converged in its Critical 
Theoretical genealogy (Honneth, 2007a). I then engage with concerns stemming from the 
biological language and framing of ‘pathology’, and the philosophical question of how one can 
conduct such explicitly normative critique in today’s conditions of normative crisis (Honneth, 
2004a, 2007b). Through outlining the incidental nature of the medicalised language, and the 
theoretical potency and philosophical justifiability of the approach, this section seeks to justify 
my investment in social pathology diagnosing critique.  
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The second section focuses on recognition. Through charting the development of recognition 
as a social-theoretical construct, I outline its distinctive features and further differentiate the 
framing from social pathology diagnosing critique. I argue that while recognition has proved of 
tremendous import to social theory for centuries, recent developments have led to a radical 
reimagining of the framework. Through outlining the distinctive development of Honneth’s 
Critical Theory of Recognition, the final part of this section argues that while Honneth has 
reoriented both recognition and Critical Theory, ‘recognition’ remains an entirely distinct 
framework to social pathology. The origins of Honneth’s recognition approach are presented, 
serving as an introduction to his importance for this project more broadly.   
This first chapter thus lays the necessary foundations for my core submission. As stated in 
my introduction, this thesis marks a distinctly critical engagement with Honnethian recognition-
derived approaches to social pathology scholarship (how he ‘does’ social pathology diagnosis). 
Yet, equally, I draw heavily upon Honneth’s analysis of the social pathology tradition (how 
Honneth ‘gets’ the importance of social pathology). This contradictory relationship with 
Honneth’s work continues throughout the project.  
 
Pathology diagnosis: the history and utility of a central resource for Critical Theory  
Critical Theory and the Syncretic Nature of Social Pathology Diagnosis 
Whitehead famously declared that Western philosophy8 ‘consists of a series of footnotes to 
Plato’ (Whitehead, 1979: 39). It should thus perhaps come as little surprise then, that the first 
engagement with a framing of societal malfunctioning, or societal illness, can be found in The 
Republic (Plato, 2008: 369a-372d). During Socrates’9 discussion of the ‘City of Pigs’, the 
hypostatized pastoral idyll of a city, Socrates warns that the ‘polis’ can enter a ‘fevered state’ 
when ‘unnatural desires’ for luxury goods come to dominate (Plato, 2008: 369a-372d). Such 
problematic luxury is presented as a harmful deviation from the pastoral; typified by the 
excessive consumption of alcohol, or of fatty sauces (Plato, 2008: 372c). It is a little unclear 
whether the prevalence of these ‘unnatural desires’ constitutes a ‘fever’ in itself, or if the 
distinctly ‘fevered’ quality arises only when a particular dynamic is precipitated. Wealth is sought 
                                                          
8 Of course, there are many discussions on topics similar to ‘social pathology’ in non-Western social-theory and 
social-philosophy. Consider, for instance, Jiddu Krishnamurti’s (2008) work on the question of adjustment to 
alienating social norms. The core message Krishnamurti offered to his followers was ‘it is no measure of health to 
adjust oneself to an unwell society’, this sounds remarkably similar to Fromm’s engagement with social pathology. 
However, due to my investment in the Critical Theoretical tradition, combined with the restrictive nature of a 
doctoral thesis, these approaches will have to wait for a future project.  
9 As ever, it is unclear to what extent Socrates functions as a ‘mouth-piece’ for Plato, or whether this is an accurate 
representation of Socrates’ own position (Cohn, 2001).  
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to determine one’s status, yet such status determination can occur only relationally (Plato, 2008: 
373a). Thus the ‘fevered’ society exhibits the following dynamic of negative infinity: ever greater 
luxury is sought to show a relationally higher standing, leading to an insatiable acquisitive drive. 
This dynamic has no determinable end, and risks exhausting all social resources. For Plato, it 
appears to be society itself that is ‘fevered’ (Plato, 2008: 373a). In the spirit of Whitehead’s 
axiom, Neuhouser has connected Plato’s discussion of fevered societies to Rousseau’s analysis 
of ‘amour-propre’ two millennia later (Neuhouser, 2012). For Neuhouser, the focus on negative 
dynamics remains crucially important to ideas of social pathology diagnosis today (Neuhouser, 
2012: 631). Plato marks an early contribution to a distinct species of social criticism that utilises 
the language, and structure, of the diagnosis of societal illnesses, and attendant impaired 
functionality.    
Following his tutor’s lead, Aristotle’s Politics utilises similar framings. Commentators have 
suggested that Politics can be read as a diagnosis of ‘political pathology’ (Tracy, 1969: 304). 
Aristotle’s use of the norm of health when determining the ‘proportionate blend’ of the ‘mixed 
constitution’ continues this approach, but in a subtly different vein (Aristotle, 2009: 1302b33-
1303a3). As with Plato, it is society itself that can exhibit ‘pathologies’, not (necessarily) the 
social subjects. Society is again discussed, albeit analogously, as a corporeal meta-subject, 
presaging the weak social organicism of the Frankfurt School tradition (Strydom, 2011). From 
Plato to Aristotle, to the Scholasticism that gripped Europe, social criticism has a long tradition 
of turning to the language of the bodily to critique impaired social functioning (Nájera, 2017). In 
his extensive discussions on social pathology diagnosis, Honneth charts a similar genesis 
(Honneth, 2007c). In continuing accord with Honneth, I contend that despite its millennia of 
history, the pathology diagnosing approach only attained maturity with the writings of Rousseau 
in the eighteenth century (Honneth, 2007c: 5). 
The scholarly orthodoxy is to pose a division in Rousseau’s works between efforts to diagnose 
social pathologies and attempted remedies (Wokler, 2001; Chapter Four). The Discourse on 
Political Economy, the Discourse on the Arts and the Sciences (‘The First Discourse’), and the 
Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (‘The Second Discourse’), are often read as the ‘diagnosis’, 
while The Social Contract and Emile are often presented as the ‘cure’. It is with the Discourses 
that the tradition of social pathology diagnosing critique developed in earnest. For Honneth, 
Rousseau’s polemical social critique is significant for it represented a rejection ‘of an entire form 
of life’ (Honneth, 2007c: 7), rather than a ‘mere investigation of …  political-moral legitimacy 
(Honneth, 2007c: 10). The focus of Rousseau’s investigation was ‘the structural limitations … 
(society) imposes on the goal of human self-realization’ (Honneth, 2007c: 10), an examination 
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of the obstacles to subjects attaining the good life. It is this change in focus, a move away from 
analyses of injustice or illegitimacy, and towards an analysis of the societal flaws preventing 
subjects achieving self-realization, which marks the true maturation of social pathology 
diagnosing critique as a form of social criticism sui generis.  
It is perhaps the ‘Second Discourse’ which reads most evidently as a critique of the 
development of modern civilisation. Here, the citoyen de Geneve iconoclastically declares that 
man is ‘naturally good’ (Rousseau, 1984: 147), yet ‘the extreme inequalities of our ways of life’ 
make us ‘wretched’ (Rousseau, 1984: 84). There is nothing natural to:  
The excess of idleness among some and the excess of toil among others, the ease of stimulating and 
gratifying our appetites and our senses, the over-elaborate foods of the rich, which inflame and 
overwhelm them with indigestion, the bad food of the poor, which they often go without altogether, 
so that they over-eat greedily when they have the opportunity; those late nights, excesses of all kinds, 
immoderate transports of every passion, fatigue, exhaustion of mind, the innumerable sorrows and 
anxieties that people in all classes suffer, and by which the human soul is constantly tormented: these 
are the fatal proofs that most of our ills are of our own making, and that we might have avoided nearly 
all of them if we had adhered to the simple, unchanging and solitary way of life that nature ordained 
for us (Rousseau, 1984: 84-85). 
Rousseau argued that ‘vanity and scorn’ (Rousseau, 1984: 114) were the hallmarks of civilisation. 
Such vices are presented as anathema to ‘natural man’, who lived in a ‘golden mean’ ‘between 
the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our own pride’ (Rousseau, 1984: 
115). Rousseau’s philosophy represents a critique of foundational social developments which 
inhibit the capacity of man to achieve a good and happy life. For Neuhouser, it is the profundity 
of this critique, the depth of the deviation from the social conditions necessary for subjects’ self-
actualisation, that makes Rousseau the social pathologist par excellence (Neuhouser, 2012).  
With Rousseau, social pathology diagnosis developed into a critique of the direction society 
had taken in its entirety, directly confronting a world where man was ‘born free, yet everywhere 
he is in chains’ (Rousseau, 1968: 49). For Rousseau such a society was making man both 
physically ill and chronically restricting his capacity for self-realisation. In one intriguing passage 
Rousseau comments, ‘we could write the history of human illness by following the history of 
civilized societies’ (Rousseau, 1984: 85); yet, this fascinating contention aside, Rousseau’s 
diagnosis is of wretchedness more than biological ill health. Rousseau perhaps marks the zenith 
of pathology diagnosing social critique which submits that society itself may be suffering from 
its own faults and flaws, and that its sub-optimal functioning inhibits the capacity of its members 
to attain self-realisation.  
With the Frankfurt School, social pathology diagnosis came to bridge the diagnostic 
endeavour of Rousseau, introduced above, with a species of critique developed by Hegel. Hegel 
brought forward a radicalisation of the critique of reason (Marcuse, 1969); framing rationality 
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both as a social product, and as a metaphysical layer of the socio-political (Dahbour, 2017: 87-
108). Reason for Hegel, in Marcuse’s words, was more ‘task’ and less ‘fact’ (Marcuse, 1969). This 
radicalisation of the critique of reason remains a crucial aspect of Critical Theory (Held, 2013). 
As Honneth submits, ‘that social pathologies are to be understood as a result of deficient 
rationality is ultimately indebted to the political philosophy of Hegel’ (Honneth, 2004a: 341). For 
the first generation of Frankfurt School scholars, it was the Hegelian framing of ‘historically 
effective reason’ that centred their Critical Theory (Honneth, 2004a). Crudely summarising 
Hegel’s sophisticated socio-political philosophy, one can say: it is only when society lives up to 
the highest standard of reason that it is capable of maintaining that social subjects will live good 
and happy lives. Thus, left-Hegelians broadly strive for a ‘rational’ society, critiquing the aspects 
of social life which fail to live up to the highest possible existing standard of reason (Marcuse, 
1969). The species of pathology diagnosing critique adopted by Critical Theory imbibes Hegel’s 
critique of reason, adding an essential second lens to its optics. One can already see how social 
pathology diagnosis presents as a multi-layered theoretical endeavour: building on the 
Rousseauian diagnosis of society as inhibiting the capacity of subjects to achieve self-realisation, 
with the Hegelian critique of societal irrationality. The social institutions and processes that 
inhibit self-realisation are thus framed as evincing deficient social rationality. Rationality is 
manifest, and perpetuated, both socially, and in cognitive form: in the subjects themselves. 
Thus, the Critical Theoretical diagnosis of social pathologies focuses on both the social 
institutions themselves, and the ideological artifice that maintains them through the cognitive 
impairments induced in the social subjects (Strydom, 2011; Held, 2013). 
Following Hegel, left-Hegelian thought centres a similar critique of rationality. As Honneth 
contends, in their various formulations, left-Hegelians submit that ‘a rational universal is always 
required for the possibility of fulfilled self-realization within society’ (Honneth, 2004a: 341). The 
‘rational universal’ refers to the idea expressed above, that the highest possible standard of 
socially existing reason needs to be operative throughout the contours of social life. Within 
varying objects of critique: the market, the family etc, the desire for a ‘rational praxis’ (this 
optimal rationality manifesting in the social world) remains a constant. For Marx, for instance, 
the ‘social pathology’ is that ‘the actual organisation of society …. [falls] short of the standards 
of rationality that are already embedded in the forces of production’ (Honneth, 2004a: 340). 
Synthesising Rousseau’s understanding of pathology diagnosis with Hegel’s, one can read (with 
crude simplification) the central Marxist critique, as a species of pathology diagnosis thus: the 
actual organisation of society, in the capitalist political economy, does not live up to the highest 
standards of rationality that already exist, this sub-optimal social functioning prevents social 
19 
 
subjects from attaining the good life. A more rational, post-capitalist society lies latent within 
the irrational present.10  
Another layer of analysis is added with the incorporation of the psychoanalytic dimension to 
social pathology diagnosis. Freud, and the lesser known Mitscherlich, both mark important 
developments to pathology diagnosing critique (Honneth, 2014a). Freud (1953) analysed the 
explicitly ‘social neuroses’, these repressive social dynamics that produce anxious and neurotic 
subjects. Freud depicts society, as a meta-subject, suffering from ‘neuroses’; thus, producing 
unwell citizens. That society can be structured in such a way to create neurotic subjects adds an 
additional psychoanalytic layer to the pathology diagnosing endeavour. When society 
‘habituate(s) … situations and conditions of satisfaction that are not normal’, the ‘most obvious 
outcome is nervous illness’ (Freud, 1959: 201-2). It is worth stressing that for Freud, with a clear 
implicit ontological assumption about the social body: both society and the social subjects are 
unwell.11 In many ways this style of social pathology diagnosis overlaps with Rousseau’s: social 
actors are suffering because society is constructed in ways that oppose the subjects achieving 
self-actualisation. Learning from Freud and Mitscherlich, Critical Theorists incorporated an 
analysis of how the distorted social rationality impacts subjects at a psychoanalytic register. 
One important aspect of both the Freudian and Mitscherlichian approach is that the suffering 
of society’s members, as a result of the deformed state is reason, is framed medically, and 
restricted to the clinically unwell. Rather than the ‘chained’ and ‘wretched’ (Rousseau, 1968) of 
Rousseau, it is a discussion of the ‘neurotic’ and ‘ill’ (Freud, 1959) for Freud and Mitscherlich. It 
should be noted that while Critical Theory draws extensively on psychoanalysis to diagnose 
societal irrationalities, it does not follow the contention that a social pathology requires 
medically ‘ill’ subjects (Honneth, 2014a: 698). Rather, drawing from Freud, Critical Theorists 
‘establish a connection between defective rationality and individual suffering’ at a psychological 
level (Honneth, 2007c: 38) and are thus able to immanently ground their critique of reason. 
Deficient social rationality is experienced in psychic suffering in the social subject through 
neuroses and alienation more broadly, not merely through clinical diagnosis. Thus, Critical 
Theorists do not seek to connect manifest social irrationalities to symptoms present within the 
DSM (for example): the connection to the immanent is more holistic.   
                                                          
10 Benjamin is distinct amongst Critical Theorists in viewing the latency of the more rational future to be most 
accessible through a speculative cultural history, yet even his account retains the core idea that the possibilities for 
a better future remain dormant and extant, even if it kept alive through the memory of the past resonating in the 
cultural present (Caygill, 2004).   
11 One can read the ‘strong naturalism’ of this account being distinct from the ‘weak naturalism’ of Critical Theory 
more broadly (Strydom, 2011).   
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With origins in The Republic, reaching maturity with Rousseau, adding essential timbre with 
Hegel’s critique of historically effective reason, and drawing on the insights of psychoanalysis, 
the diagnosis of social pathologies became ‘the distinctive theoretical resource of Critical 
Theory’ (Freyenhagen, 2015: 131). Drawing strongly on its left-Hegelian roots, it was the 
diagnosis of the pathological deviation of rationality under capitalism that gave Critical Theory 
its ‘explosive charge’ (Honneth, 2004a: 338). As framed in my introduction, Critical Theory 
engaged these irrationalities through a consciously interdisciplinary project; drawing upon the 
methodologies of political-economy, psychoanalysis, psychology, philosophy and legal theory 
(Held, 2013; Jeffries, 2017).  
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) has been presented as the 
diagnosis of social pathology par excellence (Honneth, 2000). In this text, Adorno and 
Horkheimer obliquely disclose how a species of reason, instrumental rationality, has come to 
dominate human thought, with devastating effects (Roberts, 2004). Their highly idiosyncratic 
work is read by Honneth as a presentation that the existing ‘social circumstances violates those 
conditions which constitute a necessary presupposition for a good life amongst us’ (Honneth, 
2000: 122). In Dialectic of Enlightenment the social pathology is primarily one of a deformed 
rationality which has developed an ‘extraordinary sweep’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 61), 
through which subjects fail to grasp the particularities of the life-world, instead perceiving ‘the 
particular only as one case of the general’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 84-5). This 
foundational epistemic corruption is considered a crucial antecedent for the ‘new kind(s) of 
barbarism’ of late capitalism (Adorno and Horkheimer: xi). Dialectic of Enlightenment is a highly 
idiosyncratic text, and the presentation and structure of the work makes engagement 
challenging. However, the authors’ ambition to disclose the incompatibility of unalienated, 
meaningful existence, with an instrumental rationality run amok, remains central.  
While Dialectic of Enlightenment constitutes a diagnosis of social pathology at a 
macrocosmic, epistemic, foundational level; works of Critical Theory have tended to represent 
a targeted engagement with instantiations of social irrationality. As stated, Critical Theory 
utilises a spectrum of disciplines to engage with the social (Held, 2013), and thus the framing of 
social pathology diagnosis has been adapted for divergent (inter-)disciplinary parameters.  
The work of psychologist and psychoanalyst, Erich Fromm, for instance, represents a 
sustained engagement with social pathology drawing upon Marx and Freud (see Chapter Six). In 
an analysis which flows between texts, Fromm (1951) articulates the ‘pathology of normalcy’, 
how the inadequacies and irrationalities of the capitalist societies are perpetuated through their 
acceptance as ‘normality’ (Fromm, 2010). In The Sane Society (1963), Fromm epitomises how 
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the pathology framing has been used to engage with both problematically irrational social 
arrangements (in the objective, manifest social world) and the ideological or cognitive 
impairments which inhibit social subjects from emancipation, and which impede progressive 
political praxis.  
Similarly, the economist and political scientist, Friedrich Pollock (1928) articulates the 
irrationalities present in state-capitalist political-economies. Nancy Fraser’s engagement with 
critical political economy continues this tradition today (Fraser and Jaeggi, 2018). The 
relationship between pathology diagnosis and negative dynamics in the work of both Pollock 
and Fraser returns my discussion to the earliest framing of social pathology as found in The 
Republic. Neuhouser’s intellectual history has charted the diagnosis of social pathologies within 
the economic organisation of society back to Rousseau’s Discourse on Political Economy and 
explores five distinct manifestations of the heuristic within that sole work (Neuhouser, 2012). 
Bonefeld’s Critical Theory and the Critique of Political Economy (2014) offers yet another recent 
substantial Critical Theoretical engagement with political economy and social pathology. 
Bonefeld’s more distanced relationship to the critique of pathologies of reason adds further 
nuance and timbre to pathology diagnosing critique. 
The diagnosis of social pathologies is thus a Critical Theoretical constant; even within works 
that do not explicitly utilise pathology diagnosis as their central analytical resource. Marcuse, 
for instance, speaks of the ‘pathological deformation’ of the personality in One Dimensional Man 
(1964), while Habermas’ Reflections on Communicative Pathology (2001) identifies the 
pathological deformations of the communicative realm. Neumann details the pathological 
anxieties arising from the atomistic foundations of ‘democratic will formation’ (Honneth, 2003). 
Even Adorno’s Minima Moralia (1951), a work oft-cited as more poetic lament than social theory 
(van den Brink, 1997), retains the social pathology diagnosing rubric upon closer analysis 
(Honneth, 2004a). In a telling passage Adorno (1978) explicitly links the various facets of 
damaged life to the loss of a good universal, and thus fundamentally connects his analysis to the 
limitations precipitated by deficiencies in the historically existing societal rationality. It is as if 
Critical Theorists are unable to help themselves from diagnosing social pathologies: there is a 
driving force within the research project which pushes its practitioners to attempt to capture 
the essence of the social malady, to seek out the core contradictions of the social conjecture. It 
thus seems entirely justified to argue that an engagement with social pathology has been a 
constant thread throughout the Critical Theory tradition and one which can be charted in the 
key canonical literature which social theoretically and philosophically informs the project 
(Honneth, 2007c).  
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This first section has charted the development of a distinct species of critique: social 
pathology diagnosis. It has tracked the framing’s origins in Ancient philosophy, articulated the 
importance of Rousseau (see Chapter Four), Hegel (see Chapter Five) and Fromm (see Chapter 
Six), and discussed the centrality of the approach to first, second and third generation Frankfurt 
School Critical Theorists. This engagement has demonstrated the prevalence of the diagnosis of 
social pathologies over time ‘as an alternative to the mainstream liberal’ mode of critique 
(Freyenhagen, 2015: 131) and has outlined the complexity of its development. I have presented 
social pathology diagnosis as a valuable tool for analysing deformations in socially effective 
reason, and the precipitant impact on the capacity of subjects to attain self-realisation. This 
analysis has shown how pathology diagnosis today draws on a multiplicity of theorists, traditions 
and disciplines, including Rousseau (Chapter Four), Hegel (Chapter Five) and Fromm (Chapter 
Six).  
 
Social Pathology Diagnosis: A social-theoretically and philosophically justifiable framework for 
social critique 
Having established that the diagnosis of social pathologies represents the ‘distinctive resource’ 
(Freyenhagen, 2015; 131) of Critical Theory; I now subject the approach to detailed scrutiny. I 
start by problematising the strong naturalistic (or ‘organismic’) conception of society, which, 
prima facie, appears necessary for the diagnosis of such pathologies.12 This discussion leads into 
questions of social functioning and the problems of philosophically justifying a species of critique 
built on an apparently partisan, and teleological understanding of society. Drawing on Honneth 
(2000, 2004a, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2014a inter alia) and Neuhouser (2012), I contend that these 
challenges can be sufficiently addressed. Further, I argue that the optic of pathology diagnosis 
enables a crucial, ‘thicker’ species of social critique. I argue that through the exposition and 
analysis of socially defective reason, made possible through pathology diagnosing critique, 
‘forms of life’ can be critically appraised. Social pathology diagnosis is thus positioned as an 
essential prerequisite for Critical Theory’s ‘deeper’ engagement with the social.  
 
On the signifier ‘pathology’ and the ontology of the signified 
It is worth engaging directly with both the language and the idea of a biologically ‘unhealthy’ 
society. As discussed, Plato, Rousseau and Freud all expressly speak of society itself as ‘fevered’ 
                                                          
12 As stated in my introduction, there is an interesting and growing philosophical literature on these concerns, 
however, due to the social-theoretical nature of this project, and limitations in space, I am unable to delve too far 
into these debates here.  
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or ‘neurotic’. One might thus suspect that social pathology diagnosis necessitates a strong, 
exaggerated naturalism, presenting society as a living entity that can be studied and ‘diagnosed’ 
using the tools of the natural sciences. Following MacLay (1990), it might be submitted that 
social pathology diagnosis is based on a strong ‘socially organismic’ understanding. Such 
organicism attracts substantial criticism (Struve, 1978). Arguably it is a product of too ‘fantastic 
an imagination’; representing an implicit ontological statement that cannot be justified 
philosophically (McGee, 1991). Such critiques contend that society plainly is ‘not alive’ as 
understood biologically; society simply is not ‘an organism’ in any meaningful way. Further, even 
if a philosophical justification could be found for comprehending society organismically, this 
would merely precipitate further serious, potentially irredeemable, complications. The 
‘organism’ presented by society would be so wildly divergent to all organisms hitherto studied 
that it would require the creation of unique, and inevitably political, instruments of analysis.  
Critics have further contended that the framing of ‘objective biological illness’ is both 
politically dangerous and academically anachronistic (Honneth, 2014a: 684). Discussions of 
‘degenerate societies’, and ‘healthier societies’, have a sinister, and well charted history, for 
both the political right and left; sharing the semantic field of fascism, ethnic cleansing, and 
eugenics (Sewell, 2009). Further, following Foucault’s (1963) The Birth of the Clinic, ‘illness’ and 
‘health’ are now often understood as social constructs, created discursively, rather than bearing 
any unmediated relation to objective biological impairment (Foucault, 1963). For Foucault, the 
discourse of ‘pathology’ is utilised to bring forth subjectivities for ‘disciplining’ (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1982: 173). In such an understanding, the language of ‘the pathological’, ‘the sick’ and 
‘the deviant’, refers to discursively constructed categorisations, utilised to legitimate 
governmentality rather than to further emancipation (Foucault, 1963). The very idea that 
biologically framed social illness should function as an objective referent for social criticism thus 
appears academically destabilised and politically untenable.  
Various rejoinders can be rallied. First, a distinction needs to be drawn between thinkers who 
explicitly embrace a strong naturalist ontology, and those who merely utilise the pathology 
framings for its explanatory utility while retaining a fidelity to the weak naturalism common to 
Critical Theory (Strydom, 2011; Honneth, 2014a). An obvious difference exists between arguing 
society is, ontologically, a living organism, and simply utilising such an organismic framing 
analogously to further one’s argument (MacLay, 1990). The pathology diagnosing tradition has 
traditionally been read as reflecting the ‘weak naturalism’ of Critical Theory (Strydom, 2011: 10). 
I thus contend the species of pathology diagnosing critique deployed by Critical Theory is not 
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essentially predicated on a ‘strong’ organismic understanding of the social. Rather, the inference 
is that, 
there is a continuity between nature and the socio-cultural form of life … [a] relation …. [which] is not 
[to be] interpreted in a strong determinate sense which could lead to an epistemological reduction of 
society to nature (Strydom, 2011: 10).  
Alternative arguments could also be submitted which negate the commitment to a weak 
naturalistic understanding of the social. As presented here, the core submission of a diagnosis 
of social pathology is that society is failing to function at its optimum capacity. There is no 
essential naturalism to the notion of functionality: one can speak of a functional helicopter as 
much as a functioning liver. From such a position one could argue that the usage of the biological 
analogy is just that, an analogy, and an alternate lexical framing, could, and quite possibly, 
should, be utilised; both to displace unhelpful incidental ontological critiques and to negate 
concerns over the language of ‘pathology’. Indeed, it is undeniable that the lexicon of ‘illness’ 
brings with it political and academic complications. A more prudent framing would perhaps be 
to discard the language of ‘pathology’ and ‘diagnosis’ altogether, and instead utilise the explicit 
terminology of ‘functionality’ and ‘impaired functionality’. The alternate analogy of a machine, 
impaired in its workings, could have similar utility, while avoiding some of the political 
complications with the analogy of illness.  
The first rejoinder sought to embrace the language of the natural while rejecting the 
‘epistemological reduction of society to nature’ (Strydom, 2011: 10). The second rejoinder 
claims that the language of the ‘natural’ and thereby of ‘pathology’ is merely incidental.   
The second response, that the language of biological illness could, and arguably should, be 
rejected, and replaced with the language of ‘impaired functionality’, would fail to appease the 
challenges brought forth from a Foucauldian paradigm. The shift from ‘illness’ to ‘impaired 
functionality’, utilising a new mechanical analogy, could be understood as mere ‘New Speak’. 
The state would simply bring forth subjectivities that could be ‘legitimately disciplined’ along 
these new terms of ‘impaired functionality’. My second rejoinder is that Foucault’s critique is of 
the impact of ‘illness’ and other such discursive markers on subjects (Foucault, 2003: especially 
Chapter Two). Social pathology diagnosis works at a different register, analysing society itself, 
as a totality. The ‘diagnoses’ and ‘pathologies’ of the social, articulated by Critical Theorists, refer 
to a ‘form of life’ (Honneth, 2000: 119; Jaeggi, 2018) and do not mark an engagement with 
subjects either as individuals, or as collective groups. The object of analysis is the social meta-
subject. The framings of illness at this register cannot (at least in any proximate, immediate 
manner) legitimate the state’s disciplining of subjects; indeed, often, in Critical Theoretical 
analysis, the state itself is the object of critique (Pollock, 1941, inter alia). 
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In response to the critiques that social pathology diagnosis has unavoidable foundations in 
social organicism, and brings forth a politically, and academically unsound framing of the social, 
multiple rejoinders have been offered (Honneth, 2004a). One can embrace a weak naturalism 
which has traditionally been the approach favoured by Critical Theorists (Strydom, 2011), yet 
other alternatives are equally justifiable. Social pathology diagnosis can be understood as 
making purely analogous use of the biological, rather than necessitating any strong ontological 
submission. The biological referent and language of social pathology is thus understood as 
merely incidental; indeed, shifting to the lexicon of mechanics might be pragmatic transition. In 
response to the Foucauldian caution against the lexicon of ‘illness’ and ‘diagnosis’, one can 
respond that social pathology diagnoses operates at a ‘higher’ register; focusing not on social 
subjects, but the entire subject of the social. Critical Theorists do not diagnose subjects as 
pathological; rather the diagnosis is of social dynamics and modalities more generally as evincing 
(a) defective form(s) of reason.  
 
Normative Challenges  
Even if one accepts that the signifier ‘social pathology’ is incidental, signifying the theorists’ 
investment in ‘deeper’ problems of societal ‘irrationality’ or ‘impeded functioning’, various 
social-theoretical and philosophical questions arise. Does society even have a function or a 
deeper rationality? If so, how might theorists determine what it is? And how can social theorists 
justifiably talk of ‘impaired social functioning’ or ‘societal irrationality’ while these fundamental 
questions remain contested? Perhaps, most significantly, why would such a species of critique 
be of use? How would such a critique of ‘social irrationality’ or impeded functionality extend the 
tried and tested liberal framings of justice and legitimacy? Because first-generation Critical 
Theorists wrote before the post-structuralist and post-modernist assault on normativity they did 
not engage with such concerns (at least not explicitly, or in the same language). While there is 
no space in this project to engage with these topics in the detail required to do them justice, an 
abridged attempt follows below.  
It might be submitted that any suggested societal ‘function’ or ‘rational organisation’ would 
necessarily be based on a partisan, teleological, understanding of society, which today seems, 
prima facie, normatively unjustifiable. Logically, it is impossible to diagnose society as 
‘irrational’, ‘non-functional’, or ‘impaired’ in its functioning, without some referent to society’s 
‘function’ or transcendent sense of ‘rationality’. Agreement about ‘rationality’ or ‘functionality’ 
thus appears to be imperative for this species of critique to be meaningful. While there remains 
no consensus on the conditions of an ideally rational or functional society, how can social 
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theorists engage in such critique in a justifiable manner? With the ascent of post-modern and 
post-structuralist thought, variations on this normative concern have been challenging Critical 
Theory, and sociological theory more broadly, for the last forty years (Honneth, 2004a, 2014a).  
Honneth (2000, 2004a, 2014a) has written extensively on the normative challenges posed to 
social theory and marks the most pronounced engagement with their implications for social 
pathology diagnosis. While acknowledging the severity of the normative challenge, Honneth 
does not attempt to produce a theoretical panacea. Instead, Honneth advances a working patch, 
of a ‘weak formal anthropology’, as a foundation for pathology diagnosing social critique 
(Honneth, 2007a). By turning to the foundational, anthropological needs of the human animal, 
Honneth submits that the social theorist can justifiably engage in discussion on ‘formal 
conceptions of ethical life’ (Honneth, 1995: 171-9). If one is ‘sufficiently abstract’ (Honneth, 
2005: 174), the charge of partisanship, of ‘embodying particular visions of the good life’ will be 
unsustainable (Honneth, 1995: 174). The normative questions are neither ‘solved’ nor ‘negated’. 
Instead, this weaker, formalistic understanding of the social enables discussion to take place 
with minimal norm-enshrining, and norm-dependant content. One can read Honneth’s weak 
formal anthropology functioning as a meta-theoretical ‘patch’; in this light he does not seek to 
solve the normative challenge; instead, he seeks to facilitate the conditions in which social 
theory can continue while such fundamental questions are further problematised.  
Neuhouser offers a radically different response to the ‘philosophical questions’ that plague 
attempts at ‘ascribing ends to social practices and institutions’ (Neuhouser, 2012: 628-632). In 
contrast to Honneth, Neuhouser submits such squeamishness to ethical partisanship merely 
demarcates the perimeters of liberal thought (Neuhouser, 2012). In Neuhouser’s work the 
reality of an ethical component to social critique is neither counter-productive nor 
philosophically problematic: it is merely seen an accepted facet of non-liberal social theory and 
social philosophy (Neuhouser, 2012). This embrace of ethical postulates is based on Neuhouser’s 
submission that some commitment to ‘conceptions of the good, or of human flourishing’ is 
essential for critical thought that is ‘thicker’ than the limiting confines of ‘liberal theories of 
justice’ (Neuhouser, 2012: 628-632). For Neuhouser, there is no aporia here: 
A social theory that takes the idea of social pathology theory (seriously) rests implicitly on a vision of 
social reality according to which the social, as distinct from the merely political, cannot be adequately 
grasped or evaluated without attributing ends to social practices and institutions that are in a broad 
sense ethical (in the sense of being bound up with ideas of the good life or human flourishing)’ 
(Neuhouser, 2012: 630). 
For Neuhouser this is no cause for alarm; he considers the ethical embrace 
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 to be not a defect of the theoretical approach I am trying to articulate but a necessary consequence 
of the fact that what it takes as its object is social reality, not merely the political realm (Neuhouser, 
2012: 630). 
In Neuhouser’s framing the appeal to social functionality is simply a reality of ‘thick’ social 
criticism and a result of the complexities of the social world. When one moves beyond the 
confines of liberal thought an imbrication in ethical postulates is inevitable, and reflects the 
complexities of the social, rather than a limitation of the approach to critique. 
When one holds Honneth’s and Neuhouser’s submissions in tandem, a satisfactory rebuttal 
to the ethical challenge can easily be rallied. A critique of the social as ‘irrational’, or ‘functionally 
impaired’, can be justifiably built on a thin, formal anthropology. If this fails to appease the 
normative challenge, one could offer Neuhouser’s rebuttal: ‘thick’ social criticism is based on 
the (partisan) attribution of ends to social practices.  This is an existential reality of ‘thick’ social 
philosophy and is foundational for a deeper engagement with the social realm. Critical Theorists 
have long been aware of this fact. As stated in the introduction, Horkheimer’s (1975) signal 
essay, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, excoriated the ‘savants’ of traditional theory, those who 
sought to engage in social and political theory without any partisan investment. Resultantly, 
Critical Theorists, while diagnosing social pathologies, have done so with a consideration of their 
‘cultural locatedness’ and with an explicit awareness of their commitment to political praxis 
(Bronner, 2011).  
Beyond Neuhouser and Honneth, my preferred rebuttal to such challenges would be to 
return to the approach championed by first generation Critical Theorists, that of immanent-
transcendence (Delanty, 2011). While there may be no accord on the good life or what 
constitutes a functional, or an optimally rational society, through a turn to an immanent-
transcendent approach, the theorist may still identify the objective contradictions which exist 
within the social world. With a ‘sufficiently dialectical’ analysis of said contradictions (Strydom, 
2018), in this instance the pathological irrationalities of the social, the theorist can adopt a form 
of critique which remains sensitive to the disputed nature of social life, while drawing out the 
objective contradictions of the present, and, through doing so, point towards a more rational 
future (Chapter Six).     
If one accepts the above analyses, the diagnosis of social pathologies, as practised by Critical 
Theorists, is neither blighted by an unjustifiably strong naturalist ontology, nor destabilised by 
ethical partisanship. I thus argue that social pathology diagnosing critique offers a social-
theoretically and philosophically sound approach to conducting deeper, more foundational 
social critique beyond the confines of liberal social and political theory.  
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The Distinctive Utility of Pathology Diagnosing Critique 
Diagnosing a social pathology, stating that society is ‘sick’, and therefore ‘irrational’ or ‘non-
functional’, is a declaration of something more fundamental than a social injustice. Neuhouser 
frames this eloquently: 
First, saying that a society is sick involves more than saying that it is unjust. It is not that the category 
of injustice is always irrelevant to diagnoses of social pathology but rather that, even when 
considerations of justice are relevant, calling a pathology ‘injustice’ under-describes it. Consider the 
example of global warming. It would not be unreasonable to regard global warming caused by human 
activity as an instance of injustice (injustice to future generations, perhaps, or as an injustice on the 
part of those who profit from the phenomenon to those who merely suffer from it.) It would, however, 
be a mistake to regard this as an exhaustive description of the problem. This is even more plausible in 
the case of unsustainably low birth rates, where it is harder to see the problem as one of injustice to 
future generations since the very problem is that those generations are not going to exist in the first 
place (Neuhouser, 2012: 629 – my bold). 
 
A diagnosis of social pathology can thus penetrate to core concerns driving social reproduction 
and submit that something has gone ‘gravely awry’ with the dominant form of life itself 
(Neuhouser, 2012: 631). Pathology diagnosing social critique is thus more potent than 
traditional liberal theory. With the case of global warming, the pathology serves to ‘thwart 
fundamental human end(s)’ that are ‘deriving from our nature as biological beings’ (Neuhouser, 
2012: 631). Liberal critiques of injustice crucially lack the purchase, or even the knowledge 
interest, to engage at this level of analysis. This is perhaps the most intense benefit of adopting 
a social pathology approach to social critique, it enables the social theorist to ask these deeper, 
more foundational questions about the social world. Pushing this further, Honneth writes that 
the diagnoses of social pathology marks ‘an instance of reflection … within which measures for 
successful forms of social life are discussed’ (Honneth, 2007c: 4) and, a moment where we focus 
‘on the appropriateness of our way of life’ (Honneth, 2000: 122).  
The diagnosis of social pathologies is unique in that it offers Critical Theorists a framework 
through which both the successfulness and the appropriateness of our ways of life can be 
assessed, while simultaneously providing a means of engaging with the obstacles to our sound 
understanding of these problems (Honneth, 2000). To engage with the totality of the social as a 
system, with its distinct dynamics and modalities, it is essential for the theorist to be able to step 
back and make such an assessment. The diagnosis of social pathologies is the critical tool that 
enables such a moment of critical reflection (Honneth, 2000, 2007c).  
While Critical Theorists utilise multiple and interlocking disciplines for research, drawing from 
psychoanalysis, philosophy, social theory, law, politics, geography and psychology, the diagnosis 
of social pathologies has additional import for Critical Theory as it marks the commonality of the 
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research programme tout court (Honneth, 2004). Fromm’s psychoanalysis, as much as Fraser’s 
political economy, or Adorno’s philosophy, can be grasped, and comprehended, as co-
dependent contributions to the project of diagnosing the pathologies of the social. The Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, as much as The Sane Society, can thus be held as efforts constructed under a 
shared horizon. As Honneth (2004a) submits, Critical Theory marks multiple, distinct 
engagements with the social, that yet all share a foundational basis in the critique of pathologies 
of the deformed reason of capitalist society.  
For Honneth, 
Critical Theorists … perceive capitalism as a social form of organization in which practices and ways of 
thinking prevail that prevent the social utilization of a rationality already made possible by history’ 
(Honneth, 2004a: 351). 
 It is through the diagnosis and analysis of such restrictive processes and modes of thought, that 
the pathologies of the capitalist form of life can be comprehended. The breadth and profundity 
of social pathology diagnosis is imperative: as Laitinen submits, pathology diagnosis is essential 
for a penetrative engagement with the social; the essential fact is ‘there is a lot to be criticised 
in the social reality as it is’ (Laitinen, 2015: 48). Critical Theorists require a paradigm which can 
hold, and enable access to, the totality of the social; to enable the articulation of deformed 
rationality along the psychoanalytic, political-economic and social theoretical registers.  
In this first section, I have argued for the centrality of pathology diagnosing critique 
throughout the past and present of Critical Theory, and, through a critical exegesis, I have 
presented the approach as both social-theoretically potent and as philosophically sound. 
 
Recognition Theory: A Focus on the Intersubjective 
Having established the significance, and philosophical justifiability, of pathology diagnosing 
critique, I now engage with the recognition paradigm. In this section I argue that while 
recognition theory has been of major utility for social theory, it has historically been invoked in 
to further entirely different concerns to pathology diagnosis. While social pathology diagnosis 
enables a ‘deeper’ social critique; recognition theory offers an optic through which to explore 
the dyadic intersubjective moment, subjectivation and consciousness. I submit that while 
Honneth’s recent radicalisation of the recognition rubric, in The Struggle for Recognition, moves 
to reposition recognition as a way to view the social totality, Honneth’s reframing of recognition 
still does not focus on the core themes of pathology diagnosis. This second section thus outlines 
what is meant by ‘recognition’, both prior to, and within, Honneth’s framing. This serves to both 
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outline the significance of Honneth’s intervention, while marking its continuing distance from 
the traditional concerns of pathology diagnosing critique. 
 
Consciousness, Subjectivation and Intersubjectivity 
Recognition [Anerkennung] is perhaps the most debated component of today’s socio-theoretical 
lexicon (Ricoeur, 2005). Indeed, Ricoeur submits that as many as twenty-three different 
understandings of ‘recognition’ have been advanced (Ricoeur, 2005: 5-16). Thus, before 
proceeding further, I present a working definition of recognition for the purposes of this project. 
For this I turn to Hirvonen (2015), who submits that recognition should be framed as ‘positive 
status attribution that happens between persons and (that) also constitutes those persons’ 
(Hirvonen, 2015: 210 – original italics). I adopt Hirvonen’s accessible construction for it 
immediately draws out the two components essential to recognition: a) a moment of mutual 
attribution of positive features between subjects (the intersubjective moment), and b) that this 
process is essential for subjectivation. This secondary facet, that recognition is ‘both responsive 
to personhood, but at the same time also … constitutes it’ (Hirvonen, 2015: 210) informs the 
ontological commitments of Honneth’s Critical Theories of recognition (Ikäheimo, 2007: 227-
228). As with my above introduction to social pathology, I offer a brief overview of recognition’s 
role in social theory, drawing out its distinctive concerns: consciousness, intersubjectivity and 
subjectivation. These are concerns distinct from pathology diagnosing critique, which is 
identified instead by a desire to conduct ‘deeper’ social critique.  
The orthodox view holds that the ‘post-Kantian’ imagination of Fichte and Hegel marks the 
genesis of recognition theorising as practised today (Honneth, 2005; Laitinen, Särkelä and 
Ikäheimo, 2015: 3). The Fichtean-Hegelian focus of enquiry was the intersubjectively framed 
moment of subjectivation, and its entwined social-structural realities. In particular, their interest 
was in how structures of consciousness were socially mediated (Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo, 
2015). As Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo (2015: 3) draw out, Fichte and Hegel came to hold that, 
‘through recognition of others, human individuals begin to relate to themselves and their 
environment both epistemically and motivationally’ in radically differentiated manners. 
Recognition became grasped as foundational to the subject’s social existence and self-relation. 
Their enquiry evolved to comprehend society as both product, and creator, of consciousness. 
Hegel and Fichte thus developed conceptual tools to apprehend the patterns and structures of 
the social as an interconnected whole, and saw recognition, consciousness and subjectivation 
existing in a proximate relationship.  
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Hegel is often read as radically expanding Fichte’s more ‘deontological’ understanding of 
recognition (Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo, 2015: 4). Most famously, in The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Hegel introduces a conflictual dimension to the recognition frame: the famous ‘struggle 
for recognition’ [kampf um Anerkennung] (Hegel 1970: Chapter Four).13 This much-discussed 
conflict between ‘master’ and ‘slave’, or ‘lord’ and ‘bondsman’, centres the themes of 
dominance and dependency in the recognition register (Kelly, 1966). The subject’s foundational, 
essential recognition is not bestowed with beneficent altruism. Instead, following Hegel, 
recognition theorists today still point towards an existential ‘struggle for recognition’.14 Drawing 
upon these Fichtean and Hegelian roots, the idea of recognition, and struggles for its attainment, 
mark a substantial impact on the Western social-theoretical canon (Kok and van Houdt, 2014).15 
Recognition’s reach extends far beyond both left-Hegelian and neo-Hegelian scholarship, and 
can be seen to have influenced Dewey, Mead and Lacan (amongst others) (Laitinen, Särkelä and 
Ikäheimo, 2015: 5).  
This historical sketch is, inevitably, cursory, and I stress that recognition, just like social 
pathology diagnosis, carries many layers of complexity (Ikäheimo, 2002; Laegaard, 2005). My 
submission here is merely that historically, before its rebirth in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, recognition marked a targeted engagement with the social, focusing on the dyadic 
intersubjective moment, and the social structural realities connecting consciousness, 
subjectivation, and the social. While social pathology diagnosis, as discussed, offers a deeper 
critique of forms of life, through exposing the defective nature of the social totality; recognition 
theory’s philosophical antecedents offer an optic for a more targeted analysis on the relation 
between subjectivation, consciousness and the intersubjective moment.   
From Fichte and Hegel to Taylor and Honneth, recognition offers one point of entry to the 
social, making no claims nor pretensions to offering a means of engaging with, let alone 
critiquing, the social totality. To underline this point, Hegel’s multifaceted social philosophy, 
charted in his Philosophy of Right, extends far beyond the philosophical and semantic fields of 
the recognitive (de Boer, 2013).16 From recognition theory’s roots in Fichte and Hegel, one can 
see the emergence of a body of thought providing an insightful point of entry to the social, 
through a focus on the intersubjective moment. It is crucial to stress that the philosophical 
                                                          
13 Buck-Morss (2009) suggests that Hegel’s framing made have had an antecedent political reality to it, that of the 
Haitian slave revolts. 
14 Tellingly this is the title of Honneth’s central work on the subject.  
15 For example, Chitty (2018) argues that Marx’s understanding of ‘Species Being’ is best understood relative to 
‘Hegel’s view of human beings as conscious subjects who are rationally driven to become universally self-conscious’ 
(Chitty, 2018: 134-135). 
16 De Boer’s paper, ‘Beyond Recognition? Critical Reflections on Honneth’s Reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ 
develops this argument with particular relevance to contemporary debates in recognition scholarship.  
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antecedents to Honneth’s recognition theory never presented as an optic to comprehend the 
social in its totality (Ricouer, 2005). In contrast, this is a claim Honneth repeatedly makes today 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2001).  
While Honneth is the name most associated with contemporary scholarship drawing on 
recognition (Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo, 2015: 5-7), it was Charles Taylor’s Multiculturalism 
and the Politics of Recognition that brought recognition to the forefront of the contemporary 
social-theoretical imagination (Heywood, 2007: 316; Martineau, Meer and Thompson, 2012: 2). 
Through his easy prose, and relatable discussions of new social movements, Taylor reintroduced 
the recognition paradigm to popular consciousness. To Taylor, recognition is tied intrinsically to 
identity (Taylor, 1994); the absence of due recognition, ‘can inflict harm, can be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’ (Taylor, 
1994: 25). Taylor’s essay returned recognition to the centre of social theory, and, with a new, 
accessible focus on identity, retreated from the Fichtean-Hegelian metaphysics. ‘Recognition’ 
offered both social-theorists an efficacious explanatory framing and offered the members of 
new social movements a rubric for demands, in an intuitive vocabulary. Yet, it must be clarified 
that for Taylor, recognition did not, and ought not claim to, present as the sole axis for social 
theoretical analysis or for social action. While the desire for recognition helped frame the claims 
of the new social movements, Taylor did not present recognition as an optic through which to 
view the totality of social struggle.  
While Taylor returned the recognition framing to the popular imagination, Honneth’s The 
Struggle for Recognition is ‘generally acknowledged’ as ‘presenting the most ambitious agenda 
… utilizing the idea of recognition’ in contemporary social theory (Laitinen, Särkelä and 
Ikäheimo, 2015: 6). Honneth’s theory opened the door to a form of social critique which 
analysed society, in its entirety, on the basis of its capacity to enable subjects to achieve the 
forms of ‘primary intersubjective’ recognition required for their self-actualisation (Varga and 
Gallagher, 2012: 243-260). Many scholars go so far as to say that Honneth created an entire 
Critical Theory derivative the central tenets of the recognition theoretical outlook: a true Critical 
Theory of Recognition (Alexander and Lara, 1996: 126-136). In the next section, I critically 
engage with Honneth’s contemporary framing of recognition, and argue that, while he radically 
expands the recognition optic to incorporate the totality of the social, Honneth’s approach 
remains substantially distinct from the pathology diagnosing framing. 
From Hegel and Fichte, to Taylor and Honneth, ‘recognition’, and ‘recognition theories’ 
represent an entry point for analysis of the social world through a focus on the intersubjective 
and its relation to consciousness and identity. This thesis in no way rejects the utility of 
33 
 
recognition theory as a point of engagement with identity, consciousness and subjectivation. 
Instead, following Taylor (1994) and Honneth (2005), I agree that recognition is at the core of 
the demands of many new social movements, and through a focus on identity, consciousness 
and subjecthood, recognition centric approaches can provide much needed insight for social-
theory. My submission is merely that the knowledge interest of recognition theory, up until 
Honneth, was limited to a differentiated understanding of consciousness, subjecthood, 
subjectivation and identity. The philosophical antecedents of Honneth’s recognition theory do 
not offer a paradigm for totalising social critique, a claim which continues to distinguish 
Honneth’s approach, despite its controversiality (Fraser and Honneth, 2001). Simply put, 
recognition centric analyses offer a distinct engagement with the social, which can be of true 
utility, but both historically and presently, their concerns are entirely distinct from the diagnosis 
of social pathologies. As I shall argue, attempts to fuse them have proved damaging to 
theoretical potency (Chapter Two). 
 
Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition   
Honneth’s Critical Theory of recognition was first presented in Kampf um Anerkennung (1992) 
and published in English three years later as The Struggle for Recognition (Honneth, 1995). It is 
worth stressing the work’s distinctiveness from both the preceding recognition theoretical 
approaches and from pathology diagnosing social criticism. The Struggle for Recognition marked 
a radical expansion of recognition theory (Martineau, Meer and Thompson, 2012: 3). Honneth’s 
approach comprehends not only new social movements as recognition struggles, but views all 
social dynamics, including the explicitly political-economic, through the recognition paradigm 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2001). I stress that for the early Honneth, ‘recognition theory’ and 
‘pathology diagnosis’ marked two distinct and evolving endeavours (Freyenhagen, 2015), and 
thus their dissimilarity, and lack of interpenetration marked no profound anomaly or drawback. 
In Honneth’s earlier work they were simply divergent research interests. It is only when the two 
come to be elided in the ‘pathologies of recognition’ approach that problems of such a union for 
pathology diagnosing critique came to the fore (Chapter Three).17    
Published seven years before Kampf um Anerkennung, Honneth’s Kritik der Macht argued 
that the Frankfurt School strain of Critical Theory suffers ‘from an exclusive focus on the domain 
of material production as the locus of transformative critique’ (Anderson, 1995: xi). Honneth’s 
long-time translator, Anderson, thus situates The Struggle for Recognition as Honneth’s 
                                                          
17 As I draw out in Chapter Three, Honneth’s interests of ‘recognition’ and ‘social pathology’ were fused by other 
scholars. 
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‘alternative account’ (Anderson, 1995: xi), an attempt at transcending, in Martin Jay’s words, 
the Frankfurt School’s ‘productivist bias’ (Jay, 2012: 5). In place of the antecedent materialism, 
which Honneth saw as ossifying Critical Theory, Kampf um Anerkennung moved to centre Critical 
Theory around ‘struggles for recognition’ (Anderson, 1995: xi). To this end Honneth radically 
extends a line of Hegelian thought, part of Hegel’s earlier ‘Jena writings’. In particular Honneth 
reanimates System der Sittlichkeit; with its distinct recognition centrality (Hegel, 1979). As 
Anderson’s summarises; 
Honneth takes from Hegel the idea that full human flourishing is dependent on the existence of well-
established, ‘ethical’ relations – in particular, relations of love, law, and ‘ethical life (Sittlichkeit) – 
which can only be established through a conflict-ridden developmental process, specifically, through 
a struggle for recognition (Anderson, 1995: xi). 
Honneth’s key challenge was to build a ‘social theory with normative content’ derived from 
these insights of the Jena period Hegel, that would be acceptable in today’s ‘condition of post-
metaphysical thinking’ (Honneth, 1995: 1). To do so Honneth drew on Mead’s psychology and 
Winnicott’s object-relations theory (Honneth, 1995: 71-91). Utilising empirical psychology, 
sociology, psycho-analysis and history, Honneth advanced the merits of considering the social 
as a totality as a network of recognition relations. The legal framework, the market, the systems 
of familial and erotic love; all now were offered as sites of demands for the intersubjective 
recognition essential to identity formation and human flourishing. Fundamentally, feelings of 
‘disrespect’ and ‘injustice’, which catalyse protest and agitation, evince ‘relational disorders’ 
that should be ‘assessed within the categories of mutual recognition’ (Honneth, 1995: 106). 
Honneth makes this point even more explicit with regards the politico-economic realm in 
dialogue with Nancy Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2001). He states one should ‘speak of capitalist 
society as an institutionalised recognition order’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 137); and considers 
demands for alternative distributions as ‘specific kind(s) of struggle for recognition in which the 
appropriate evaluation of the social contributions of individuals or groups in contested’ (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001: 171). It seems no exaggeration to state that Honneth’s Struggle for 
Recognition marks a radically distinct move in Critical Theory to comprehend all instances of 
socio-political contestation as instances of ‘the expression of a struggles for recognition’ (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001: 137). Honneth’s recognition monism marks a substantial divergence from 
past recognition framings: Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition views the totality as the 
social as a recognition matrix.  
In the final chapter of The Struggle for Recognition Honneth moves to produce ‘A Formal 
Conception of Ethical Life’, dependant on ‘the intersubjective conditions’ necessary for ‘personal 
integrity’ (Honneth, 1995: 171). Yet, the closer Honneth returns to the crucial focus on 
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historically mediated reason, essential to pathology diagnoses, the closer he moves to a 
paralysing historicism:  
What can count as an intersubjective prerequisite for a successful life becomes historically variable 
and is determined by the actual level of development of the patterns of recognition (Honneth, 1995: 
175). 
Thus, while the three distinct patterns of recognition (reflecting love, rights and solidarity) 
represent ‘intersubjective conditions that we must further presuppose, if we are to describe the 
general structures of a successful life’ (Honneth, 1995: 175) their realities, and modes, of their 
granting and apprehension, are products of located historical reality. Yet this reality, and its 
development is never tied to society as evincing a historically mediated rationality. It is ‘the 
patterns of recognition’ which overdetermines social life. In short, Honneth’s Struggle for 
Recognition does not provide the tools for social critique which were essential for by previous 
Critical Theoretical social pathology diagnoses. Recall, pathology diagnosing critique has long 
been based on a fusion of theoretical frameworks and was consciously practised through a 
‘multifaceted and polycentric’ diagnostic endeavour (Fraser and Honneth, 2001). Honneth’s 
Critical Theory of Recognition does not seek to engage with the totality of the social to diagnose 
social pathologies. Rather, it seeks to engage solely with ‘the development of patterns of 
recognition’ (Honneth, 1995: 175). That this limited, recognition-centric endeavour has come to 
be conflated with the totality of pathology diagnosing critique is the central theoretical 
development which this thesis seeks to displace.   
It is clear that Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition marked a radically distinct reorientation of 
Critical Theory, arguing for a new focus on the essential ethical relations necessary for the 
subject to develop self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Honneth, 1995), it did not offer 
the tools, or present a desire, to engage in pathology diagnosing critique qua Frankfurt School 
notions of diagnostic critique. In Honneth’s recognition theory, the foundational requirements 
for human flourishing prove to be entirely ‘dependent on the establishment of relations of 
mutual recognition’ (Anderson, 1995: xi). Alexander and Lara thus go as far as to frame The 
Struggle for Recognition as a ‘philosophical and sociological polemic’ (Alexander and Lara, 1996: 
127), precisely due to the divergence between Honneth’s recognition-centricism and the 
antecedent frameworks for social critique.  
Honneth’s Kampf Um Anerkenung marked a radical change in the direction of Critical 
Theoretical scholarship on recognition. Following Honneth, the social totality is now increasingly 
viewed as a recognition network; and struggles for recognition became a primary means to 
comprehend not only new social movements, but also the market, and the institutions of the 
family (Honneth, 1995, 2014b). Yet Honneth’s radical extension of the recognition framing did 
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not extend to a direct conflation of recognition theory with the Frankfurt School tradition of 
pathology diagnosing tradition. Kampf Um Anerkenung neither positioned recognition theory as 
a pathology diagnosing rubric, nor sought to precipitate a synthesis between the two critical 
theoretical tools. Honneth’s analyses, and championing of pathology diagnosis, simply marked 
a divergent endeavour to his Critical Theory of recognition. While Honneth champions both his 
radical Critical Theory of recognition, and a reanimation of the pathology diagnosing tradition, 
it was not his own research that united these framings. That damaging elision, which this thesis 
critiques, and seeks to displace, was instead performed through a later generation of theorists 
(Chapter Three). 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has engaged with the central assumptions which undergird the broader project, 
namely the continuing justifiability and relevance of pathology diagnosing social critique and its 
natural dissimilarity from recognition theory. Through a cursory outline of the social pathology 
and recognition-theory traditions, it has demonstrated the richness of these distinct 
approaches. As this chapter has stressed, Honneth’s new Critical Theory of Recognition marks a 
radical reorientation of the recognition-theoretical framework. It is this new, totalising 
recognition paradigm that this thesis seeks to critique. 
My discussion on the origins of social pathology started with Plato. Perhaps the most famous 
injunction of the great philosopher was that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’ (Plato, 
38a5-6). Not only is the desire to conduct a foundational critique of our way of life a central part 
of being human, but the urgency of this endeavour has never been more pressing. The 
doomsday clock sits at two minutes to midnight (Mecklin, 2018). Without such foundational 
reflection, and consonant political practice, the bell risks tolling ever sooner. Society’s ability to 
diagnose its own pathologies is central for the flourishing of social subjects: both because 
criticism is itself an important form of social existence, but more pressingly, without the ability 
to diagnose the fundamental social irrationalities, society will continue to be driven by self-
destructive, capitalist social logics.  
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Chapter Two 
Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition: A Critique 
Introduction  
In this second chapter I critique the recognition-theoretical approach advanced by Honneth 
(1995, 2014b). By bringing Thompson’s (2016) The Domestication of Critical Theory into dialogue 
with existing critiques of recognition theory (Fraser 1995a, 1995b, 2001; McNay 2008, inter alia), 
this chapter argues that exclusively recognition approaches to engaging the social totality are 
social-theoretically, philosophically, and politically unjustifiable. It is worth reiterating that I do 
acknowledge the insights offered by alternative recognition approaches. This chapter is not an 
attempt to invalidate or refute the idea of a ‘recognition moment’ or the importance of other 
recognition framings for social theory (past and present). Honneth’s approach is distinct from 
other understandings of recognition in that it is entirely monistic:18 for Honneth the totality of 
the social can be grasped through recognition theory. This chapter thus offers a critique targeted 
at Honneth’s overly-restrictive recognition approach which excludes alternate approaches to 
social critique. My thesis proper seeks not the termination of all engagements with recognition. 
Rather this thesis builds to argue for a ‘multilateral’ and ‘polycentric’ Critical Theory which can 
benefit from a plurality of approaches to engaging with the social, including a modified, non-
unifocal recognition lens (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 209). To restate, the broader aim of this 
project is to reanimate the Critical Theoretical engagement with social pathologies by displacing 
the problematically restrictive recognition-derived approach with a more open framing so the 
full breadth and range of social pathologies can be interrogated. As shall be developed in 
Chapter Three, the dominant recognition-derived approaches to social pathology diagnosis are 
predicated upon a restrictive recognition theoretical understanding of the social. The critique of 
what Fraser terms ‘recognition monism’ offered in this chapter seeks to destabilise the 
foundations upon which today’s dominant approaches to social pathology are built (Fraser and 
Honneth, 2001).  
As I emphasise throughout this thesis, those19 who adopt a ‘pathologies of recognition’ or a 
recognition-cognitive approach to the social critique ‘are convinced that the terms of 
recognition must represent the unified framework for [the Critical Theoretical] … project’ (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001: 113). Drawing heavily on Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition, they 
                                                          
18 The is the term used repeatedly by Fraser in her debate with Honneth and seems apposite as an adjective 
considering the unifocal, singular reliance on recognition that Honneth advances (Fraser and Honneth, 2001).  
19 As shall be discussed in Chapter Three, one can see such trends in the ‘Jyväskylä School’ approach, in the ‘Essex 
School’ theorists, and in the recognition-cognitive framing of Zurn (2011). 
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submit the strong thesis ‘that even distributional injustices must be understood as the 
institutional expression of social disrespect – or, better said, of unjustified relations of 
recognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 114). The ‘recognition-turn’, and the subsequent 
variegated embrace of such thought, has occurred across traditional disciplinary lines. As a result 
there have been sparks of resistance within philosophy, gender theory, political theory, psycho-
analysis and sociology (McNay, 2008; Fraser and Honneth, 2011; Thompson, 2016). To avoid the 
limiting effects of arbitrary disciplinary demarcations, I have loosely grouped the critiques of 
Honnethian recognition approaches into ‘political’, ‘philosophical’, and ‘social-theoretical’ (in 
contrast to ‘gender’, ‘sociology’, ‘philosophy’, ‘psycho-analysis’ inter alia). I acknowledge the 
weakness of my typology,20 and use it apologetically, to provide a clear structure and to unite 
theoretical concerns which may cross disciplinary boundaries. 
This chapter sits in three sections. First, there is a social-theoretical critique of the 
Honnethian approach to Recognition, second a philosophical critique, third, a critique of the 
political limitations and contradictions that a unifocal or monistic recognition perspective 
precipitates. Expressed most simply, this chapter argues that such restrictive recognition 
approaches are philosophically unjustifiable, limiting to social-theoretical engagement and are 
politically counter-productive. This chapter is thus essential to my broader thesis as the 
‘pathologies of recognition’ framework, and the ascendant ‘recognition-cognitive’ approach to 
social pathology diagnosis (discussed in Chapter Three), are both predicated upon the untenable 
Honnethian account of recognition. 
 
Social Theoretical Critique  
Other distinct structures, other distinct pathologies 
For theorists committed to an exclusively recognition account of the social, all societal problems, 
including distributional irrationalities, ‘must be understood as the institutional expression of 
social disrespect’, stemming from ‘unjustified relations of recognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 
2001: 114 – my bold). The entirety of social reality is presented as accessible to the social theorist 
via the optic of recognition theory (Fraser, 1995a, 1995b; Fraser and Honneth, 2001). Such an 
approach holds recognition as the ‘fundamental overarching’ social category and views all other 
logics and modalities as ‘derivative’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 2-3). Such recognition accounts 
seeks ‘to subsume the problematic of redistribution (inter alia) within’ the recognition 
                                                          
20 As stressed in my introduction, Critical Theory has long advocated an interdisciplinary approach. I adopt this 
subject based division solely for its useful structural demarcations and do so well aware that such an approach has 
limitations.   
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theoretical optic (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 3). All social realities are presented as ‘derivate’ 
from fundamental recognition relationships. The role of the social theorist is thus to uncover the 
‘pathologies of recognition’, the instances, and dynamics of ‘failures of recognition relationships’ 
and to examine ‘the inherent dangers that unstable or ambivalent recognition relationships 
pose’ (Hirvonen, 2015: 209). Drawing on Fraser (1995a, 1995b; Fraser and Honneth, 2001) and 
McNay (2008), I argue that such an approach fails to account for the existence of the numerous 
social structures which are not merely epiphenomenal to recognition relationships.21 Thus, the 
ascendancy of the pathologies of recognition and recognition-cognitive approaches (Chapter 
Three), which are predicted on solely recognition-theoretical accounts of the social, seriously 
impedes the Critical Theoretical diagnosis of social pathologies. If the only social pathologies 
that are accessible through a solely recognition account are those of the recognition order it 
undeniably follows that the numerous other species of social pathology: those of political-
economy, of consciousness, of the psyche, inter alia, are rendered invisible and inaccessible. 
This thesis submits that it is precisely this elision of important social domains that has served to 
‘domesticate’ pathology diagnosing social critique.  
Drawing on Fraser, I directly challenge the Honnethian assertion that all social pathologies 
must be viewed as stemming from ‘unjustified relations of recognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 
2001: 114). Following Fraser, while I do not consider economic distribution to be merely 
epiphenomenal to the recognition order of society; neither do I submit that both social orderings 
are entirely independent, and hermetically sealed.  
Rather, the economic logic of the market interacts in complex ways with the cultural logic of 
recognition, sometimes instrumentalising existing status distinctions, sometimes dissolving or 
circumventing them, and sometimes creating new ones. As a result, market mechanisms give rise to 
economic class relations that are not mere reflections of status hierarchies (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 
214). 
Furthermore,  
Neither those relations nor the mechanisms that generate them can be understood by recognition 
monism. An adequate approach must theorize both the distinctive dynamics of the capitalist economy 
and its interaction with the status order (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 214). 
Under scrutiny here is the fundamental legitimacy of the strong thesis advanced by unifocal 
recognition theorists: that all social inequities and irrationalities can be traced to, and are 
reflections of, society’s antecedent recognition order. In sharp contradistinction, I find Fraser’s 
account entirely more convincing when she submits that ‘not all maldistribution is a by-product 
of misrecognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 35). To justify this crucial submission Fraser offers 
the example of a skilled, male, white worker, who becomes unemployed ‘due to a factory closing 
                                                          
21 For example, capitalist macro-economic logics.  
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resulting from a speculative corporate merger’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 35).22 The resultant, 
potentially mass unemployment that occurs in exactly such situations is best theorised as the 
result of a multiplicity of factors, including: 
 
…the supply and demand for different types of labor [sic]; the balance of power between labor [sic] 
and capital; the stringency of social regulations, including the minimum wage; the availability and cost 
of productivity enhancing technologies; the ease with which firms can shift their operations to 
locations where wage rates are lower; the cost of credit; the terms of trade; and international currency 
exchange rates (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 215). 
 
Following Fraser, I submit that viewing this plethora of political-economic factors (not to 
mention the complex constellation of non-political economic factors, many of which are equally 
distanced from the recognition order) as expressions of the recognition order, is unjustifiable. 
Rather, these political-economic factors are best theorised as a result of logics inherent to the 
dominant form of capitalist economy (Thompson, 2016). In such cases it seems incontrovertible 
that deeply significant social actions occur with momentous material repercussions that have 
‘little to do with recognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 35). The importance of the operation 
of such capitalist logics, which are at the very least once-removed from the status order, cannot 
be underplayed. As Fraser suggests, the ‘distinguishing feature’ of capitalist modernity is the 
‘creation of a quasi-autonomous, impersonal market order that follows a logic of its own’ (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001: 24): a logic which is not merely epiphenomenal to the given society’s 
recognition order. This is not to claim, or to underprivilege, the significance of status, identity, 
or recognition to social reproduction, or to underinvest in the academic utility of their study and 
analysis. Rather, my submission is that the dominant trend to focus solely on ‘pathologies of 
recognition’ restricts the capacity of the social theorist to engage with, and expose, the 
numerous genera of social pathologies that exist in the various other social-structures which 
operate contemporaneously and non-epiphenomenally, to the recognition order. 
As first and second-generation Critical Theorists submitted, there are pathologies of the 
political-economic order itself (Held, 1980; Strydom, 2011). The grand thesis of Capital may even 
be read as Marx’s prediction that the capitalist system would fall under the weight of its own 
pathologies (Honneth, 2007c). Such ‘social pathologies of the economy’ may include inter alia 
self-perpetuating dynamics of negative infinity, a trend towards overall immiseration, or the 
systemic reward of consumption irrespective of the cost to other social goods (Neuhouser, 
2012). It is evident that such pathologies are not accessible through a solely recognition 
                                                          
22 Fraser’s hypothetical worker is white, male and working in an esteemed job, to represent an ideal-typical 
individual who does not suffer from ‘misrecognition’.  
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register,23 for they are not ‘pathologies of recognition’. Rather they are pathologies fundamental 
to the economic order, which exist non-epiphenomenally to the recognition order.   
As subsequent chapters of this thesis will advance, the dominant recognition-derived 
approach to social pathology diagnosis, and to social theory more broadly, obscures a plethora 
of important social dynamics (Chapters Four to Six). Chapter Four explores Rousseau’s 
foundational social theory, drawing out the existence of multiple framings of social pathology 
which are entirely inaccessible to recognition-centric approaches. Perhaps the most obvious 
candidate for social-theoretical scholarship which is invisible to the recognition-monist 
approach is the presence of (non-recognitive) social-structural dynamics. Neuhouser (2012) 
locates such a species of social pathology in Rousseau’s Discourse of Political Economy, 
exemplified below: 
… in order to raise … armies, tillers had to be taken off the land; the shortage of them lowered the 
quality of the produce, and the armies’ upkeep introduced taxes that raised its price. This first disorder 
caused the people to grumble: in order to repress them, the number of troops had be increased and, 
in turn, the misery; and the more despair increased, the greater the need to increase it still more in 
order to avoid its consequences (c.f. Neuhouser, 2012: 11). 
Here we have a species of social pathology, a self-perpetuating negative dynamic, that is not 
observable through recognition accounts, and one which has little, if anything, to do with the 
recognition register. Both farmers and soldiers may be esteemed and recognised, and nothing 
would change, for the pathology exists in a deeper social dynamic, not at an intersubjective 
register. As left-Hegelians would argue, the problem is simply an irrationality in social 
organisation (Chapter Five). Further pathological dynamics invisible to the recognition approach 
are engaged with by Fromm (Chapter Six). Fromm’s account of ‘pathological normalcy’ is 
important in that it combines a Marxian critique of the irrationalities and limitations in the 
objective social order with the pathologies of the ideological realm which lead to the societal 
dynamics of normalisation and quiescence (Fromm, 1963). Consider, for instance, Stanley 
Kubrick’s dark satirical comedy, written contemporaneously to Fromm’s The Sane Society, Dr. 
Stranglelove or: How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. In the denouement, when 
the war committee is discussing an impending nuclear apocalypse and the need to restart 
civilisation in protected underground bunkers, an interesting dialogue occurs, indicative of this 
subset of social pathologies which exists entirely beyond the recognition register. General ‘Buck’ 
Turgidson (George C. Scott) and Dr. Strangelove (Peter Sellers) discuss the need to prevent a 
‘mineshaft gap’.24 This is, of course, a dark satirical extension of ‘the arms race’. For Fromm, this 
                                                          
23 Interestingly, a recent paper claims to frame similar logics through exactly such a recognition lens (Schaub and 
Odigbo, 2019). I critique the manifold failings of this attempt in Chapter Three.  
24 The joke here is that while for decades the Soviet Union and the United States had been racing to stockpile more 
and more nuclear weapons, in a dynamics which had developed beyond the control of either superpower, a similar 
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dialogue would be seen as depicting two species of pathology, neither accessible to a solely 
recognition account. Instead, we have a psychological pathology (that such a dynamic is 
accepted as a norm) and secondly, and a species of pathology in social functioning more broadly. 
The ‘mineshaft gap’, as with the ‘nuclear gap’ represents a species of damaging negative 
dynamic, which, annexed to the socially imbued and perpetuated pathological paranoia, risks 
becoming a dynamic of negative infinity.  
These examples are merely indicative of the breadth and depth of framings of social 
pathology which are obscured by the Honnethian recognition approach to social critique. As 
expressed throughout subsequent chapters on Rousseau (Chapter Four), Hegel (Chapter Five) 
and Fromm (Chapter Six) the full genera of social pathologies is perhaps limitless, and the 
artificial restraints of the Honnethian recognition imaginary must urgently be challenged and 
repudiated to regain social-theoretical potency. The contemporary dominance of the 
recognition approach to social-theory restricts access to crucial aspects of social reality, leading 
to a ‘telescoped’ Critical Theory (Thompson, 2016: 6). Restrictive Critical Theories of Recognition 
are thus social-theoretically unsound as they fail to account for the multiplicity of distinct social 
processes and modalities which are not merely epiphenomenal to the recognition order. This is 
a social-theoretical weakness which is unsurmountable which lies at the heart of Honneth’s 
approach.  
 
On the dangerous allure of unifocal social theory 
Part of the problem with restrictive recognition accounts may stem from the desire to find a 
unitary category of analysis to start with. Drawing on Fraser, I submit there are reasonable 
grounds to ‘object in principle to any proposal to ground a normative framework on one 
privileged set of experiences’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 205 – original italics). A social theory 
which commits to a singular optic for understanding social reality ‘puts all its eggs in one basket’ 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 205) from the start. Once a commitment has been made to an 
approach, the temptation is thus to stretch it, to attempt to incorporate too much within its 
confines. This is precisely what Critical Theories of recognition have been accused of: ‘inflat(-ing) 
the idea of recognition to the point of unrecognizability (sic), thereby draining it of critical force’ 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 210; Thompson, 2016).  
                                                          
dynamic could occur where each power sought to hold the most underground sites for survival (mineshafts were 
considered a potentially safe place to be during a nuclear conflict). 
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While this is perhaps excessively generalising, broad-brush analysis, there are undeniable 
advantages to supporting a ‘polycentric and multilateral’ Critical Theory (Fraser and Honneth, 
2001: 209), the approach this thesis champions. There is no need to push for a singular optic, it 
provides no greater insight compared to polycentric approaches to the social. Unicentric 
recognition accounts which purport the primacy of an ‘a priori monism’ of recognition serve to 
artificially restrict social theoretical engagement (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 210). A strong 
critique of monistic approaches to the social is that they privilege a singular entry point to social 
reality, necessarily offering a singular set of parameters for comprehension. When, inevitably, 
the contingent messiness of social reality is too complex for a singular framework, theorists 
committed to the strategy redefine terms, and stretch parameters, leaving their original insight 
distorted beyond recognition (McNay, 2008: 195). Such a critique of restrictive recognition 
accounts is entirely justified, for they ‘illegitimately’ serve to ‘totalize one mode of integration, 
truncating the full range of social process’, and thus obscures the full spectrum and genera of 
social dynamics and their attendant pathologies (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 214).  
McNay goes as far as to submit that recognition theorists have fallen victim to what Bourdieu 
termed ‘scholastic epistemo-centricism’ (Bourdieu 2000: 52; McNay 2008: 195). This is a general 
tendency which can occur in social theory where theorists develop such an investment in an 
approach that the ‘specificity of social practice is neutralized’ so as to enable it to be ‘assimilated 
to an intellectual construct’ (McNay, 2008: 195). Not only can a critique be offered to the claim 
that the struggle for recognition is a constant ‘archetype whose fundamental dynamic is 
superimposed on all … social relations’ but the very nature of the dynamic shifts arbitrarily as 
desired (McNay, 2008: 51). It becomes increasingly unclear what ‘recognition’ means as it needs 
to be constantly redefined, sometimes ‘beyond all recognition’ (Ricoeur, 2005: 5-16). 
The complexity of social reality cannot be grasped by a singularly recognitive account, 
because no unifocal approach to conducting social theory can access the totality of the social. 
All theoretical approaches come with their attendant limitations. Many in the current 
generation of recognition theorists, in their desire to comprehend the breadth of social reality 
within their singular recognition framework do damage to their very conception of social reality 
to stay ‘true’ to their approach. In this regard restrictive recognition approaches to the social 
epitomise ‘scholastic epistemocentricism’ (McNay, 2008: 195).    
Restrictive recognition accounts are social-theoretically unjustifiable in that they fail to 
access the range of social processes and structures that constitute social reality. Through these 
omissions, the precipitant recognition-derived engagements with social pathology occlude the 
economic, psycho-analytic and social logics which occur beyond the recognition order. McNay 
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(2008) suggests that recognition theorists’ devotion to their framing despite these obvious 
failings can be explained through reference to the tendency to ‘scholastic epsitemocentricism’. 
Restrictive recognition-derived engagements with the social world thus do damage to their own 
comprehension of social reality in order to stay ‘true’ to their desired approach.  
   
Philosophical Critique  
Having advanced a social-theoretical critique of the dominant recognition theoretical approach 
to social theory, the chapter now presents a philosophical critique. To reiterate, the division of 
this chapter into social-theoretical, philosophical, and political is admittedly imperfect, and at 
best crudely functional. While the social-theoretical section focused on the critiques of the 
unifocal recognition framing as an inadequate means of theorising society, my philosophical 
critique focuses on the neo-Idealist assumptions and ontological claims that the unifocal 
recognition approach necessitates.  
Uniting Thompson (2016), McNay (2008), and Fraser (1995a, 1995b, 2001) this section argues 
that restrictive Critical Theories of recognition are predicated upon damagingly ‘reductive 
understanding(s) of power’ (McNay, 2008: 2). The Honnethian recognition approach 
unjustifiably distances human sociality from ‘concrete social structures and mechanisms’ 
(Thompson, 2016: 5). Honneth’s approach is found wanting because recognition does not occur 
in a vacuum, hermetically sealed from market forces. The diagnosed ‘pathologies of recognition’ 
which follow from such an account, those (relative few) which are even observable within said 
optic, are thus philosophically limited: they are predicated on illegitimately extracting the 
recognition dyad from broader, non-recognition based, social processes. Utilising Thompson’s 
critique of ‘neo-Idealism’ (Thompson, 2016, 2019), I argue that the monistic recognition account 
necessitates indefensible ontological commitments and precipitates an ‘ahistorical’ and 
‘reductive’ understanding of subject formation (McNay, 2008: 24). My primary submission is 
that recognition monists, those who express the causal, ontological and moral primacy of the 
intersubjective dyad, necessarily disconnect social pathologies ‘from a socio-structural account 
of power’ (McNay, 2008: 9). Further, drawing on McNay (2008), Connell (1987) and Fraser 
(1995a, 1995b, 2001), I argue that recognition monists present a false universal commonality to 
social existence, submitting that an identical intersubjective dynamic can be located cross-
culturally. Such an understanding is prima facie rejected in light of historical and social 
contingency, and the complexities of non-standard human subjects, for example: infants, the 
enslaved, or those with serious learning difficulties. Finally, I submit that recognition 
theoreticians’ claims that the optic of recognition solves the ‘theory-immanent problem’ 
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(Honneth, 2001: 125-6) is unjustifiable. I end my philosophical critique of Honneth’s recognition 
monism by submitting there exists no immanent ‘body of pristine experience in inchoate 
everyday suffering’ with which social theorists can align progressive scholarship (Fraser and 
Honneth, 2001: 203). The imperatives of systems and structures that ‘pulse beneath the surface 
of everyday life’ (Thompson, 2016: 7) are coeval with human sociality, shaping consciousness, 
subjectivation and intersubjectivity. Fundamentally, the Honnethian recognition account is 
crippled by its ontological commitment to the primacy of the dyadic recognition moment: such 
an approach is a wilful negation of the constant impact of power, especially systemic-structural 
imperatives, on all facets of human existence.      
 
Neo-Idealism and the ontological commitments of Honnethian recognition theory 
As established in Chapter One, Honnethian recognition theorists, in keeping with Third 
Generation Critical Theory more broadly, seek a ‘pure kernel’ of social existence from which to 
enter the social conjecture (Thompson, 2016). For recognition monists this point of entry is the 
intersubjective moment of recognition. Honneth, for instance, is explicit in the causal, 
ontological and moral primacy he accords the ‘moment’ of intersubjective praxis (Honneth, 
1995, 2014). He posits a fundamental, ‘primal dyad’, which ‘lies at the at the origin of social 
relations’ (McNay, 2008: 47). The recognition of subject A by subject B, and, simultaneously, of 
subject B by subject A, is held to be the optimum point of entry to social reality for critical 
scholarship as it marks the genesis of social being (Honneth, 1995; McNay, 2008).  
These is a clear ontological claim here: for recognition theorists, society is held to be nothing 
more than ‘extrapolations of psychic dynamics’ (McNay, 2008: 138). Society is determined by, 
and is best conceived as, a ‘recognition order’ (Honneth, 1995, 2014). The importance placed on 
the intersubjective dyad is staggering: recognition marks nothing less than the originary point of 
the social25 and, for Honneth, it is the entirety of the social. For recognition theorists, there is a 
‘unidirectional causal dynamic’ to the ‘ontology of recognition’ (McNay, 2008: 138): everything 
flows outward from the recognition moment. Thus, the intersubjective relations of recognition 
between subjects instigates, comprises, determines and perpetuates the dominant form of 
social reality. For recognition monists the primal dyadic relationship comes first in all aspects of 
social philosophy: it is recognition relationships that constitute subjectivities and human 
sociality. From such a viewpoint it logically follows for the site of analysis, and thus of social 
critique, to shift to the cognitive and noumenal capacities essential for intersubjective praxis. 
                                                          
25 Recall how all foundational subjectivation requires a recognition relationship.  
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Thus, with the Third Generation of Critical Theory there is a new-found (and mis-placed) faith in 
the emancipatory and critical powers of the cognitive and the intersubjective (Thompson, 2016).   
 In The Domestication of Critical Theory (2016) Thompson critiques this movement of the 
primary site of Critical Theoretical analysis as evincing a ‘neo-Idealist’ social ontology 
(Thompson, 2016).26 Thompson defines ‘neo-Idealism’ as, 
… (a school of thought where) … thinkers proceed from the premise that there is a self-sufficiency to 
the powers of intersubjective reason, discourse, structures of justification, and recognition 
(Thompson, 2016: 15 – my italics). 
In addition to the word ‘self-sufficiency’, one could add the adjectives ‘potency’ and ‘purity’. At 
core here is that neo-Idealists invest the cognitive realm with an ability to avoid penetration by 
the ‘potency of social power, rooted in the material organization of social life’ (Thompson, 2016: 
15). They contend that the strictures of social structure do not impede the cognitive domain, 
nor in any way corrupt or tarnish its emancipatory potential. The intersubjective moment is held 
to be simply infallible.  It is with this belief they fall into, what Thompson describes as, the ‘neo-
idealist fallacy’. Contemporary recognition theorists invest ‘modern subjects with powers of 
rationality … (they) simply cannot possess’ (Thompson, 2016: 5 – my italics). ‘The crucial flaw’ of 
such neo-Idealist thought, 
 is that it detaches itself from a theory of socialization that is actually fused to the concrete structures 
of social power and its capacity to shape consciousness and cognition (Thompson, 2016: 3).  
For neo-Idealists, certain facets of subjectivity, and sociality, are not shaped and determined by 
social structures, and can thus be invested with radical emancipatory potential. This is based on 
an unjustifiable social ontology: social being is not solely derived from recognition relationships. 
The cognitive capacities of subjects are created and shaped by broader social-structural logics 
(Thompson, 2016: 3-5). In light of Thompson’s critique, it seems evident that Honnethian 
recognition theory is predicated upon an unsustainable social ontology and a theory of 
subjectivation which is congenitally blind to the impact of power, particularly ‘constitutive 
power’, upon subjects.  
This return to the cognitive, as recognition monists advance, fundamentally negates the 
foremost philosophical insight of Marxian philosophy. Recognition monists fail to account for 
Marx’s materialist inversion of Hegelian Idealism, that: 
It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness (Marx, 2010 (1859): 92). 
                                                          
26 The critique is levelled at ‘contemporary critical theory’ (broadly synonymous with Third Generation Critical 
Theory), however in a latter article Thompson focuses explicitly on the neo-Idealism in Critical Theories of 
recognition (Thompson, 2017). 
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Ever since Marx’s Copernican insight it has been apparent that the cognitive facets essential to 
intersubjective recognition are determined by subjects’ material worlds. There is no pristine 
cognitive capacity which is excluded from the corrupting effects of social systems. In Thompson’s 
words, neo-Idealists fail to engage with how ‘concrete social structures … exert formative 
pressure on socialization and consciousness’ (Thompson, 2016: 5). I contend that the 
‘pathologies of recognition’ that are produced by the Honnethian recognition account are 
philosophically untenable and fail to engage with the reality that social structures are not merely 
epiphenomenal to a foundational recognition dyad. In accord with Thompson, Bollenbeck (2019) 
thus argues that Honneth’s Theory of Recognition serves to turn Hegel on its head ‘and back 
again’, returning Critical Theory to pure Hegelian Idealism. 
Honnethian recognition accounts are thus philosophically unjustified in that they cast the 
intersubjective moment as untouched by the power emanating from systemic-structural 
processes. In short, this chapter argues that a social ontology is required that comprehends 
society as more than just the extension of primal intersubjective dynamics. The constant 
presence of structural-systemic logics, coeval with subjectivation, will forever frustrate 
restrictive, unifocal recognition theorists, who hunt the untouched ‘intersubjective moment’. 
The implicit ontological commitments of Honnethian recognition theorists, to viewing society as 
nothing more than extensions of the primal recognition dyad, which itself remain always pure 
and untouched,27 is destabilised once one embraces the Marxist insight of the impact of social 
structure on consciousness. Honnethian recognition theorists appeal to a fictive ‘kind of 
subjectivity that has not been shaped and formed by defective social relations and institutions’ 
(Thompson, 2016: 6). Such an understanding fails to account for the complex reality of power, 
and the way in which subjectivities are constituted, coeval with power, rather than independent 
to, and isolated from, power. This understanding is based on an unjustifiable social ontology, 
which echoes back to Hegelian Idealism as clearly as Honneth himself returns to Hegel’s Jena 
writings. Thompson’s Domestication of Critical Theory is an essential intervention in that it 
reintroduces the two centuries of scholarship since Hegel, reminding Critical Theorists of the 
essential Marxist insight that ‘power relations rooted in capitalist forms of economic life 
structure the deeper socialization processes that shape the cognitive dimension of the 
personality of subjects’ (Thompson, 2016: 64).  
The social ontology and precipitant theory of subjectivation the Honnethian paradigm 
necessitates is philosophically unjustifiable as it falls into a brazen neo-Idealism. That Critical 
                                                          
27 This problematic investment in a flawless area of the social can be seen to recur with Honneth’s (2014) framing of 
‘social freedom’ in Freedom’s Right. 
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Theorists have been so keen to obviate the essential hallmark of Marxist scholarship, the 
importance of the social world on consciousness, seems terrifying. In this regard McNay frames 
the problem of the dominant recognition approaches beautifully when she argues that it casts 
‘power relations … [as] a post hoc effect’ (McNay, 2008: 47) on consciousness. McNay continues, 
the ontology of recognition understands the sources of inequality as generated through an 
interpersonal dynamic of struggle, but this face to face dynamic is disconnected from a socio-structural 
account of power (McNay, 2008: 47-48).  
It is simply untenable to cast power as ‘an exogenous factor that come to operate post hoc upon 
the recognition dynamic’ instead of being held as fundamentally ‘intrinsic’ to all social life 
(McNay, 2008: 72)   
 
Universal Primal Dyad 
Recognition monists contend that there is an essential ontological antecedent to all human 
sociality: all ‘social relations are seen as extrapolations from primal psychic dynamics’ (McNay, 
2008: 19). A recognises B, who simultaneously recognises A, and from the continuing expansion 
of such recognition relationships social relations, and society, is created. The struggle for 
recognition is presented as both universal and constant. This ultimately (if successful) 
symmetrical primal relationship is submitted as a fundamental, human, anthropological fact. 
Drawing on McNay (2008), Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2001), Connell (1987) and Fanon (1952), 
I argue that this presentation presents a false universal commonality to social existence. In light 
of historical contingency, and the complexities of the myriad subject positions which 
problematise the posited symmetrical ‘primal dyad’, I argue that Honnethian recognition 
theorists offer an ahistorical understanding of the social, blind to socio-cultural variation (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001). Connell (1987), for instance, strongly argues that there is tremendous 
variation to the patterns and logics of oppressive social structures. Even if one were to accede 
that the antecedent core to all social action was a primary recognition dyad, a strong thesis 
which requires substantial, as yet unprovided, justification (which I have rejected above); this 
dyadic relationship would surely be mediated, and susceptible to socio-cultural variation. The 
idea that at core, all social relations can be reduced to a primal psychic dyadic relationship, which 
is constant in formation, and equally necessary for the attainment of an anthropological need 
across cultures, seems philosophically untenable in light of socio-cultural difference.  
Fanon’s analysis of the psycho-analytic dimension of colonial oppression in Black Skin, White 
Masks, helps illustrate the problems of entrenching the ‘primacy of recognition 
anthropologically, below the level of historical contingency’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 206, 
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McNay, 2008).28 Extending McNay, I read Fanon as arguing that there can never be a moment 
of Hegelian recognition in the colonial context, between coloniser and colonial subject. The 
potential to attain subjecthood through intersubjective praxis is never presented, for there is 
never the possibility of a moment of mutuality. In McNay’s reading, the ‘overwhelming power 
inequalities [in coloniality] annihilate’ the possibility of recognition (McNay, 2008: 55); therefore 
‘it is not the struggle for recognition that forms the subjectivity of the colonial subject but social 
subordination’ (McNay, 2008: 55).  The ‘crushing object-hood’ of ‘blackness’ locks the colonial 
subject into oppressive psychic dynamics; there is no potential for transcendence or 
emancipation through intersubjective praxis (Fanon, 1952: 60). The fundamental dyadic 
relationship is unattainable in the contingent life-world of the colonial subject. But, pace the 
(implicit) convictions of Honnethian recognition theorists, the absence of the possibility of such 
relations does not preclude radical, agentival subjectivites, capable of myriad acts of resistance 
(Fanon, 1952). The struggle simply is ‘not personal but social’ (Fanon, 1952: 215, c.f. McNay, 
2008: 55). For Fraser, such examples are proof that the unifocal recognition theorists assertion 
that ‘one single motivation [recognition]’ underlies social action is prima facie untenable (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001: 203). The example of the contingent impossibility of recognition within the 
colonial context, yet, simultaneously the very real capacity for struggle and for radical 
subjectivity, poses a challenge to Honneth (Coulthard, 2014). In this example there are subjects 
existing in a reality where the impossibility of mutuality precludes the possibility of a moment 
of intersubjective praxis. That the form of sociality occurring in such a situation is an extension 
of primal dyadic relations of recognition seems implausible and characterising such a conjecture 
as subjects ‘struggling for recognition’ negates the phenomenological and structural realities of 
the contingent moment. To claim such realities remain epiphenomenal to primal dyadic 
relations of recognition, or struggles thereof, seems both ‘a-historical’ and ‘reductive’ (McNay, 
2008: 24).   
One further complication for those claiming the universality and primacy of the dyadic 
relationship posited by recognition monists is that it is unclear that all subjects attain the ‘level 
of consciousness that the model seems to require’ (McNay: 2008: 134). The relationship 
between mother and child, essential to the recognition theoretical psychoanalytic theory of 
Jessica Benjamin, for example, necessitates cognitive capacities in the infant which cannot be 
empirically ascertained. Further, there exist countless mature subjects, with rich socialities, that 
                                                          
28 Theorists have also utilised Fanon to critique how recognition politics plays out in particular locations. For 
instance, Coulthard’s (2014) Red Skin, White Masks draws upon Fanon to critique the recognition paradigm through 
a targeted engagement with how recognition-derived political engagements have harmed the indigenous Canadian 
population.  
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have cognitive impairments (consider those with severe learning difficulties or disabilities). One 
cannot commit to the claim that these subjects possess the cognitive capacities essential to 
intersubjective praxis. It is thus philosophically questionable, as well as politically problematic, 
to necessitate the degree of consciousness needed for intersubjective praxis as a precondition 
for entry into the social community.    
The argument here, juxtaposing and extending McNay, Fraser, Connell and Fanon, is that the 
commonality recognition theorists attribute to all social existence is philosophically problematic. 
Blind to socio-cultural variation, and the social existences of subjects with limited cognitive 
capacities, recognition monists attributes a false commonality to social existence, which further 
impedes the optic’s philosophical legitimacy.     
 
An Immanent Entry Point for Social Critique? 
My final philosophical critique of the Honnethian recognition approach is to challenge its claim 
to be a ‘solution’ to the ‘theory-immanent problem’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 125-6). For 
Celikates (2018), Critical Theory remains trapped by an unhelpful methodological dichotomy. 
There are two dominant approaches to social critique.29 There is ‘external’ or ‘transcendent’ 
critique, which situates itself beyond ‘ideology’, viewing the everyday social actors as 
‘judgemental dupes’ (Celikates, 2018). Such an approach is typified by Bourdieu’s critical 
sociology, which seeks to diagnose false consciousness and societal maladies from beyond the 
immediate frame of reference of the social world through academic abstraction. Alternatively, 
there is the ‘internal’ or ‘immanent’ approach which ‘follows the actors’: such an approach is 
typified by Garfinkels’ ethnomethodology and Boltanski’s sociology of critique (Celikates, 2018: 
95). As Celikates (2018) outlines, both approaches have their limitations.30  
For Honneth, the Critical Theory of Recognition is the solution. Recall that for Honneth a clear 
‘moral injustice is at hand whenever, contra to their expectations, human subjects are denied 
the recognition they feel they deserve’ (Honneth, 2007a: 71). In these feelings of intersubjective 
disrespect, for recognition monists, one can access the ‘moral grammar’ of human sociality 
(Honneth, 1995). For Honneth, focusing Critical Theoretical scholarship on X’s feelings of 
misrecognition, enables social theory to be tied both more closely to the immanent ‘normative 
objectives of emancipatory movements’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 113) while retaining an 
objectivity through the focus on the ‘moral grammar’ of recognition. In the eyes of recognition 
                                                          
29 Beyond immanent-transcendence which is the methodology championed by Critical Theory (Strydom, 2011). 
30 For my critique of Celikates’ proposed solution, see Harris (2019).  
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theorists, by tracing the claims of denied intersubjective recognition, articulated by such 
movements, the theorist can locate an immanent entry point for their social critique. If this claim 
was justifiable it would prove a real strength of recognition theory and would represent a truly 
meritorious advance in critical social theory. The ‘pathologies of recognition’ diagnosed by 
recognition monists would thus carry the extra legitimacy of a direct connection to the 
immanent claims of the life-world, and, simultaneously, track the quasi-objective, 
anthropologically legitimated, ‘moral grammar’ of recognition.  
In contrast, I argue that such claims are entirely specious, and that, contrary to such repeated 
claims to immanence, recognition monism ‘serves more’ to legitimate a ‘metaphorical hall of 
mirrors for the self’, where ‘selves that are pathologically shaped by/through culture’ are 
deemed aspirational and legitimate (Thompson, 2016: 65). Opposing recognition-theoretical 
approaches, I argue both the immanent, the transcendent and the immanent-transcendent 
approaches are vastly superior methodologies to conducting social critique. Returning once 
again to Thompson’s critique of neo-Idealism, I argue that recognition monists fail to provide 
the immanent basis to social criticism that they proclaim, for they fail to grasp the true impact 
of social systemic power on consciousness and cognitive capacities. Yet again, the neo-idealist 
nature of recognition theory is responsible for the failure of another of its claimed benefits. 
What complicates Honneth’s claim is that it is instantly apparent that there exists both 
‘justified and unjustified claims for recognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 27). For example, 
justified claims may include the demands for recognition from those fighting racial, sexist, or 
homophobic abuse. Consider the case of black worker X, subjected to dehumanising, racist 
abuse in her working environment. X’s claim for recognition seems immediately justifiable. In 
such a scenario the recognition monist’s claim to have discovered an immanent entry point for 
social critique seems entirely justified: demands for recognition seemingly provide an excellent 
point of entry for critiquing social reality. Yet, then consider the case of the racist, white 
supervisor, Y, who feels ‘disrespected’ and ‘unrecognised’ due to his black staff looking him in 
the eye, and thus refusing to act in a manner respectful to his self-perceived ‘innate superiority’. 
Both subjects may experience similar emotions of humiliation, may feel disrespected, and feel 
they have a justified claim that the existing recognition order fails them. Recognition monism 
fails to provide an immanent point of entry to the social, for it fails to provide any clear 
determining logic as to which immanent claims are legitimate. There is no neat textbook of 
objective ‘moral grammar’ one can consult. On the contrary, such a judgement is made 
transcendent to the life-world, entirely ‘above’, or ‘outside’ the immanent social realm. The 
Critical Theory of Recognition thus slides back into transcendent critique.   
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The knowledge that both subjects feel disrespected is thus of limited utility to the social 
theorist. Indeed, investing either subject X’s, or subject Y’s sentiment with undue critical potency 
risks ‘simply reproducing the basic validity of the social reality that already exists’ (Thompson, 
2016: 25).  One must ask where each of their feelings of disrespect originate from. Both subject 
X and subject Y have been socialised into a society fundamentally shaped by ‘structural and 
functional power relations that are routinized (sic) by the prerogatives and goals of social 
systems’ (Thompson, 2016: 66). For Thompson (2016) subjects’ feelings of disrespect reflect the 
dominant sentiments and value-horizons that have been inculcated in their contingent, 
ideologically buttressed social order. McNay extends Bourdieu to advance a similar critique 
(McNay, 2008). For Bourdieu, ‘the most personal is the most impersonal’ (1992: 201): the degree 
to which subject X’s passion is inflamed by occurrence Y, the more clearly the social theorist can 
witness the primacy of Y to the broader social order. McNay extends Bourdieu’s notion of 
‘habitus’: the idea that there are culturally imbibed dispositions, tastes, preferences, and values, 
which are related to various cultural and class logics, to demonstrate the extent to which what 
one finds ‘insulting’ or ‘disrespectful’ is entirely culturally mediated. From such a perspective, 
what one finds erotic, distasteful, repulsive, or ‘disrespectful’ reflects cultural norms and is 
intrinsically linked to social structures. There is thus no ‘prelapsarian knowledge’, no ‘pure’, 
‘true’, definite, immanent life-world oppression that social theory can effortlessly track courtesy 
of the insights of recognition theory (Berlant, 2000: 43, McNay, 2008: 141).     
Without some mediating methodological commitment to ascertain critical value, subjects’ 
feelings of ‘disrespect’, and ‘misrecognition’ fail to offer a direct entry point to social reality, 
rather, to the contrary, they merely throw up the true contingent, ideology-ridden, messiness 
of the social realm (Celikates, 2018). While both the immanent and the transcendent 
approaches are aware of this problematic, the Honnethian inspired approach is paralysed in that 
it fails to acknowledge that it too suffers from the theory-immanent problem. Ultimately 
Honneth’s theory, when applied to the social world, relies upon transcendent moral 
judgements,31 eventually an ideologically interpellated human makes a call that ‘this recognition 
claim is (in)valid’, that it does or does not track the moral grammar.32  
McNay and Thompson, despite disciplinary distinctions, produce very similar argumentation: 
theorists always search in vain if they seek some ‘pure’, unmediated ‘prelapsarian’ moral 
grammar which is objectively being ‘disrespected’. Embodied subjectivites feel disrespect due 
                                                          
31 This is also the weakness of Celikates’ proposed critique as social practice.  
32 I return to this point in Chapter Seven, where I argue that this fundamental weakness of recognition theory could 
be utilised as a strength, if the entire recognition approach was inverted. 
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to the social valuations placed on various behaviour patterns. To determine which feelings of 
‘disrespect’ are to be social-theoretically supported requires complex social-theoretical analysis, 
which is at best one order removed from the direct claims of immanent politico-social groups. 
Ultimately Thompson’s critique of the neo-Idealism inherent to Honneth’s approach invalidates 
almost all of the purported strengths of the recognition theoretical approach.  
 
Political Critique  
Framing social movements as campaigns for liberation from ‘pathologies of recognition’ has 
political, as well as philosophical and social-theoretical, weaknesses (Fraser, 1995a, 1995b; 
Coulthard, 2014; Thompson, 2016). First, I argue that the move to a solely recognition approach 
represents both a symbolic and a real retreat from the critique of political economy. Even if the 
system mechanics of neoliberalism could be incorporated within recognition monism, as 
Honneth contends (Fraser and Honneth, 2001), it would still be framed as epiphenomenal to, 
rather than fundamental to, the core logics of social reproduction. Second, I argue the species 
of ‘recognition politics’ that contemporary recognition approaches are allied to, risks pitting 
progressive political causes unnecessarily at odds. Drawing on the Fraser-Young debate, I submit 
that the ‘affirmative-transformative’ contradiction has validity, although Fraser’s (incidental) 
examples may be counterproductive. The argument forwarded here is that the Honnethian 
recognition approach, and the recognition-derived approaches it precipitate, are politically 
problematic and counterproductive.    
 
A retreat from the Critique of Political Economy 
First-generation Critical Theorists sought to ‘explode the reified forms of thought’ (Thompson, 
2016: 10) engendered by the capitalist mode of production, and, by doing so, to contribute 
towards the transition to a more rational social organisation. In such an effort they sought an 
excoriating critique of the ‘organised forms of power that reproduce social pathologies’ 
(Thompson, 2016: 3). When one reads the texts of the first generation of Critical Theorists, 
Thompson’s phrase ‘organised forms of power’, can be read as largely synonymous with ‘market 
society’. The early Critical Theoretical project was at core political, representing a direct 
challenge to both the logics of capitalist economic relations and to those who supported them. 
With a unique fusion of theory and praxis, and with a hyperawareness of their location within 
ideology; early Critical Theorists saw the very process of articulating the pathological state of 
consciousness as an essential praxis: as an oppositional act to capitalist domination. Lukacs’ 
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History and Class Consciousness, is but one example amongst many which explicitly ties the 
project of articulating the pathologies of the social to an assault on the structures of capitalist 
political economy. As Lukacs expresses at the start of ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat’: 
Our intention here is to base ourselves on Marx’s economic analyses and to proceed from there to a 
discussion of the problems growing out of the fetish character of commodities, both as an objective 
form and also as a subjective stance corresponding to it. Only by understanding this can we obtain a 
clear insight into the ideological problems of capitalism and its downfall (Lukacs, 1972: 84 – original 
italics, my bold). 
The hostility to the capitalism could hardly be expressed any clearer. The ‘confrontation with 
the forms of organized power that reproduce social pathologies’, as expressed by Thompson, is 
instantly visible (Thompson, 2016: 3).   
The critique of political economy that was central to classical Critical Theory does not have 
the same resonance for today’s recognition theorists. This is not merely incidental: I contend 
that not only has the critique of capitalism been largely decentred, but, further, with the 
ascendancy of a restrictive recognition approach, the very attitude to capitalism has shifted. 
Honneth even speaks of capitalism as possessing emancipatory potential through the 
recognition relationships furthered by the market itself (Honneth, 2014b: 208; Conclusion). My 
argument here is that the ‘domestication’ of Critical Theory’s politics is not merely an incidental, 
parallel development alongside recognition theory’s ascendancy. Rather, the two work 
seamlessly together to reorient the project from its original Marxist-Weberian paradigm 
(Thompson, 2016). The recognition approach decentres anti-capitalist class politics as it serves 
to obscure market logics and downplays their primacy in social reproduction (Fraser and 
Honneth, 2001; Thompson, 2016). Resultantly, there is less of a Critical Theoretical investment 
in engaging with the market as a primary sight of analysis for social pathologies.  
Monistic recognition accounts recenter the focus of the Critical Theoretical endeavour to the 
cognitive capacities essential for, and the moment of, intersubjective praxis. This represents an 
unabashed retreat from a focus on structural-systemic logics. For McNay, this is indicative of the 
‘new constellation of political culture… (in which) … the centre of gravity has shifted from 
redistribution’ (McNay, 2008: 89). Recall that for Honnethian recognition theorists ‘even 
distributional injustices must be understood as the institutional expression of social disrespect 
– or, better said, of unjustified relations of recognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 114). From 
such an optic the dynamics of market forces must be construed as epiphenomenal to an 
antecedent recognition order. Political-economy is consumed by the primal dyadic relationship 
(McNay, 2008). When the recognition lens is presented as capable of scoping the entirety of 
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social reality, the utility of placing political-economy at the centre of one’s analysis is obviously 
limited.  
The propensity to view ‘society as a network of recognition relations’ (Fraser and Honneth, 
2001: 212) has led to the ‘displacement’ of political economic concerns at ‘precisely the moment 
when an aggressively expanding neoliberal capitalism is radically exacerbating economic 
inequality’ (McNay, 2008: 92). To the extent that recognition theoretical approaches serve to 
displace and decenter political economy, one must view Honnethian approaches as complicit in 
the prevailing ‘neoliberal amnesia’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 198). That Honneth, current 
director of the Institute for Social Research, champions an approach which serves to ‘represses 
the critique of political economy’ is remarkable (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 198). With Honneth 
submitting that the very institutions of the market ‘can be understood as … [furthering] 
institutionalized relation(s) of mutual recognition’ (Honneth, 2014b: 208), Thompson may 
legitimately question whether today’s Critical Theory does more to ‘inculcate conformity to the 
prevailing reality’ (Thompson, 2016: 1), rather than to advance radical political praxis.  
 
A Collision Course for Progressive Politics 
In an extensive, and sometimes heated exchange with Iris Marion Young, Fraser articulated a 
second, equally potent, political critique of the socio-political formations precipitated by 
theories of recognition. Critical of Young’s (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference, Fraser 
constructed a four-fold typology of political action (Fraser, 1995a). Socio-political movements 
sit on two axes; of recognition or redistribution, and of affirmation or transformative intent to 
social structures. Movements may seek social-structural transformation to remedy distributive 
injustice, or may, in their mode of engagement, inadvertently, or deliberately, affirm the social-
structure in their campaigns (Fraser, 1995a. 1995b). The very same applies equally to recognitive 
concerns. Fraser is critical of Young’s work for presenting ‘a brief for affirmative recognition’, 
without ever submitting how her theory can lead to ‘transformative redistribution’ (Fraser, 
1995b). Fraser contends that the optimum configuration would be a transformative agenda 
which incorporates both redistributive and recognitive concerns. In contrast to this ideal, Fraser 
submits that recognition politics has an in-built tendency to further restrictive affirmative 
politics which can be counterproductive to the transformative goals of more radical progressive 
movements.  
What is essential here is that Fraser (1995a, 1995b) submits that recognition based political 
movements have an inbuilt affinity to develop in a manner which is affirmative of broader social 
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structures. This is not to state that all recognition-based political movements will become 
reactionary, nor that they will all stifle more radical progressive causes. Fraser’s position is more 
measured, simply arguing there is a proclivity in recognition-centred campaigns to such a 
development. As Fraser has advanced elsewhere (Fraser and Honneth, 2001), recognition-based 
theorisations serve to occlude the significance of market logics. As a result, the politics of 
recognition has inevitably become more about status and identity, as Young (1990) admits to. 
Obvious examples of such ‘affirmative’ recognition campaigns could be reservation, affirmative 
action, or marriage equality. Such campaigns, in their desire to end a form of discrimination 
within a particular social order, seek not the abolition of the social order itself, but rather a 
better accommodation for a class of people within it. They are thus easily co-opted by neoliberal 
interests, draining them of any transformative intent. Drucker (2011) paints exactly such a 
development with the gay-rights movement, which he claims has ‘fractured’ under neoliberal 
capitalism. Brighton Pride, for instance, perhaps the epitome of a contemporary recognition-
political moment, used to be a radical, transformative project, concerned with welfare provision 
and socialist transition. Today, Pride marchers follow under the banner of the event’s lead 
patron: American Express (Wilson, 2018).  
Once such events have developed a clear ‘affirmative’ politics, Fraser (1995a, 1995b) argues 
that they may inadvertently directly impede other progressive movements which seek more 
radical social-structural transformation. This is not merely a problem of displacement: of 
transformative ideals being left behind by a move to recognition politics. Rather, while different 
progressive groups seek both ‘affirmative recognition’ and ‘transformative distribution’ at the 
same moment, we witness the real occurrence of progressive causes unnecessarily impeding 
each other. It is of course possible for the same political actor to believe in two, or more, entirely 
non-mutually excluding, political causes: racial equality and social democracy, for instance. 
What is highly problematic, with the ascent of affirmative recognition politics, is that the same 
political actor may, through supporting a recognition affirmative movement on one day, and a 
transformative socialist movement on the other, be impeding their own political objectives.33  
 
 
                                                          
33 Fraser (1995a) discusses a case of a black rights march in New York City, where, to her incredulity, nearly a million 
people marched through Wall Street without a single anti-capitalist banner. The demand for better inclusion within 
the capitalist system was, for her, clearly affirming the political-economic structure: the demand is merely for better 
inclusion within it. For Fraser, a marcher X, who, the very next day, marched in protest against the neoliberal order, 
would have been affirming the structure one day, attempting to transform it the next. While Fraser’s 
characterisation of race based movements as affirmative is debatable, the problematic she poses is convincing. To 
this extent Black Lives Matter seeks an explicitly transformative, rather than an affirmative politics (Ransby, 2015). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Honneth’s recognition-theoretical approach is problematic social-
theoretically, philosophically and politically. As the dominant approach to engaging with social 
pathologies draws heavily from Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition this is a serious 
impediment to radical pathology diagnosing social critique.  
The first section of the chapter offered a social-theoretical argument. Here I argued that an 
exclusively recognition derived account of the social serves to exclude numerous species of 
social pathologies from view as the social world cannot be engaged with solely as a recognition 
order: it is much more complex than that. Drawing on Fraser, I demonstrated how numerous 
social logics (for example, those of capital) must be theorised as more than mere extrapolations 
of recognition dynamics. Next, I argued that the very desire to frame the entirety of the social 
through a singular optic was problematic and unnecessary. In contrast, I reiterated how this 
thesis champions a ‘polycentric’ and ‘multilateral’ approach to Critical Theory (Fraser and 
Honneth, 2001).     
The second section focused on the philosophical weaknesses of Honneth’s approach. This 
discussion served to introduce Thompson’s Domestication of Critical Theory, an important 
intervention, and a text which be returned to repeatedly in this thesis. Here, I drew out how the 
dominant recognition approach falls victim to what Thompson (2016) presents as the neo-
Idealist fallacy. I argued that Honneth’s recognition-theoretical approach can thus be considered 
to be based on an unjustifiably idealist social ontology, and echoed Bollenbeck’s (2019) stinging 
indictment: that Honneth succeeded in turning Hegel on his head … and back again. This section 
further criticised the universalist pretensions of Honneth’s account: drawing on McNay (2008) 
and Fanon I argued that the idea that there is a singular intersubjective struggle that occurs 
universally is doubtful considering the experiences of coloniality. Finally, in this section, through 
an engagement with Celikates (2018), I assessed the recognition-theoretical claim to have solved 
the ‘theory-immanent’ problem. 
The last section of this chapter engaged with the political arguments against Honneth’s 
recognition-theoretical approach. Drawing on Thompson, I argue how a recognition theoretical 
approach, non-incidentally, furthers an erasure of capital critique. Finally, through an 
engagement with the Fraser-Young debate I echoed Fraser’s concerns with the ascent of 
recognition affirmative political movements which could bring progressive activists into direct 
conflict, potentially with themselves: standing upon the American Express banner at the front 
of Brighton Pride one afternoon, then picketing against big-capital the next.   
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The arguments in this chapter are submitted to support my primary social-theoretical 
intervention: destabilising the ascendant, recognition-derived approach to social pathology 
diagnosing critique. My thesis proper argues for the need for Critical Theory urgently to return 
to a differentiated, not solely recognition based, understanding of ‘social pathology’. To 
reiterate, the central submission of my thesis is that a crucial resource of Critical Theory, the 
diagnosis of social pathologies, is increasingly being rendered impotent through its troubling and 
unnecessary marriage with Honneth’s restrictive recognition approach. While the diagnosis of 
social pathologies previously provided a potent social theoretical framework, which united the 
interdisciplinary Critical Theoretical project (Chapter One), today ‘pathology diagnosis’ is 
increasingly viewed through an exclusively ‘pathologies of recognition’ or ‘recognition-cognitive’ 
lens (Chapter Three).  
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Chapter Three 
Recognition Theory and Social Pathology: A Troubling Marriage34 
Having outlined the limitations of the dominant recognition-derived approach to conducting 
social theory (Chapter Two), I now address how such a framing impacts social pathology 
scholarship. In contrast to the plurality of traditions which undergird pathology diagnosing 
critique (Chapter One, Chapters Four-Six), this thesis argues that a limited, recognition-derived 
understanding of social pathology, is increasingly dominant. This transition has impeded the 
potency of the pathology diagnosing approach and should be understood as contributing to the 
‘domestication’ of Critical Theory more broadly (Thompson, 2016). Chapter Three thus makes 
an important contribution to my broader argument by charting the ascendancy of recognition-
derived framings of social pathology across the Critical Theoretical literature. 
This chapter is comprised of four sections. First, I examine the rise of the ‘pathologies of 
recognition’ approach to Critical Theory, which is closely tied to Honneth’s Critical Theory of 
Recognition (as critiqued in Chapter Two). This discussion engages with the ‘Jyväskylä School’ 
and touches on what might be deemed a protean ‘Essex School’ of social pathology. The second 
section engages with Honneth’s (2014) problematic framing of ‘misdevelopments’ 
[Fehlentwicklungen] within Freedom’s Right. While Honneth appears to have discarded this 
framing in his more recent work, it is worth engaging with as it serves to complicate the 
discussion on social pathology (Freyenhagen, 2015) and furthers the ascent of recognition-
derived social criticism (Schaub, 2015). The third section outlines the ascent of a particularly 
restrictive, ‘recognition-cognitive’ approach to engaging with social pathologies. This framing 
was precipitated by a reading of Honneth’s approach to social pathology offered by Zurn (2011). 
While all three of these developments have served to ‘domesticate’ the diagnosis of social 
pathologies, I argue that the ‘recognition-cognitive’ framework has had the greatest impact in 
the contemporary literature and should be viewed as the most restrictive and most 
‘domesticating’. Having outlined my criticisms of the dominant recognition-derived approaches 
to social pathology scholarship, section four predicts, and responds to possible rejoinders that 
might be offered from supporters of the dominant approaches to social pathology diagnosing 
critique.    
While this chapter underscores the excessively cognitive nature of Zurn’s framing, an 
important distinction needs to be drawn between Zurn’s approach and antecedent 
                                                          
34 Approximately 1200 words of this chapter, specifically my critique of Zurn’s framing of social pathology, has been 
published as part of my article in the European Journal of Social Theory 22(1): 45-62, Harris N (2019) Recovering the 
Critical Potential of Social Pathology Diagnosis.    
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understandings of social pathology. While many of the conceptions of social pathology 
championed in later sections of this thesis have a cognitive dimension, none are exclusively 
cognitive. The cognitive impediment described by Rousseau (Chapter Four), Hegel (Chapter Five) 
or Fromm (Chapter Six) is but one part of the pathology; a companion to, or manifestation of, 
pathologies in the manifest social world (Strydom, 2011). The ascendant recognition-cognitive 
framing focuses solely on pathologies located ‘in the head’ of the social subject, negating the 
social dynamics existing in the material world (Freyenhagen, 2015: 136). My thesis contends this 
has undeniably ‘domesticating’ consequences for pathology diagnosing critique.  
 
The Ascent of the Pathologies of Recognition Framework 
With research programmes35 and special issues36 increasingly marching under the ‘Pathologies 
of Recognition’ banner, it is evident that the contemporary study of social pathology has 
developed a distinctly recognitive inflection (Hirvonen and Pennane, 2019; Schaub and Odigbo, 
2019, inter alia). Honneth’s scholarship, particularly his Critical Theory of Recognition, is of 
unparalleled importance in shaping contemporary discussions on social pathology (and Critical 
Theory more broadly) (Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo, 2015; Thompson, 2016, 2017, 2019). 
Perhaps the most provocative intervention provided by Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition 
is his submission that a sufficiently well-ground recognition lens can provide a singular optic 
through which to examine and critique the social totality (Honneth, 1995; Fraser and Honneth, 
2003, inter alia; as critiqued in Chapter Two). Honneth’s Critical Theory is further distinct in that 
it holds recognition as the ‘fundamental overarching’ social category and views all other logics 
and modalities as ‘derivative’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 3). While the ascendance of such 
critical theories of recognition has led to an increasingly divided academy (Fraser, 1995; McNay, 
2008; Thompson, 2016), the dominant literature on social pathology remains overwhelmingly 
recognition-centric (Canivez, 2011; Hirvonen, 2015; Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo, 2015). While 
Honneth has an impressive theoretical output on both social pathology (2000, 2004, 2007a, 
2007b, 2014, inter alia) and on recognition (1995, 2008, 2014 inter alia; Fraser and Honneth, 
2001) it is the ‘Jyväskylä School’ that truly united these theoretical concerns (Laitinen, 2015).37  
 
                                                          
35 See, for example, Arto Laitinen’s work as part of the Academy of Finland’s project entitled ‘Pathologies of 
Recognition’. 
36 See, for example, Studies in Social and Political Thought. 2015 Vol. 25(1). 
37 It is curious to note that Honneth himself does not utilise the language of ‘pathologies of recognition’ despite 
providing the central theoretical ‘ingredients’ across his research interests. 
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The Importance of the Jyväskylä School for furthering a pathologies of recognition approach 
It was within the Finnish academy that the fusion of Honneth’s otherwise siloed concerns of 
‘pathology’ and ‘recognition’ were united, both in social theory and social research. Indeed, if 
one makes any engagement with the literature on ‘pathology’ or ‘recognition’ it is hard to escape 
the ‘Jyväskylä school’ (Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo, 2015: 24). This group has published 
extensively as individuals and as a collective, with key figures including Arto Laitinen, Heikki 
Ikäheimo and Arvi Särkelä. Despite their moniker the academics who comprise this ‘school’ are 
spread beyond Jyväskylä, hence the increasing impact of their paradigm across international 
scholarship.38 Through various research projects, conferences, and with a focused doctoral and 
postdoctoral community, academics across The University of Tampere and The University of 
Jyväskylä have published an extensive array of books, paper and book-chapters, furthering 
recognition scholarship and its intertwinement with social pathology.39   
There are three features typical of the Jyväskylä School’s approach to diagnosing social 
pathologies, all of which can be traced to Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition: a) a 
restrictively recognition-derived approach to social pathologies, b) an attempt to theorise social 
pathologies that effect both isolated individuals and broader groups through the recognition 
lens, and c) a commitment to both social theory and social research utilising the ‘pathologies of 
recognition’ framework.   
Hirvonen’s (2015, 2019) research is indicative of the Jyväskylä’s School’s ‘pathologies of 
recognition’ approach. Hirvonen views social pathologies as being, definitionally, ‘failures of 
realizing recognition relationships successfully’ (Hirvonen, 2015: 209). From such a position, the 
role of the critical social theorist becomes simply analysing pathologies of recognition, the 
intersubjective disconnects responsible for failed recognition relationships (Hirvonen, 2015: 
209). True to Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition, if the entirety of the social world can be 
understood through a recognition approach, why would critical social theorists desire to look 
for pathologies elsewhere? In this regard, the Jyväskylä school shows a remarkable fidelity to 
Honneth’s unifocal Critical Theory. The problem, as established in Chapter Two, is that 
Honneth’s approach is fatally flawed and ‘domesticating’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001; McNay, 
2008; Thompson, 2016). As Hirvonen’s definition of social pathology (above) indicates, for 
Jyväskylä school theorists, social pathologies are solely to be understood as ‘pathologies of 
recognition’. For Laitinen and Ikäheimo (2011), this reflects both the foundational nature of 
                                                          
38 Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo claim that there are academics operating as part of the ‘Jyväskylä School’ in 
locations as diverse as Tampere, Sydney, Frankfurt, Lucerne, St. Gallen and Helsinki (2015: 24). In the four years 
since they submitted this the impact of their approach and its critical research has grown further.  
39 Recognition and Social Ontology etc  
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recognition relationships as advanced by Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition, but also a 
distinct commitment to a social ontology which places supreme importance on the recognition 
moment. For Laitinen and Ikäheimo, both the socially produced nature of our understanding of 
‘being’, and the ‘being that is the social’, can be best understood through a recognition 
perspective. One could state that the Jyväskylä school, like Honneth, is ‘recognition down to the 
core’: for such theorists no other perspective is necessary.   
For the Jyväskylä school, recognition is not merely of utility to explain the pathologies of the 
ideal-typical subject-meets-subject recognition moment; the so-called ‘intersubjective dyad’. 
Rather, in keeping with Honneth (1995) and Martineau, Meer and Thompson (2012), the 
recognition approach can be adapted to productively explain broader group dynamics 
(Hirvonen, 2015). For Hirvonen, it is entirely possible to ‘map out and analyze pathologies of 
collective recognition’ (Hirvonen, 2015: 210), and, through doing so, to outline the ‘systemic and 
institutional problems in providing opportunities for flourishing lives’ (Hirvonen, 2015: 209). In 
his more recent scholarship, Hirvonen (2019) has focused on the ascent of populist discourses 
and political campaigns, analysed through the pathologies of recognition approach. Such an 
understanding explicitly contends that the recognition paradigm is well placed to outline the 
pathologies intrinsic to social structural logics which impact on collectives. In such an analysis 
one can hear the resounding echo of Honneth’s exclusively recognition approach to the social, 
as outlined in his debate with Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2001). As stated in the previous 
chapter, such an approach is untenable.  
Finally, it is worth stressing how the Jyväskylä school has further entrenched the pathologies 
of recognition approach by utilising the perspective to conduct social research. While O’Neill 
and Smith’s edited collection Recognition Theory as Social Research (2012) laid the foundations 
for social research conducted through a ‘pathologies of recognition’ approach, there was no 
explicit engagement with the framing of ‘pathology’ in their collection. Yet again, it is the 
Jyväskylä school who unite ‘pathologies’ and ‘recognition’. For example, Niemi (2015) uses an 
explicitly ‘pathologies of recognition’ framing for his research into social work. As with the 
Jyväskylä school’s social theory, such an approach has proved popular and impacted other 
research collectives. For instance, Houston and Montgomery (2017) utilise an explicitly 
‘pathologies of recognition’ approach to ‘reflect critically on contemporary social pathologies’ 
that pose challenges to ‘critical and radical social work’. For the social researchers and social 
theorists of the Jyväskylä school, and those who draw upon their approach, recognition is of 
supreme, overarching importance to understanding social pathologies. To summarise in their 
own words, they view their research as seeking to  
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… critically compliment the Hegel-inspired picture outlined by Honneth and others following him of 
successful relationships of recognition and their generally optimistic conception of the content, 
dynamics and results of needs, demands and struggles for recognition with an account of denied, 
lacking or rejected recognition (Laitinen, Särkelä, Ikäheimo, 2015: 5). 
 
Beyond the Jyväskylä School 
Drawing upon Honneth, and the foundations laid by the Jyväskylä school, a plurality of theorists 
extend the Honnethian approach to its logical conclusions: arguing that the recognition 
paradigm can be drawn upon to identify all social pathologies (Zurn, 2011; Canivez, 2011; Fraser 
and Honneth, 2011; see Freyenhagen 2015; Thompson 2016, 2019; Canivez, 2019). Schaub and 
Odigbo’s (2019) paper ‘Expanding the Taxonomy of (Mis-)Recognition in the Economic Sphere’ 
epitomises this approach. One could perhaps go as far to tentatively state Schaub is part of a 
protean ‘Essex School’ of social pathology scholarship.40      
The distinguishing feature of such an approach is the counter-intuitive attempt to utilise the 
‘pathologies of recognition’ framing to engage with explicitly market logics.41 Schaub and Odigbo 
(2019) argue that by locating ‘need’ within the framing of ‘recognition’, the pathologies of the 
market can be comprehended in an ‘expanded taxonomy’ through the recognition paradigm. 
Through outlining the ‘consumptive’ and ‘productive’ facets in recognition of need, esteem and 
respect, the co-authors urge social pathology theorists to engage with the ‘variants of 
misrecognition that … [form] part of the economic sphere’ (Schaub and Odigbo, 2019: 117). 
From such a perspective, those who ‘have to rely on food and clothes banks’ are victim of 
‘consumptive need misrecognition’ (Schaub and Odigbo, 2019: 112). To those outside the 
recognition-paradigm, such an approach will surely raise an eyebrow at the very least because 
it seems such an unnatural framing.42 Scepticism as to the utility of such an approach may be 
further aroused due to two facets of the co-author’s framework.  
First, as the co-authors stress, their intervention is solely designed to enhance and polish the 
recognition approach. There is no attempt to see how recognition could be connected to, or 
utilised alongside, other framings of social pathology. Their key argument is that an 
… expanded taxonomy is a useful tool for social pathology theorists, who should appreciate the full 
range of variants of misrecognition when diagnosing pathologies of misrecognition in the economic 
sphere (Schaub and Odigbo, 2019: 103). 
                                                          
40 Fabian Freyenhagen, Jörg Schaub and Timo Juetten, all based at the University of Essex, have published 
extensively on recognition, and have connected it to social pathology in varying ways throughout their research. 
The claim they represent a ‘school’ is perhaps more contentious as Freyenhagen appears at best ambivalent 
towards the ‘pathologies of recognition’ paradigm, while Schaub (2019 inter alia) and Juetten (2017 inter alia) are 
clear proponents of the recognition-derived approach.  
41 Perhaps the most obvious reason this is counter-intuitive is because the market, not being a conscious subject, is 
incapable of granting recognition in any ways similar to the intersubjective praxis of the Hegelian dyad.  
42 See footnote 7. 
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Note that the co-authors talk of ‘social pathology theorists’, which would obviously include 
those interested in the full breadth of the pathology framework, yet immediately juxtapose this 
with ‘diagnosing variants of misrecognition’. The sentence does not allow that social pathology 
theorists might invested in looking at a plurality of alternate framings of social pathology. Schaub 
and Odigbo represent an approach to social pathology scholarship which appears solely invested 
in recognition.  
Second, the co-authors do not engage with the plurality of arguments against the 
recognition-derived approach to social pathology. There is one solitary sentence in a footnote 
which states that ‘many argue that other systemic factors not reducible to issues related to 
recognition also shape outcomes in the economic sphere’ (Schaub and Odigbo, 2019: 118). It is 
interesting that the co-authors consider there to be ‘many’ academics opposed to a restrictive 
recognition account, however they make no engagement with their arguments in the body of 
their text. More interestingly still, the co-authors do not even offer a single sentence stating that 
there are many academics who philosophically oppose the recognition derived approach (recall 
Chapter Two).43 Thompson (2016), Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2001) and McNay (2008) all 
present widely read critiques of the Honnethian recognition approach which provide a critique 
of the ontological assumptions central to the recognition account. The co-authors’ do not even 
offer a sentence stating this fact, let alone engaging with such arguments. This is highly indicative 
of the fractured nature of the academy when it comes to conversations surrounding social 
pathology. 
To stress, this analysis has not been offered to single out Schaub and Odigbo for special 
treatment: on the contrary, I turn to their paper as it is indicative of the siloed and contested 
nature of recognition theoretical engagements with social pathology more broadly 
(Freyenhagen, 2015; Thompson, 2016, 2019; Canivez, 2011, 2019). What the discussion here has 
begun to draw out is that both within and beyond the Jyväskylä School there is a literature which 
marries recognition and social pathology. Crucially, this fusion occurs in such as a way as to 
obscure alternate framings of social pathology.   
 
On Misdevelopments  
It is worth engaging with the framing of social ‘misdevelopments’ which Honneth (2014) 
presents in Freedom’s Right. This can be read as a further factor fusing recognition and social 
                                                          
43 I read this brief footnote as admitting to a knowledge of the social-theoretical critiques of recognition theory, 
which are largely centred around the criticism that the recognition approach fails to capture the full range of social 
pathologies (see Chapter Two). 
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pathology (Schaub, 2015: 113).44 Following Freyenhagen (2015), I argue Honneth’s addition 
needlessly complicates the discussion on social pathology and is unworkable. Yet, more 
importantly than the failure of the intervention, I argue Honneth’s turn to ‘misdevelopments’ is 
indicative of the trend to ‘domesticate’ the diagnosis of social pathologies. Honneth is clear that 
he considers obstacles to social freedom not to be ‘social pathologies’ but ‘misdevelopments’. 
Honneth’s intervention here attempts to arbitrarily restrict the purview of social pathology.   
 
Honneth’s framing of misdevelopments in Freedom’s Right 
Honneth’s Freedom’s Right marks his greatest investment in ‘misdevelopments’ as pertaining to 
a social malady distinct from ‘social pathologies’ (Freyenhagen, 2015: 143). It is essential to 
acknowledge the idiosyncratic nature of Freedom’s Right. The text unites a methodological 
commitment to normative reconstructionism with investments in recognition theory, and a 
reconceptualised (metaphysically absent) Hegelianism. In lieu of Hegel’s metaphysics, Honneth 
sporadically champions an Apel inspired hermeneutic-discursive hybridity.45 It is within the 
horizon of such a rich and multifaceted project that Honneth distinguishes between ‘social 
pathologies’ and ‘misdevelopments’, which perhaps might help explain the lack of clarity on this 
particular thematic. To be charitable to Honneth, Freedom’s Right has lots of things ‘going on’, 
and this certainly isn’t his main theoretical investment. That said, Honneth attempts to provide 
clarity to the distinction. ‘Social pathologies’ are held to be the obstacles preventing legal and 
moral freedom; 
Social embodiments of misinterpretations for which the rules of action themselves are at least partially 
responsible (Honneth, 2014b: 128). 
In contrast, misdevelopments are the obstacles held to be preventing ‘social freedom’, and thus, 
must be sought elsewhere, not in the constitutive rules of the respective system of action (Honneth, 
2004: 129). 
Schaub helps differentiate between the two: 
Let me give you an example for each [misdevelopments and social pathologies]: the socially triggered 
tendency to withdraw from communicative relationships and to view one’s involvements with others 
almost exclusively from the impersonal standpoint of law is one of Honneth’s examples of a legal 
pathology. Think, for instance, of a husband who, anticipating his divorce, starts to evaluate each and 
every move he makes strategically according to how it will be evaluated by a judge who has to decide 
on the custody of the couple’s children. The deregulation of the market sphere can serve as an 
                                                          
44 Schaub (2015: 113) writes that ‘Honneth associates different types of social aberrations [pathologies and 
misdevelopments] with the two types of relationships of recognition.’ One must note that for Schaub, who is 
entirely recognition-centric in his scholarship, this analysis may not be seen as intentionally furthering a recognition-
theoretical approach. 
45 For a full discussion on the methodological strengths and limitations of Freedom’s Right see the special issue of 
Critical Horizons 16(2).   
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example of a social misdevelopment. For it leads to a situation in which interactions between 
individuals are less and less about general and reciprocal interest satisfaction (Schaub, 2015: 113). 
Despite a lack of clarity in the broader literature, two comments can be made with some 
certainty: (a) central to Honneth’s distinction between ‘social pathologies’ and 
‘misdevelopments’ is whether the identified social malady serves as an obstacle to the 
development of ‘legal’ or ‘moral’ freedom (pathologies) or to ‘social’ freedom 
(misdevelopments), and (b) the obstacles to the attainment of social freedom are, for Honneth, 
not due to problems intrinsic to the social logics itself, but to a deviation from their harmonious, 
emancipatory potential.   
 
The troubling development of ‘misdevelopments’ 
Freyenhagen’s (2015) paper ‘Honneth on Social Pathologies: A Critique’ is rightly scathing about 
Honneth’s framing of ‘misdevelopments’, which is deemed fundamentally ‘unworkable’ 
(Freyenhagen, 2015: 131).  Similar to Schaub (2015), but with a subtly distinct emphasis, 
Freyenhagen understands the distinction Honneth attempts to make between ‘pathologies’ and 
‘misdevelopments’ as based on whether the social malady is due to ‘internal’ factors with the 
sphere of freedom (pathologies) or ‘external’ factors, which serve to retard the inherent 
emancipatory potential of a social sphere  (misdevelopments) (Freyenhagen, 2015: 146-147).  
Freyenhagen rightly critiques the distinction on two grounds. Firstly, it is unclear why certain 
social maladies might not be both ‘misdevelopments’ and ‘pathologies’ simultaneously, a 
consideration Honneth’s theoretical infrastructure in Freedom’s Right seems unable to 
accommodate (2015: 147). Second, the idea that social freedom does not have any pathologies 
seems arbitrary and unjustifiable: 
social freedom – roughly modelled on the idea of love, such that the pursuit and realization of your 
ends is reciprocally implied in the pursuit and realization of my own ends, and vice versa  is not just a 
superior freedom which provides the proper framework and the preconditions for the other two, but 
is so innocent and pure just like love is often thought to be that it can never be at fault when things go 
wrong within its practices and institutions. In this way, misdevelopments are reserved for the practices 
of social freedom, and only legal and moral freedom’s deviations are due to their internal structure 
(Freyenhagen, 2015: 147). 
As Freyenhagen argues, this distinction is never fully justified by Honneth, and is ultimately 
arbitrary and unhelpful. Freyenhagen goes so far as to identify thirteen ‘misdevelopments’ 
within Freedom’s Right which fail to neatly fit into Honneth’s parameters: some overlap 
between being obstacles to legal, moral and social freedom, others are simply underdeveloped 
or contradictory. Some are perhaps better considered as ‘injustices’ or ‘illegitimacies’ 
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(Freyenhagen, 2015: 148). This serves to transition Critical Theoretical critique away from its 
more foundational, deeper questions. 
Yet the clear theoretical limitations of Honneth’s framework are not the main concern of this 
chapter. What is of more interest to me is how recent developments in social pathology 
scholarship have served to restrict the potency of the framing and have fused social pathology 
with recognition. In this regard, Honneth’s framing of misdevelopments is crucially 
domesticating as it serves to restrict the framing of social pathologies, and to remove central 
social-structural logics from its purview. As Freyenhagen states, 
… A number of social problems that prior to Freedom’s Right were counted by Honneth as social 
pathologies … have now become misdevelopments. This might seem to be merely a rebranding of 
them. However … reframing these problems as misdevelopments suggests that the sphere in which 
they occur – the market – and its associated norms are itself unproblematic and should merely be 
protected from external influences (rather than overcome or at least contained in virtue of an in-built 
tendency to generate social pathologies). The sphere and its norms are removed from critical view, 
with a sole emphasis of critique on external influences (Freyenhagen, 2015: 148). 
Returning to Thompson’s (2016) critique of ‘domesticated’ Critical Theory, such a move away 
from the focus on central social logics, such as the market, previously of fundamental concern 
to Critical Theory, is a clear ‘domestication’. For Thompson, an analysis of the logics which ‘pulse 
beneath the surface’ (Thompson, 2016: 7) of capitalist society needs to be at the core of Critical 
Theory. In Freedom’s Right, Honneth’s turn to the language of ‘misdevelopments’ serves to 
make this concern inaccessible to social pathology diagnosing critique. Honneth’s desire is clear, 
to restrict the purview of ‘social pathology’ to instances where the individual fails to realise the 
emancipatory potentials for recognition within the legal and moral spheres of freedom (Schaub, 
2015). That the director of the Institute of Social Research would advocate a framing of social 
theory which excludes the central logics of social reproduction (capitalist logics) from critique 
would be unthinkable to first- and second-generation Critical Theorists. Honneth’s framing of 
misdevelopments, and his desire to move market logics into a terrain which can never evince 
social pathologies, evinces the truly ‘domesticated’ nature of contemporary Critical Theory 
(Thompson, 2016).  
 
The ascendancy of the recognition-cognitive conception of social pathology  
Zurn’s second-order disconnect framework 
The contemporary discussion on social pathology was significantly influenced by Christopher 
Zurn’s intervention which served to: (a) both (further) fuse pathology diagnosis with recognition, 
and (b) restrict the framing to a recognition-cognitive model (Freyenhagen, 2015). Zurn argued 
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that social pathologies ‘exhibit a similar underlying conceptual structure, that of second-order 
disorders’ (Zurn, 2011: 345). Such disorders operate through a  
 … fundamental disconnect between first-order contents and the subjects’ reflexive grasp of the 
origins and character of those contents, where that gap systematically serves to preserve otherwise 
dubious social structures and practices (Zurn, 2011: 348). 
Zurn’s framing of social pathology is considerably closer to a structure that one would 
traditionally associate with ideology, and he indeed argues that, 
Marx’s articulation of a theory of ideology …. is a good example of the conceptual structure … central 
to Honneth’s attempts to reinvigorate the practice of social critique through the diagnosis of social 
pathologies: namely, the grasp of social pathologies as second-order disorders (Zurn, 2011: 346).  
For Zurn, ideology represents an archetypal social pathology insofar as 
it contributes to deleterious social outcomes through a kind of second-order disorder, a disorder 
socially patterned and thereby contributes to unwanted social outcomes (Zurn, 2011: 348).  
While straightforward factual inaccuracies which can inhibit self-realisation (for instance, 
believing that Cambridge is the capital of England) can arise from plain mistakes, or 
miscommunication, ideological beliefs can only be ‘explained by second-order distortions in the 
process of belief-formation and stabilisation’ (Zurn, 2011: 347-8). It is only maladies of this 
second species that Zurn holds as social pathologies. For Zurn, all social pathologies are thus 
cognitive impairments where second-order operations are impeded, precipitating undesired 
social outcomes. It is immediately apparent that Zurn’s conception of social pathology is 
radically cognitivist. 
Zurn must also be credited with explicitly marrying this cognitivist framing with Honneth’s 
critical theory of recognition. It is Zurn’s intervention which moved social pathology scholarship 
in both a cognitivist and a recognition-theoretical manner. It is this particular conception of 
social pathology that I term ‘recognition-cognitive’. As Zurn establishes, in his framework, it is 
ideological acts of recognition which represent the reality of social pathologies. 
Honneth seeks a way of identifying, in the act of the recognition relationship itself, which markers we 
could use to say that it is an ideologically distorting, rather than a socially productive, instance of 
interpersonal recognition. His answer is basically that acts of recognition are ideological when there 
is a substantial gap between the evaluative acknowledgement or promise that the act centres upon, 
and the institutional and material conditions necessary for the fulfilment of that acknowledgement 
or promise (Zurn, 2011: 349). 
From Zurn’s perspective, deficient recognition relationships alone can no longer be framed as 
social pathologies. As Zurn argues, ‘without the second-order disorder, what we might 
generically call ‘bad’ acts of recognition (misrecognition, non-recognition) are not ideological’, 
therefore for Zurn, they ‘cannot count as social pathologies’ (Zurn, 2011: 349). This brings us to 
an understanding of social pathologies as socially induced second-order cognitive disconnects 
which perpetuate ideologically structured recognition relationships. The comparatively 
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restrictive nature of this conception is immediately obvious, and has been subjected to critical 
analysis (Freyenhagen, 2015; Laitinen, 2015). 
Freyenhagen rightly comments that Zurn’s formulation serves to locate social pathologies 
solely ‘in the head’ (Freyenhagen, 2015: 136). Furthering Thompson (2016), I argue the 
transition to Zurn’s approach marks a clear ‘domestication’ a such a framing fails to equip social 
theorists with the tools essential for identifying problems existing in the broader social world; 
conceptual tools previously offered by the broader conceptions of social pathology (Chapter 
One, Chapters Four to Six).  Freyenhagen reads Zurn’s conception of social pathology as stating 
that ‘the problem is how people interpret the world, not that it needs changing at a fundamental 
level’ (Freyenhagen, 2015: 145). What Laitinen describes as the ‘institutional reality’ of social 
freedom is untouched by Zurn’s characterisation (Laitinen, 2015: 44). It should be noted that 
while Freyenhagen and Laitinen both critique the restrictive and cognitivist nature of Zurn’s 
framing, the heightened limitations produced by Zurn’s marriage of the cognitive with the 
recognitive is left unaddressed in their analysis. This is perhaps because both theorists remain 
within a broadly ‘pathologies of recognition’ paradigm. It is worth noting that even for scholars 
who embrace the recognition-theoretical framing of social pathology, Zurn’s account is seen as 
too restrictive. This is not because of its recognition-centricism, but because of the tight confines 
of its cognitive requirement.  
 
Zurn’s influence on Honneth 
Despite the restrictive nature of Zurn’s framing of social pathology, his account has been highly 
influential (Freyenhagen, 2015: 136). While Honneth does not explicitly adopt Zurn’s 
formulation to the letter, his framing of social pathology in the preface to The Idea of Socialism 
(for example) is clearly reflective of Zurn’s analysis. This is in clear contrast to Honneth’s (2000, 
2007) earlier framings of social pathology: consider his discussion of Rousseau and Hegel as 
‘social pathologists’. This increasingly cognitive understanding is reiterated by Honneth when he 
introduces social pathologies as being ‘found at a higher stage of social reproduction’ and 
functioning to ‘impact subjects’ reflexive access to primary systems of actions and norms’ 
(Honneth, 2014b: 86). Elsewhere, Honneth explicitly utilises Zurn’s framing of second-order 
disorders, introducing pathologies as ‘deficits of rationality in which first-order beliefs and 
practices can no longer be acquired and implemented at a second order’ (Honneth, 2014b: 86). 
That said, it is worth stressing that Honneth does not simply adopt Zurn’s framing verbatim. 
Rather, his discussion leads towards social pathologies being evinced through 
Verhaltenserstarrung; a rigidity ‘in social behaviour’ and self-relation (Honneth, 2014b: 87). 
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However, in the final analysis, this rigidity is ultimately a manifestation of the second-order 
cognitive disconnect articulated by Zurn.  
Returning briefly to Laitinen’s critique, Honneth intentionally locates social pathologies 
beyond the complex ‘institutional reality’ of ‘social freedom’ (Laitinen, 2015: 44). Honneth 
presents social pathologies as only existing in the realms of legal and moral freedom; as stated 
above the maladies of ‘social freedom’ are presented instead as ‘misdevelopments’. Thus, 
returning to Freyenhagen’s useful turn of phrase, Honneth’s Freedom’s Right follows Zurn in 
locating social pathologies entirely ‘in the head’: as cognitive disconnects restricting subjects’ 
capacity to realise their own moral and legal freedoms (Freyenhagen, 2015).     
In his most recent work, The Idea of Socialism, Honneth makes limited use of the notion of 
social pathology. He does however turn to it in one intriguing passage: 
It might help to recall that current economic and social events appear far too complex and thus 
opaque to public consciousness to be capable of intentional transformation. This is particularly true 
when it comes to processes of economic globalisation in which transactions are carried out too 
quickly to be understood; here a kind of second-order pathology seems to make institutional 
conditions appear as mere givens, as being ‘reified’ and thus immune to any efforts to change them 
(Honneth, 2016: 3-4). 
By describing the pathology as ‘second order’, Honneth once again lends support to Zurn’s 
cognitive framing. What is perhaps of equal interest is that in a monograph discussing the 
foundational arguments in favour of socialism, Honneth does not turn again to social pathology. 
Considering Honneth’s previous investment in the heurism, the framing of social pathology 
becomes conspicuous through its absence. One might infer that Honneth has perhaps become 
less invested in social pathology scholarship; or, as I argue, that the heurism is simply of much 
less utility when grasped in the restrictive recognition-cognitive manner. 
 
The restrictive nature of the recognition-cognitive conception of social pathology 
As this thesis argues, the increasing turn in the literature to recognition-derived framings of 
social pathology precipitates a retreat from the plurality of understandings of pathology in 
circulation (Chapter One, Chapters Four to Six). Not only does this approach evince the deficits 
expressed in Chapter Two, of debated social theoretical and philosophical robustness, the 
framework also excludes the critical potency harboured by rival understandings. To return to 
the critical animus driving social theorists to utilise pathology diagnosis critique, the diagnosis 
of social pathologies enables social theorists to conduct ‘thicker’ social criticism, probing the 
form of life itself (Neuhouser, 2012). As already commented (Chapter One), and as this thesis 
builds to establish, the critical literature presents multiple conceptions of social pathology. This 
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breadth of interpretations enables social theorists to critique social maladies across social 
registers.  In contrast to this rich social-theoretical tradition, the recognition-cognitive is 
particularly restrictive: only a set group of recognition pathologies, to Zurn, can be understood 
qua social pathologies.   
The comparatively restrictive nature of the recognition-cognitive model is immediately 
apparent. The recognition-cognitive conception of social pathology only enabling theorists to 
engage with a limited, specific set of socially produced obstacles to human self-realisation. Recall 
in the recognition-cognitive framing only second-order disorders perpetuating ideologically 
structured recognition relationships are social pathologies. To pick one possible example out of 
many, this framework entirely excludes negative self-perpetuating dynamics, a conception of 
social pathology discussed by Neuhouser (2012) and seen as central to Rousseau’s social 
pathology diagnosis (Chapter Four). This is a serious restriction on the efficacy of the framing. 
Such dynamics are not captured by the traditional liberal categories of injustice or illegitimacy 
and the framework of social pathology seems entirely apposite to describe such phenomena 
(Chapter One). Similarly, the conception of social pathology associated with Fromm, of 
pathologies of normalcy, is entirely excluded from the recognition-cognitive framework 
(Chapter Six). Fromm’s rich contribution to the pathology diagnosing tradition placed the 
critique of a form of life at its centre, through its analysis of the impact of mass validation on 
accepted social ends and goals. The recognition-cognitive framing’s inability to pose such 
questions further represents a ‘domestication’ of pathology diagnosing critique’s critical 
potency.    
It should also be noted that while the recognition-cognitive model affords a primacy to the 
presence of cognitive disconnects, the framing is substantially at variance from the 
metaphysically weighty pathologies of reason conceptualisation (Chapter Five). The left-
Hegelian critique of historically effective reason enables social theorists to examine, with a 
singular conceptual sweep, both the cognitive capacities of subjects, and the extant 
development of reason within social institutions. Contrastingly, the recognition-cognitive 
framework focuses exclusively on the subject, and particularly, on the presence of a particular 
cognitive impairment. Contra the left-Hegelian tradition, the subject is not held to embody the 
historically unfolding developments of reason across society. Comparatively, the analytical 
sweep of the recognition-cognitive model is much less ambitious. Once again, one witnesses the 
rich social pathology diagnosing tradition being displaced by an ascendant recognition derived 
framing.        
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It is thus only the pathologies of recognition conceptualisation of social pathology that is 
compatible with the recognition-cognitive turn, and even then, with weighty caveats. Recall that 
for Zurn deficient recognition relationships that do not demonstrate a second-order disorder do 
not represent social pathologies. Thus, the recognition-cognitive conception of social pathology 
is only compatible with a subset of pathologies of recognition. As subsequent chapters shall 
argue, exclusively recognition-derived framings of social pathology, especially the recognition-
cognitive framework, are unproductively restrictive, and serves to exclude potent, radical 
framings of social pathology (Chapter Four – Six).  
 
Anticipated rejoinders and possible responses thereto 
I have presented the manifold weaknesses of the Honnethian recognition-theoretical approach 
(Chapter Two), and demonstrated how this problematic framing has come to dominate 
pathology diagnosing social criticism (Chapter Three). Further, the additional limitations 
imposed by the Zurnian account of social pathologies as ‘second-order disorders’, and the 
domesticating impact of Honneth’s framing of ‘misdevelopments’, have been presented and 
criticised (above). Having submitted my arguments against these leading approaches to 
pathology diagnosing social critique, it is worth briefly considering how theorists invested in such 
recognition-derived framings might respond. Sadly, as previously indicated, there is a worrying 
lack of engagement from recognition theorists with arguments against their position 
(Introduction; Harris, 2019). The critical literature, reflective of the broader discussion, is 
damagingly siloed (see my Conclusion). The following section is thus my attempt to imagine 
rejoinders to my criticisms, extrapolating from the limited existing scholarship to predict what 
recognition theorists might say if they were forced to comment on my analysis thus far. 
 
Possible rejoinders from Honneth and/or the Jyväskylä School 
In response to my critique of the pathologies of recognition framing, Honnethians, or Jyväskylä 
School theorists, might respond by reasserting the comparative merits of their position relative 
to prior, ‘canonical’ Critical Theoretical scholarship. They might stress that the pathologies of 
recognition framing enables Critical Theorists to move beyond the productivism of first-
generation theorists (Jay, 2012: 5). In this regard, they may connect their approach to 
Habermasian or Gorzian insights on the dangers of productivism (Wilde, 1998: 77-83). Honneth 
(1995) stresses that struggles for recognition occur across social domains, not solely within the 
market; love and respect are equally important features of healthy intersubjective relationships. 
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Such an analysis could be further developed to comment on how the pathologies of recognition 
approach is particularly popular as a tool for engaging with irrational racial and gender 
hierarchies (Hirvonen, 2015), both of which were problematically peripheral in earlier Critical 
Theoretical scholarship (Said, 1993: 278; Allen, 2016).  
On the charge of the exclusionary nature of their approach, in direct opposition to Thompson 
(2016), McNay (2008) and Fraser (Fraser and Honneth, 2001), Honnethians might continue to 
advance the position stated in Redistribution or Recognition: that a sufficiently well-ground 
recognition lens is capable of viewing the entirety of the social world. Despite the strength of 
the arguments against this position, an explicit denial seems to be the stock-response from 
recognition theorists. Hence, one can see Schaub and Odigbo (2019) attempting to diagnose the 
totality of economic pathologies through a pathologies of recognition framing, despite the 
voluminous literature pointing to the folly of such an enterprise (Chapter Two). For Honnethians, 
all that is required is a sufficiently differentiated recognition approach. If more problems are 
presented, the solution is to add nuance to their approach, to further finesse the recognition 
lens. Their contention would remain that the entirety of the social world is best understood as 
a network of interconnected recognition relationships and that social irrationalities are thus best 
characterised as deriving from pathologies of recognition (Honneth, 1995; Fraser and Honneth, 
2001).  
In response to the former rejoinder, that the recognition-derived approach to social 
pathology diagnosis, whatever its limitations, serves to overcome serious limitations in 
antecedent Critical Theoretical scholarship, I reply that the purported gains come at the cost of 
social-theoretical justifiability and political potency. While it was entirely the case that first-
generation Critical Theory failed to adequately interrogate concerns of race and gender (Said, 
1993; Allen, 2016), the pathologies of recognition approach fails to incorporate them into a 
philosophically justifiable, broader Critical Theoretical infrastructure. Further, recognition-
derived approaches, in addition to displacing many of pathologies intrinsic to the economic 
register, and through doing so impedes the political potency of Critical Theory (Thompson, 
2016), it does so without capturing the totality of the social pathologies which produce race and 
class hierarchies (Thompson, 2019).  The goal must be to produce a Critical Theory that can 
incorporate an analysis of class, race and gender centred social pathologies, and for this 
endeavour, as this thesis argues, a ‘polycentric and multilateral’ engagement is required (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001). The pathologies of recognition approach, while more alert to concerns of 
gender and race than earlier Critical Theoretical approaches, fails to provide a philosophically 
solid foundation for social critique, and excludes manifold social pathologies from its purview. 
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By presenting the entirety of the social world as a recognition order, Critical Theorists escape 
economism only by arriving at an unjustifiable, limited culturalism (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 
Chapter One). In response, in keeping with my broader thesis, I champion the merits of a multi-
perspectival pathology diagnosing account. The pathologies of recognition approach falls 
substantially short of such an objective.  
In response to the latter rejoinder, a direct rebuttal of Thompson’s (2016), McNay’s (2008) 
and Fraser’s (2001) arguments that a recognition approach cannot capture the totality of social 
pathologies, I point to the displaced utility of the multiple, alternate framings of social pathology 
(Chapters Four-Six). As I shall argue in the following chapters, a considered engagement with 
Rousseau, Hegel and Fromm draws out potent pathology diagnosing resources which are 
displaced by the dominant recognition-derived approaches to pathology diagnosing social 
criticism. There is a desperate need for recognition theorists to engage with the arguments 
against their position, as the claim that the pathologies of recognition perspective can capture 
the totality of the pathologies of the social world is simply unsustainable (Chapters Four-Six). 
 
Possible rejoinders from Zurn 
Similarly, Zurn, and those who identity merit in his approach (see above), might also respond to 
my criticisms by pointing to the relative merits of their position relative to the alternative 
conceptions of social pathology in wider literature. They might claim that Zurn’s account 
provides a much-needed theoretical specificity; the ‘second-order’ conception of social-
pathologies is much tighter, more precise than the muddle of alternate accounts of pathology 
in circulation (Honneth, 2007a, 2007b). They might perhaps concede that while Freyenhagen 
(2015) and Laitinen (2015) are correct, that the Zurnian account fails to capture the totality of 
insistence of social pathology found within the literature, that this exclusionary trait is in fact a 
strength, it sharpens the analytic focus of the heurism. The claim might be that, while there is 
indeed a plurality of alternate species of social wrongs not captured by their account of social 
pathology, Zurn’s framework is advantageous in that it clearly demarcates social problems which 
exist at a ‘higher order’ of social reproduction, through its focus on the reflexive capacities’ of 
subjects (Zurn, 2011). This conception thus succeeds in distilling the idea that there is something 
‘deeper’, something more intrinsically wrong with the form of social life that is engaged with 
through the framing of social pathology (Honneth, 2000).  
In response to such counter-claims, I would respond that theoretical specificity does not have 
to come at the cost of political impotence and social-theoretical myopia. As stated above, in 
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keeping with Laitinen (2015), there are numerous social problems which exist, which are 
foundational problems for social existence, which are at least once-removed from cognitive-
impairments in the social subject. The framing of social pathology has previously been utilised 
to provide a focus for pressing social ills which require penetrating social critique. Zurn’s 
cognitive account removes the social-structural logics integral to capitalist society from the 
purview of social pathology unless that incorporate a ‘second-order disorder’ component. By 
arbitrarily excluding non-cognitive concerns from the understanding of social pathology, I would 
counter that Zurn’s approach is theoretical unsound and politically problematic. As alternate, 
broader pathology diagnosing approach is essential for a more potent Critical Theory.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed recent developments in social pathology scholarship, charting the 
increasing fusion of pathology diagnosing critique and recognition theory. I have drawn out how 
this contingent marrying of frameworks has occurred through both the ascendancy of the 
‘pathologies of recognition’ approach, championed by the Jyväskylä School, and through Zurn’s 
‘recognition-cognitive’ understanding. Honneth’s short-lived framing of ‘misdevelopments’ was 
briefly engaged with, and the limitations of this approach were presented. By engaging with 
Freyenhagen (2015) and Schaub (2015), I demonstrated how Honneth’s framing of 
‘misdevelopments’ furthered the ascent of recognition theoretical approaches to social critique 
and attempted to displace central aspects of the pathology diagnosing tradition. Indeed, 
bringing Freyenhagen and Thompson (2016) into dialogue, I argued that Honneth’s framing of 
misdevelopments serves to exclude market logics from pathology diagnosing critique: a clear 
domestication of Critical Theory. 
While the pathologies of recognition framing needlessly restricts pathology diagnosing 
critique to the recognition register, I have explained how Zurn’s ‘recognition-cognitive’ 
understanding enforces even more crippling restrictions. With Zurn, social pathology diagnosing 
critique is not merely fused with recognition theory but is further curtailed to instances of an 
extremely specific cognitive dynamic, to occurrences of ‘second order disconnects’. Such a 
framing serves to drastically enfeeble the pathology diagnosing tradition.  
The arguments presented here presage those of Chapters Four to Six, each of which advances 
the merits of an alternate, non-recognition derived framing of social pathology, which has been 
needlessly excluded by the dominance of recognition, and recognition-cognitive framings of 
social pathology. 
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Chapter Four 
Rousseau: the social pathologist par excellence 
Introduction 
An engagement with Rousseau is essential for revitalising forms of pathology diagnosing critique 
which transcend the dominant recognition paradigm. This chapter presents Rousseau as the 
progenitor of social pathology diagnosis; and thus, in Honneth’s words, as the true ‘founder of 
social philosophy’ (Honneth, 2007c: 10). Rousseau’s importance for Critical Theory (Thompson, 
2015; Ferrara, 2017), and indeed to sociology as a discipline more broadly, cannot be 
understated (Darling, 1994). Durkheim (1960) notably viewed Rousseau as the first ‘sociologist’. 
This chapter argues that Rousseau’s scholarship was dominated by his diagnosis of social 
pathologies (Honneth, 2007c: 7). A considered engagement with Rousseau discloses multiple, 
distinct framings of social pathology, which transcend the dominant recognition-derived 
approach (as introduced in Chapter Three). 
Rousseau has also been presented as the recognition theorist par excellence (Neuhouser, 
2008). It is therefore particularly gratifying to discover such resources within Rousseau’s own 
work.  As the secondary literature stresses, Rousseau’s analysis is indeed largely concerned with 
the foundational ‘breach of the monological self-relation’ (Honneth, 2007c: 8) that led to the 
tragic loss of man’s natural, ‘pure’ innocence (Darling, 1994: 6). Yet, even for Rousseau, a 
foundational recognition-theorist (Neuhouser, 2008), a recognition perspective, 
unaccompanied by alternate pathology framings, is of limited utility. This is patently evident 
because numerous, well-developed framings of social pathology can be found across Rousseau’s 
oeuvre, which are incompatible with a ‘pathologies of recognition’ approach. Through a 
presentation of these divergent framings of social pathology, this chapter seeks to further my 
critique of the dominant, restrictive, recognition-derived frameworks, and to stress the plurality 
of potent framings of social pathology which Critical Theorists should return to.   
This chapter commences with a brief reconstruction of Rousseau’s oeuvre framed through 
the lens of social pathology diagnosis. This is offered to establish the true extent to which 
Rousseau’s work was dominated by pathology diagnosing social critique. This serves to justify 
my contention that Rousseau, the recognition theorist par excellence (Shaver, 1989; Neuhouser, 
2008), is equally the social pathologist par excellence. This analysis is also presented to justify 
my turn to Rousseau as a legitimate point of departure for my reconstructive project: as stressed 
in my introduction there was no shortage of possibilities. Such an engagement additionally 
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serves to foreground my subsequent analysis. I contend that Rousseau’s life and work can be 
crudely framed as:  
a) ‘an early Rousseau’: with his initial diagnosis of social pathology, 
b) ‘a middle period Rousseau’: with his attempts at a solution, and 
c) ‘a late period Rousseau’: with his turn to introspective reverie as a cognitive palliative. 
Having presented the centrality of ‘pathology diagnosis’ to Rousseau’s life and work, I outline 
five divergent framings of social pathology which can be found within, and across, Rousseau’s 
output. In this endeavour I both utilise, and diverge from, Neuhouser’s (2012) analysis of 
Rousseau’s Discourse on Political Economy. My attempt here is to present an analysis indicative 
of the framings of social pathology which can be located across Rousseau’s work, not solely 
focusing on the Discourse on Political Economy.46 Mine is, of course, an incomplete analysis, but 
serves to outline in some detail the following central pathology diagnosing framings in 
Rousseau’s work, namely: 
a) Self-perpetuating negative dynamics, 
b) Unstructured dependency, 
c) Cultural Pathology, 
d) The colonisation of one social sphere by the logic of another, and, 
e) Multiple layers of recognition pathology. 
Having sympathetically introduced these multiple framings of social pathology, I move to outline 
three points of divergence between Rousseau’s analysis and today’s dominant recognition-
derived framings (Chapter Three). Particular emphasis is placed on the utility of Rousseau’s 
diagnosis of ‘rationality-colonising’ pathologies, the chapter argues that such an approach 
interfaces well with Dialectic of Enlightenment style arguments (Honneth, 2000). Such an 
approach is entirely divergent from the dominant pathologies of recognition and recognition-
cognitive frameworks. Next, drawing on Neuhouser (2012), I point to the import of viewing 
social pathologies as being built on, or in many instances necessitating, self-perpetuating 
negative dynamics. As presented, such dynamics can occur without any intentional ‘human 
malevolence’ (Rousseau, 1979: 45). Indeed, pace the dominant recognition-cognitive framing, 
drawing on Rousseau, I argue that such pathologies, while ultimately experienced cognitively, 
are located in social practices and logics which exist at a different ontological level to that of 
                                                          
46 Which was Neuhouser’s (2012) project in ‘Rousseau und die Idee einer pathologischen Gesellschaft’.  
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human consciousness.  Echoing Neuhouser,47 pace today’s dominant framing of social 
pathology, I argue that such maladies are appropriately described in the language of pathology 
(Neuhouser, 2012: 637-640).  
Finally, by returning to my initial exposition of Rousseau as a social pathologist, I move to 
reinforce the central argument of my thesis: that Rousseau himself, the father of recognition 
theory (Shaver, 1989; Neuhouser, 2008), turns to multiple conceptions of social pathology 
removed from a ‘pathologies of recognition’, or recognition-cognitive framework. I argue that 
this dramatically underscores the essential limitations of the dominant, restrictive, pathologies 
of recognition and recognition-cognitive frameworks. Rousseau, a crucial progenitor of 
recognition theory, who views the entire corruption of civilisation as precipitated by changing 
recognition relations, still does not attempt an analysis of the social without utilising additional, 
alternate, non-recognition-based framings of social pathology. 
 
Rousseau: The consummate social pathologist 
The aim of this section is to articulate how Rousseau’s pathology diagnosing critique inflected 
his entire output, and thus to underscore the merits of my engagement with his complete 
corpus. This is presented to justify my turn to Rousseau as a starting point for my reconstructive 
project. I contend that Rousseau’s diagnosis can be found in his operas, his roman a clef, his 
musicology, his plays, and his autobiography, in addition, of course, to his seminal social-theory. 
This section further serves to foreground my discussion of Rousseau’s most prominent framings 
of social pathology. I present this analysis to justify my initial turn to Rousseau, rather than the 
legion of potential alternate scholars who have been labelled as social pathologists 
(Introduction; Honneth, 2007 inter alia). As established in my earlier chapters, I do not argue 
that an engagement with Rousseau alone will be sufficient to revitalise pathology diagnosing 
critique. Rather, as I hope to establish here, analysing his work marks an entirely appropriate 
place to commence such a project.  
Rousseau’s oeuvre can be crudely divided into three periods relative to his changing 
diagnoses of social pathology: ‘an early Rousseau’ (1743-1761), ‘a mid-period Rousseau’ (1762-
1771) and ‘a late Rousseau’ (1772-1778). Early Rousseau is the radical pathology diagnostician, 
mid-period Rousseau forwarding iconoclastic palliatives, late-Rousseau, withdrawn, finding 
introspective means of coping with the pathologies of the social. 
                                                          
47 While this chapter draws on Neuhouser, and approves of his analysis in ‘Rousseau und die Idee einer 
pathologischen Gesellschaft’, his broader philosophical work, such as Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love (2008) sits 
problematically close to the dominant recognition perspective.  
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The Early Rousseau: 1743-1761 
In 1750 the Academy of Dijon hosted an essay competition, inviting responses to the following 
stimulus: ‘Has the restoration of the sciences and arts contributed to the purification of morals?’ 
(Wokler, 2001: 23). Rousseau’s submission, the famous Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, 
collected first prize, his response a resounding negative.48 For Noone, this work marked the 
beginning of Rousseau’s ‘war with society’ (Noone, 1980: 6). The First Discourse can be read as 
commencing Rousseau’s lifelong investment in articulating, and, in his later work ameliorating, 
social pathologies. 
Commencing with Horace’s epigram, ‘Decipimur specie recti’ (Rousseau, 1993: 3),49 Rousseau 
argued that civilization is ‘the bane of humanity’ (Wokler, 2001: 34).  Drawing on both 
contemporary sources and texts from antiquity, Rousseau passionately argued that society, 
‘maintained the appearance of all the virtues, without being in possession of one of them’ 
(Rousseau, 1993: 5). Rousseau’s indictment is that humanity has been denatured through the 
civilising process, leading to the erasure of mankind’s ‘natural’, child-like innocence (Douglass, 
2015). From this early stage in Rousseau’s work it is the ‘natural’, and the ‘natural world’ which 
is triumphed, and the city which is remorselessly castigated (Lukacs, 1972: 136). Ironically, it is 
thus the nations which pride themselves most on their superiority in art and culture, that prove 
least commensurate with the conditions necessary for humankind50 to experience their true 
humanity (Rousseau, 1953, 1984, 1993; Strong, 1994; Wokler, 2001). Ultimately civilisations that 
invest too heavily in the ‘perpetual restraint’ of arts driven ‘society’ will crumble under the 
weight of their supreme decadence (Rousseau, 1993: 6).  
Yet despite possessing ‘neither order, nor logic, nor structure’ (Wokler, 2001: 23), The First 
Discourse is truly significant as a pathology diagnosing text.51 The content of the work itself, as 
a social pathology, is of obvious direct relevance. The First Discourse offered a radical critique of 
the form of life, in Strong’s words, it was perhaps the first essay to really show ‘the 
homelessness’52 of humanity (Strong: 1994: 152). Yet equally importantly for understanding 
Rousseau as a social pathologist is the formative influence this engagement had on his 
                                                          
48 This text will also be referred to in this chapter as The First Discourse. 
49 I loosely translate this as ‘we are deceived by what seems to be right’. 
50 While this project makes a concerted effort to avoid gendered pronouns and analysis more broadly, when 
engaging with Rousseau this is not possible. While Fromm can be translated with gender-neutral terms without 
impeding his analysis, Rousseau’s work is explicitly gendered, to pretend to the contrary would be both obfuscating, 
and any such an erasure would arguably be politically problematic in itself. 
51 Rousseau himself came to dislike the First Discourse, regarding it ‘as amongst the worst’ of his writing (Rousseau, 
1953: 328-9). 
52 Compare this framing with the German ‘bei sich, zu Hause’ understanding of alienation [Entfremdung] (Hardimon, 
1992: 167-8). 
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subsequent thinking (Damrosch, 2005). In The Confessions, Rousseau recalls how it was through 
the process of writing The First Discourse that he first ‘saw another universe’; that he ‘became a 
different man’ (Rousseau, 1953: 327). In my analysis, it was with The First Discourse that 
Rousseau found his distinctive voice, and his identity, as a social pathologist. From this point on, 
all of Rousseau’s published work bore (at the very least) leitmotifs of pathology diagnosis 
(Wokler, 2001; Damrosch, 2005): the multifarious evils of the city, the comparative majestic 
‘purity’ of nature, the tragedies of inflamed pride, and the denaturing impact of labour in 
‘civilised’ society. 
While The First Discourse and Le Devin du Village53 positioned Rousseau as an enigmatic 
contrarian, a 1753 essay, Letter on French Music, triggered palpable hostility from the 
establishment. Uniting aspects of his pathology diagnosis from Discourse on the Arts and 
Sciences with earlier fragments on musicology, Rousseau’s essay earned him condemnation and 
infamy unprecedented in Querelle des Bouffons.54 For Rousseau (1995), French music typified 
the pathological artificiality of the city. Northern European speech was presented as being less 
mellifluous, more staccato, less natural. In contrast, Southern European speech was more 
enchanting, more animated, more human. The inclement conditions of the ‘North’ precipitated 
a vernacular most adept for the instrumental communication of needs: ‘shrill’, ‘unpassioned’ 
[sic], equivalence oriented (Rousseau, 1995: 380, 407-409). The regulars of Theatre du Palais-
Royal that Rousseau deplored were (not so) implicitly condemned for their discourse shorn of 
‘sweetness’, suitable only for pathos-less langue de bois (Rousseau, 1995: 425-427). Rousseau’s 
Letter on French Music is a clear continuation of the core themes of The First Discourse. One can 
image Rousseau’s contempt for the forced paean to beauty cleansed for the palate of the 
Parisian nobility. With his contribution to the Guerre des Bouffons Rousseau focused his 
pathology diagnosing critique on the alienated, ‘fraudulent’, lack of humanity that the arts 
precipitate. Once again, it is Rousseau’s voice as a social pathologist which resonates crisply 
throughout this essay.  
While The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences precipitated Rousseau’s rise to prominence, it 
was with the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, four years later, that Rousseau’s mature 
diagnosis was most memorably expressed. Retaining the pathos and interdisciplinarity of The 
First Discourse, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality was substantially better structured, with 
                                                          
53 Rousseau’s first successful opera, often translated as The Village Soothsayer. While the score is musicologically 
progressive, the libretto is socially conservative.  
54 Querelle des Bouffons (Quarrel of the Comedic Actors) is the term most often applied to the extended 
musicological-philosophical debate that took place in Paris between 1752-4. Sometimes known instead as Guerre 
des Bouffons (War of the Comedic Actors), the battle lines were drawn between the respective supporters of French 
and Italian opera.  
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clearer, more developed argumentation (Wokler, 2001).55 Honneth (2007) suggests this work 
represents the pinnacle of Rousseau’s pathology diagnosing social theory. Commencing with a 
fictive anthropology, Rousseau (1984) outlines how humanity has passed through three key 
stages: from a natural, unalienated existence, through an initial early sociality, to today’s 
debased, pathologically alienated, social order.56 Rousseau seeks: 
to pinpoint that moment in the progress of things when, with right succeeding violence, nature was 
subjected to the law; to explain by what sequence of prodigious events the strong could resolve to 
serve the weak, and the people to purchase imaginary happiness at the price of real happiness 
(Rousseau, 1984: 77-78). 
In the first stage, man is initially described as a simple, self-sufficient creature:   
… an animal less strong than some, less agile than others, but taken as a whole the most 
advantageously organized of all. I see him satisfying his hunger under an oak, quenching his thirst at 
the first stream, finding his bed under the same tree, which provided the meal; and behold, his needs 
are furnished (Rousseau, 1984: 81). 
There existed a brief happy median, of natural but communal sociality, where humans were 
social but self-reliant.  
People grew used to gathering together in front of their huts or around a large tree; singing and 
dancing, true progeny of love and leisure (Rousseau, 1984: 114). 
Yet such an idyll was not to last: 
Each began to look at others and to want to be looked at himself; he who was most handsome, the 
strongest, the most adroit or the most eloquent became the most highly regarded… (Rousseau, 1984: 
114). 
The human race began to 
… attach importance to the gaze of the rest of the world, and … (knew) how to be happy and satisfied 
with themselves (only) on the testimony of others, rather than on their own (Rousseau: 1984: 136). 
Central to Rousseau’s diagnosis is the rupture of man’s monological self-relation. There is a 
foundational recognition pathology at the core of Rousseau’s diagnosis (Neuhouser, 2008). With 
civilisation, ‘[n]atural pity suffered … dilution’ (Rousseau, 1984: 132) at the expense of an 
ascendant inflamed pride, Amour-Propre. The natural innocence of this hypostatised mid-period 
of human development was tragically displaced by the ‘passions and caprices of civilized 
communities’ (Rousseau: 1984: 83). Unalienated ‘natural’ man was lost with the ascendancy of 
the ‘artificial faculties’ (Rousseau, 1984: 81) prized by modernity.   
The Second Discourse details how the ascent of an inflamed Amour-Propre precipitated 
relations of unstructured dependency. While ‘man is weak when he is dependent’ (Rousseau, 
1984: 99), modernity precipitates ‘universal dependence’ (Rousseau, 1984: 98). Of equal import 
                                                          
55 This text will also be referred to as The Second Discourse.  
56 For a more expansive, and more critical framing, see Robinson (2008). 
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was Rousseau’s indictment of the pathological cultural apparatus which perpetuated this social 
conjecture. Based on falsehood, complicity and alienation,  
… it was necessary in one’s own interest to seem to be other than one was in reality. Being and 
appearance became two entirely different things (Rousseau, 1984: 119). 
What I hope to establish here is the legitimacy of reading The Second Discourse as an exposition 
of social pathology. It was with this text that Rousseau truly became ‘the first great critic of 
bourgeois society’ (Plattner, 1979: 3), the social pathologist par excellence. 
From 1762 Rousseau’s diagnosis is gradually displaced by texts designed to explicitly facilitate 
political transition; to ameliorate the pathologies articulated.   
 
The Mid-Period Rousseau: 1762-1771 
Where previously the focus of Rousseau’s work was on articulating a diagnosis of social 
pathology; from 1762 he produced explicitly political texts, which can be read as suggested 
‘cures’ or ‘palliatives’ (Affeldt, 1999; Neuhouser, 2012). In 1762 Rousseau published two 
particularly ‘incendiary’ texts: The Social Contract and Émile.57 
The Social Contract has been read as an explicit attempt to cure the ills outlined in The Second 
Discourse through a radical republicanism (Neuhouser, 2012: 628). The Social Contract was an 
attempt to structure society in such a way that: 
… each citizen shall be at the same time perfectly independent of all his fellow citizens and excessively 
dependent on the republic (Rousseau, 1968a: 99). 
Recall The Second Discourse’s critique of pathologically unstructured dependence. The Social 
Contract is an attempt to structure dependence: in Rousseau’s formulation all must depend on 
the state. Such a polity, theoretically, would encourage a ‘moral and communal existence’ 
(Rousseau, 1968a: 85). The Social Contract presents the blueprint for a society capable of 
existing without the pathologies of dependence, and thus able to cultivate republican virtue 
(Rousseau, 1968a). There is a structural beauty in Rousseau’s figuration in his attempt to recast 
Amour-Propre as a source of social cohesion rather than personal enmity (Neuhouser, 2008).58 
Through state-led processes of socialisation, the citizens of the hypostatized republic will come 
to direct their desire for recognition and pride towards their shared status as citizens of the same 
polity. What was once the greatest source of enmity has become the binding force for solidarity 
(Rousseau, 1968a; Neuhouser, 2008).  
                                                          
57 Both were burned, despite substantial opposition from the philosophes. Voltaire famously stated that the burning 
of the text was one of the few things as atrocious as the writing of it (Gay, 1959). 
58 It is this structural beauty: the conversion of the fundamental ‘fall’ into the basis for redemption that animates 
Neuhouser’s (2008) Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love.  
83 
 
Émile, in contrast, while equally political, and if anything, even more controversial, was 
essentially an expression of a critical pedagogy. While sections of the text advance pathology 
diagnosis, the core aim of the text was to present a methodology through which a child may be 
raised to cope with said social maladies. In keeping with The Social Contract, Émile’s most 
important lessons are that man’s ‘weakness makes him sociable’ (Rousseau, 1911: 182); that he 
should trust his inner sentiment, and that freedom is the ultimate end. Émile is fully aware that 
he ‘cannot keep his wealth and his freedom’ (Rousseau, 1911: 436). In keeping with Rousseau’s 
earlier critique of the pathological nature of bourgeois culture, Emile is taught that  
… [t]he rich think so much of … their possessions … not because they are useful, but because they are 
beyond the reach of the poor (Rousseau, 1911: 149). 
‘The cure’ remains consistent with the lessons of The Social Contract: invest the general will with 
a true power, beyond that of any single subject. 
In 1755 Paoli liberated Corsica from Genoan rule (Lear, 1870: 260). Rousseau had a pre-
existing interest in Corsica, repeatedly remarking of its simplicity and freedom (Durant and 
Durant, 1967: 204; Damrosch, 2005: 386). On the invite of Buttafuoco, Rousseau enthusiastically 
set to drafting a constitution for the Mediterranean island. Rousseau’s affective investment in 
this project cannot be underestimated. In May 1765, he declared, 
… for the rest of my life I shall have no other interest but myself and Corsica; all other matters will be 
completely banished from my thoughts (Durrant, 1967: 204). 
Corsica retained the simple way of life he so admired. He was truly exercised when France 
deposed Paoli, and destroyed the prospect of a free, rustic Corsican republic. For Damrosch, 
Rousseau’s larger argument was ‘that Corsica should resist modernization at all costs in order to 
preserve its primitive simplicity’ (Damrosch, 2005: 387). Rousseau’s Constitutional Project for 
Corsica is of real interest in that it represents a political project designed to prevent the onset 
of many of the social pathologies he has elsewhere diagnosed (Damrosch, 2005: 386-390).     
In 1771 Rousseau wrote the last of his three main political texts, Considerations on the 
Government of Poland.59 Confounding many readers, The Government of Poland is a somewhat 
conservative text (Durrant, 1967: 884). In Durrant’s words, 
… he advised the Poles to make no sudden changes in their constitution (Durrant, 1967: 884). 
And yet traces of the early Rousseau still remain; his most strident demand is for federalisation 
and for opposing territorial expansion. A small republic might (with luck) defy the pathologising 
tendencies of modernity. This was the last of Rousseau’s explicitly political works. His thought 
                                                          
59 To today’s reader, the title is slightly deceptive. Rather than ‘Poland’, Rousseau’s proposal was for the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
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had travelled many fathoms since The First Discourse. From the ‘flights in vacuo’ (Durrant, 1967: 
884) of The Social Contract, The Government of Poland is materially anchored and short on 
abstraction. But what is clear throughout Rousseau’s work to this point is his early development 
of a penetrating pathology diagnosis, to the creation of a three core political texts, seeking to 
vitiate such pathological conditions.  
 
The Late Rousseau: 1772-1778  
From 1772 to his death in 1778, Rousseau turned to introspection and reverie. Dissatisfied with 
the failure of his political works to achieve institutional traction, ostracised by high society as a 
whole; Rousseau’s scholarship in this period marked a real change in style and intent. I frame 
the works of the ‘late Rousseau’ as typified by his efforts to come to terms with the pathological 
nature of society through a turn to introspection.  
In addition to the hugely successful Dialogues, this period saw Rousseau’s Reveries of a 
Solitary Walker. Rousseau’s bleak frame of mind is well captured by its opening line, ‘so now I 
am alone in the world’ (Rousseau, 1979: 27). In his despair and isolation, Rousseau turned to a 
‘total renunciation of the [material] world’ (Rousseau, 1979: 52), to psychically estrange himself 
from the evils of the pathological social conjecture. Seeing nothing but ‘human malevolence’ 
(Rousseau, 1979: 45) and ‘universal conspiracy’ (Rousseau, 1979: 44), Rousseau mourned ‘the 
sweet liberty [he] … had lost’ (Rousseau, 1979: 50). In contrast, nature again, triumphs. It is the 
city which is the epitome of evil: 
I see nothing but animosity in the faces of men, and nature always smiles on me (Rousseau, 1979: 
149). 
In his final years Rousseau turned to nature, to his love of botany, and to quiet introspective 
reflection.  
Throughout this brief sketch I have argued that Rousseau’s scholarship was animated by his 
‘condemnation … of modernity’ (Plattner, 1979: 5); what I present as his diagnosis of social 
pathology. Rousseau was unique in consistently engaging with the ‘depth of the human 
problem’ (Cullen, 1993: 19); his political writings, operas, plays: all were inflected by his 
diagnosis of social pathology. It is thus unsurprising that the social-theoretical infrastructure of 
his legacy offers a wealth of resources which harbour the potential to revitalise contemporary 
social pathology diagnosis. Having justified turning to Rousseau as a legitimate point of 
departure for my broader project, I now turn to reconstruct the most potent and prominent 
framings of pathology in Rousseau’s work.    
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Reconstructing Multiple Framings of Social Pathology in Rousseau’s work 
I now turn to reconstruct the most pertinent framings of social pathology in Rousseau’s work. 
The aim of this exploration is to draw out conceptions of social pathology which transcend the 
artificial boundaries of the Honnethian-recognition derived approaches dominant in today’s 
literature (Chapter Three). This section thus reconstructs no fewer than five framings of social 
pathology which, through their variance from the dominant recognition-derived paradigm, can 
provide important resources for revitalising contemporary pathology diagnosing critique. This 
analysis extends Neuhouser’s (2012) engagement with Rousseau’s Discourse on Political 
Economy, where he locates multiple framings of social pathology within that one text. While 
Neuhouser’s analysis is of real utility, the following section has a more expansive focus, 
encompassing the breadth of Rousseau’s corpus. I stress the engagement focuses on a range of 
Rousseau’s publications: this section does not limit itself to Rousseau’s social theory, rather, as 
argued above, one can read Rousseau as engaging in pathology diagnosing critique across the 
various genres and disciplines of his output.     
 
Pathological Social Dynamics 
A recurring framing of social pathology that can be found throughout Rousseau’s work is his 
analysis of self-perpetuating negative dynamics. While so often writing in opposition to the spirit 
of his era, in this regard Rousseau’s diagnosis is animated by a typical Enlightenment concern 
with modalities, logics and patterns (Delaney, 2009: 1). Indeed, in various texts Rousseau is 
perhaps best read as a theorist of ‘vicious circles’ (Noone, 1980: 67; Blackall, 1959: 465). I argue 
that a crucial aspect of Rousseau’s diagnosis is his analysis of pathological logics, which, once 
established, can occur independent of human cognition and cyclically harm the social body 
(Neuhouser, 2012). I term such modalities, ‘pathological social dynamics’. Once established, 
such logics: 
make a bad situation worse and … once initiated, … [are]…. exceedingly difficult to break (Neuhouser, 
2012: 637).  
For Neuhouser (2012), such a social pathology is most clearly expressed in Rousseau’s analysis 
of the home-land security problems of Ancient Rome in the Discourse on Political Economy.   
… in order to raise . . . armies, tillers had to be taken off the land; the shortage of them lowered the 
quality of the produce, and the armies' upkeep introduced taxes that raised its price. This first disorder 
caused the people to grumble: in order to repress them, the number of troops had to be increased, 
and, in turn, the misery; and the more despair increased, the greater the need to increase it still more 
in order to avoid its consequences (c.f. Neuhouser, 2012: 637). 
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This is clearly a description of a social malady; such a logic is undeniably problematic for the 
society. Indeed, one would find it hard to imagine a life-world absent such species of social ill. 
As Neuhouser suggests, the classic problem of ‘keeping up with the Jones’’ is perhaps an equally 
pertinent example (Neuhouser, 2012: 640). It seems self-evident that Rousseau is not merely 
describing a lack of legitimacy, or merely a lack of justice with this critique. In agreement with 
Neuhouser, I argue that Rousseau is presenting such a dynamic as constitutive of an important 
form of social pathology.   
While Neuhouser’s (2012) article ‘Rousseau und die Idee einer ,pathologischen‘ Gesellschaft’ 
focuses almost exclusively on Discourse on Political Economy, I argue that such pathological 
social dynamics are explored throughout the entirety of Rousseau’s scholarship.  
Indeed, perhaps Rousseau’s most explicit submission of a pathological social dynamic is his 
analysis of the artist’s relationship to society (Rousseau, 1960, 1997c; Delaney, 2009: 18). As 
established, this is a theme which permeates Rousseau’s scholarship. For Rousseau (1960, 
1997c), artists seek to shock and entice their audience with ever increasing contraventions of 
the social mores. The content presented thus needs to become ever more extreme, ever more 
debased. Today, an objectifying photograph of a female model in skimpy attire on an advertising 
billboard will turn few heads as commuters dash around the London Underground. Such an 
image would have been scandalous in the extreme just fifty years ago. To grab the citizens’ 
attention in the twenty-first century, images must be truly explicit, truly risqué. Likewise, for 
Rousseau (1960, 1997c) the more the social body becomes inured to depravity in the arts, the 
more explicit, the more degenerate the content needs to become to hold society’s interest. 
Hence for Rousseau, the unstructured rise of the arts represents a true problem for society. Far 
from suggesting an ever increasing humanity and a maturing aesthetic appreciation, the rise of 
the arts triggers a ‘race to the bottom’. Ultimately the ‘market for culture dialectically corrupts 
both artist and patron’ (Noone, 1980: 91).      
For Noone (1980), the most prominent ‘vicious circle’ expressed in Rousseau’s oeuvre is that 
of the self-perpetuating destructive drive towards urbanisation.60 The ‘city is the symbol of just 
about all evils’ for Rousseau; the spread of the city occurs entirely to the detriment of the 
countryside (Noone, 1980: 197). Again, as established above, this is a consistent theme of 
Rousseau’s analysis: it is the beauty of Lake Leman (Rousseau, 1997b) which is lauded and the 
Parisian salons which are castigated. This is not merely a contingent, incidental aspect of 
Rousseau’s critique of modernity. Rather, as with Rousseau’s analysis of the dialectic between 
                                                          
60 This may perhaps be better framed as ‘rural de-population’ and ‘urbanisation’. In passages the two seems 
distinct, while in others they are broadly synonymised. This may be a translation issue, I defer to native speakers.  
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artist and patron, there is a particular pathological dynamic in operation, which is central to the 
social order. Noone draws this out well, 
The rural sector, the chief source of population, has no motive to increase itself unless it is guaranteed 
the fruits of its labour. Any increase in parasitic urban numbers entails a corresponding decrease of 
peasant surpluses through taxation. When this exploitation reaches a point where the law of 
diminishing returns leaves a family with no reason to enlarge itself, it merely maintains its present size. 
Any added increment of taxation reduces the former to subsistence level or below. When it thus 
becomes unprofitable to work the fields, young agriculturalists are forced off the land and into the 
city; further augmenting the list of parasites. A vicious circle results: the more the city grows, the less 
agriculture produces (Noone, 1980: 67). 
Thus, Rousseau cautions his reader to remember, 
… that the walls of towns are made only from the debris of rural houses. Every time I see a mansion 
being built in the capital I fancy I can see the whole countryside covered with hovels (Rousseau, 1968: 
138).  
The importance of nature, and the importance of the rustic simple village to Rousseau’s 
imagination cannot be overstated (Douglass, 2015). In Lukacs’ prose, it came to represent a 
distinct ontology, invested with the moral imperative to critique the ‘growth of mechanisation, 
dehumanisation and reification’ (Lukacs, 1972: 136). 
The self-perpetuating dynamic which drives urbanisation occurs without human intention or 
cognition. Rousseau is not presenting a mistaken ideological belief, or a ‘second-order 
disconnect’ (Zurn, 2011: 345). Rather, pathological social dynamics occur, as Rousseau states, as 
seamlessly as ‘between the first and last terms of a geometric progression’ (Rousseau, 1968: 
103). Rousseau’s engagement with pathological social dynamics offers an important diagnostic 
tool. I shall return to discuss the true import of this framing in the final part of this chapter.  
 
Cultural Pathology 
A central component of Rousseau’s diagnosis is his articulation of the pathological state of 
modern culture (Wokler, 2001). While this analysis is partially secondary to Rousseau’s critique 
of unstructured dependency, it retains a central role in his theoretical infrastructure. While this 
aspect of Rousseau’s diagnosis can be located across his work, it is most memorably expressed 
in The Second Discourse. Rousseau laments, 
the extreme inequalities of our ways of life, the excess of idleness among some and the excess of toil 
among others, the over-elaborate foods of the rich, which inflame and overwhelm them with 
indigestion, the bad food of the poor, which they often go without altogether, so that they over-eat 
greedily when they have the opportunity; those late nights, excesses of all kinds, immoderate 
transports of every passion, fatigue, exhaustion of mind, the innumerable sorrows and anxieties that 
people in all classes suffer, and by which the human soul is constantly tormented: these are the fatal 
proofs that most of our ills are of our own making, and that we might have avoided nearly all of them 
if only we had adhered to the simple, unchanging and solitary way of life that nature ordained for us 
(Rousseau, 1984: 84-85). 
88 
 
One can identify three central components of Rousseau’s cultural critique; ever increasing:  
a) alienation,  
b) misery, and, 
c) artificiality.  
While these aspects of Rousseau’s cultural critique are interconnected, each retains individual 
salience.  
The importance of alienation to Rousseau’s work has been much discussed (Simon-Ingram, 
1991; Campbell, 2012). In his mature formulation, humanity’s alienation is comprehended 
relative to an essential ‘nature’ which has been irretrievably debased (Simon-Ingram, 2012). As 
Rousseau states in The Second Discourse, modernity and the civilising process saw ‘nature 
subjected to the law’ (Rousseau, 1984: 77-78). Again, there is a connection between inner 
‘human nature’, with its valorised pure sentiment, and the ‘natural world’ of Rousseau’s adored 
plants and waterfalls (Douglass, 2015). In Reveries of a Solitary Walker it is symbolically, 
cerastium aquaticium that Rousseau is most delighted to encounter: a rare, delicate bloom; 
rarely able to exist on higher ground (Rousseau, 1979: 37). Equally, Vevey, Julie’s eponymous 
‘small village at the foot of the alps’, could ‘not be further from Paris’ (Delaney, 2009: 28). 
Culture debases and alienates in a manner the philosophes fail to grasp: they have passed so far 
through the denaturing alienation of modernity they can no longer see its dangers (Hulliung, 
1994). Their embroilment in culture has left them unable to express, or connect with, true 
humanity.  
They may very well know a bourgeois from Paris or London but they will never know the human 
(Rousseau, 1990: 388). 
Rousseau is equally explicit that the debased culture corrodes tastes in an equally alienating 
manner: culture strips humanity of their natural desires. Wokler puts it most efficiently, 
Rousseau’s critique is of how, in modern culture, ‘savoir springs from pouvoir’ (Wokler, 2001: 
10).61 Lukacs presents a similar reading of Rousseau, the ‘social institution’ of culture serves to 
strip man of his human essence and that the more culture and civilisation … take possession of him, 
the less able he is to be a human being (Lukacs, 1972: 136). 
This alienation inexorably leads to a tragic sadness; modern culture normalises a perpetual 
misery (Strong, 1994). This ‘constant seduction away from humanness’ (Strong, 1994: 156), 
when consciously registered, is experienced as a truly profound melancholia. Its most superficial 
instantiations are of unnaturally ‘excess’ ‘toil’ (Rousseau, 1984: 84), ‘inflamed bowels’ 
                                                          
61 I translate this as ‘taste springs from power’. 
89 
 
(Rousseau, 1984: 84).62 Ultimately, through their complicity with the norms of the dominant 
culture, ‘… the people … purchase imaginary happiness at the price of real happiness’ (Rousseau, 
1984: 77-78). But for Rousseau there is something distinctly ‘corrupt’ (Rousseau, 1984: 79); 
rather than merely ‘tragic’ to this reality. This is a truly illusory, counterfeit existence, dominated 
by ‘artificial faculties’ (Rousseau, 1984: 81). Rousseau is most explicit, his indictment of his own 
readership in The Second Discourse leaves little to the imagination: ‘… your culture and your 
habits have been able to corrupt [you]’ (Rousseau, 1984: 79). It is the false civility, the 
debasement of the self before the social mores, that Rousseau despises. It was the ‘perfidious 
veil’ of polite society that sharpened his pen the most keenly (Wokler, 2001: 25). Again, these 
indictments are not merely of a polity that is unjust, or of its norms or leaders lacking legitimacy. 
Rousseau’s cultural critique is a crucial component of his broader articulation of the obstacles 
to social subjects attaining the good life; the pathologies of the social.   
 
The Pathological Colonisation of one Social Sphere by the Logic of Another 
A third pertinent framing of social pathology that can be found across Rousseau’s work is his 
diagnosis of the colonisation of social spheres by the rationalities of other social domains. 
Neuhouser (2012) identifies such a species of social pathology in Rousseau’s Discourse on 
Political Economy. For Neuhouser it is not merely the entry into a particular social sphere of an 
unsuitable, damaging logic; it is the total domination of said sphere by the rationality of a 
distinctly alternate social dimension. By way of example, Neuhouser points to Rousseau’s 
discussion of Marius’ hiring of mercenaries to quash dissent during the collapse of the Roman 
Empire (Neuhouser, 2012: 634). The legions were previously bound by codes of honour, proud 
of their traditions and status. Introducing mercenaries was to force the logics of exchange into 
this social sphere. As Neuhouser comments, 
It would be unwise to saddle Rousseau with the implausible view that it is a bad thing for social 
relations of any kind to be mediated by money. The more plausible claim is that certain kinds of social 
relations are necessarily distorted once money comes to serve as their organizing principle. One of 
Rousseau's complaints here is that individuals who carry out the duties of citizens only because they 
are paid to do so are easily manipulated by those in power in ways that violate the appropriate ends 
of political life (Neuhouser, 2012: 634 – my italics). 
Again, I consider Neuhouser’s (2012) analysis of useful in drawing out this distinct species of 
social pathology. Extending beyond Neuhouser’s analysis, one can readily see how such a species 
of social pathology is not merely located in Discourse on Political Economy. For instance, one can 
                                                          
62 Recall, there is a similar discussion of the unwell polity in The Republic, during Socrates’ discussion of the City of 
Pigs. Again, the problem is the deviation from the pastoral way of life, and a move towards consuming excess 
alcohol and fatty sauces (Plato, 2008: 373a).   
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read Rousseau’s On The Origins of Language as submitting that a foundational colonisation of 
the communicative sphere has occurred by the dominance of exchange logics:63 
Whereas the words aimez-moi must in the past have been superseded by aidez-moi, now all that we 
say to each other is donnez de l’argent (Rousseau, 1997c: 298-9). 
 
Again, this species of critique seems most appositely framed in the language of pathology. The 
colonisation of the communicative realm by an instrumental rationality is not, in itself, an 
injustice (Neuhouser, 2012: 634). Neither is the introduction of capital into the running of the 
armed forces an ‘unjust’ development. Rather, it represents a foundational harm to the social 
body, a challenge and threat to social functioning; and thus an impediment to social subjects 
attaining the good life. Viewing Rousseau’s critique through this optic only serves to accentuate 
the limitations of the ‘liberal’ framing of ‘justice’; and the need to engage with Rousseau as a 
pathology diagnostician becomes ever more salient (Neuhouser, 2012: 629). In agreement with 
Neuhouser (2012), I argue that this species of Rousseau’s submissions, his analyses of colonising 
social logics, is best framed as social pathology diagnoses. I draw out the true import of 
reclaiming this species of social pathology in my following section.  
 
Pathological Relations of Unstructured Dependency 
Scholarly orthodoxy has long been to view Rousseau’s analysis of pathologically unstructured 
dependency as central to his critique (James, 2013; Rousseliere, 2016). As Rousseau elaborates 
in the fictive anthropology of the Second Discourse, natural man is     
…the most advantageously organized of all. … [Capable of] … satisfying his hunger under an oak, 
quenching his thirst at the first stream, finding his bed under the same tree, which provided the meal; 
and behold, his needs are furnished (Rousseau, 1984: 81).  
He is thus,  
… [a] … free being whose heart is at peace and whose body is healthy (Rousseau, 1984: 97). 
In contrast, modernity subjected man ‘to universal dependence’ (Rousseau, 1984: 98). Of the 
many harmful ‘passions and caprices’ of civilisation, this is perhaps the most damaging: man is 
most ‘weak when he is dependent’ (Rousseau, 1984: 83). Yet Rousseau outlines how 
dependence itself is a natural state (Melzer, 2006: 281). Man cannot survive without his natural 
needs being met: he suffers from thirst, hunger, fatigue: therefore man is naturally a dependent 
creature (Rousseau, 1984). It is the particularly social fact of modern dependency, the 
unstructured nature of man’s dependence on his fellow man which is truly pathological 
                                                          
63 This clearly presages much of Habermas’ work. 
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(Rousseau, 1984: 125; Neuhouser, 1993: 378). While natural men ‘applied themselves only to 
work that one person could accomplish alone’; modernity saw humanity need ‘the help of 
another’ (Rousseau, 1984: 116). It was this turn to a pathological sociality which ‘first civilized 
men and ruined the human race’ (Rousseau, 1984: 116). Today humanity is overburdened by 
dependence, 
… [man] has become (a) slave … for if he is rich he needs (the poor’s) services, if he is poor he needs 
(the rich’s) aid (Rousseau, 1984: 116). 
For Rousseau, the true tragedy is that humanity has 
… come to love domination more than independence, to wear chains for the sake of imposing chains 
on others in turn (Rousseau, 1984: 132). 
 … anyone must see that since the bonds of servitude are formed only through the mutual dependence 
of men and the reciprocal needs that unite them, it is impossible to enslave a man without first putting 
him in a situation where he cannot do without another man (Rousseau, 1984: 106). 
There is thus an explicit complicity in humankind’s continuing dependence.  
It is not merely ‘economic’ dependency which is diagnosed in The Second Discourse; 
Rousseau is additionally at pains to articulate a state of ‘moral’ dependency (Dagger, 1981; 
Affeldt, 1999). In modernity, the human capacity to self-legislate is lost; one must submit to the 
power of the ‘sovereign authority’ which ‘divine will … [seems to] give … a sacred and inviolable 
character’ (Rousseau, 1984: 130). Modern subjects face a barrage of coercive obstacles which 
prevent them living life by virtue of their own moral judgements. Such a life precludes the 
possibility of attaining civic or social freedom (Dagger, 1981). It thus represents a damaging 
species of social pathology. 
 
Pathologies of Recognition 
There are (at least) three distinct species of recognition pathology throughout Rousseau’s 
diagnosis (Shaver, 1989). Indeed, one might be tempted to gently echo ‘Cajot’s critique’64 at this 
point. Read most sympathetically, these divergent framings echo Rousseau’s development of 
Montaigne and Pascal in his analysis (Shaver, 1989: 261).65 What is less controversial is that the 
ultimate product, Rousseau’s approach to recognition-derived critique, is considerably more 
expansive than today’s dominant ‘recognition-cognitive’ paradigm. 
The most obvious framing of recognition pathology is of truly anthropological, macro-scale 
proportions: it is the ‘unintended’, unnatural breach of man’s ‘essential’ monological self-
                                                          
64 See my earlier explanation of Cajot critique. 
65 In a fascinating paper Shaver (1989) introduces his engagement with Rousseau as a recognition theorist with 
quotes from Montaigne and Pascal. While Shaver does not explicitly raise Cajot’s point, I think it is implicitly left 
hanging.   
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relation (Rousseau, 1984; Honneth, 2007c). As Rousseau lyrically expresses in The Second 
Discourse, 
Each began to look at others and to want to be looked at himself; he who was most handsome, the 
strongest, the most adroit or the most eloquent became the most highly regarded … 
As soon as men learned to value one another, and the idea of consideration formed in their minds, 
everyone claimed a right to it; and it was no longer possible for anyone to be refused consideration 
without affront (Rousseau, 1984: 114). 
In sharp contrast to the idealised self-reliant figure of Rousseau’s fictional anthropology; 
following the breach of man’s primary monological self-relation, it became impossible for 
humanity to truly experience contentment without attaining intersubjective recognition. People 
began to,  
… attach importance to the gaze of the rest of the world, and … (knew) how to be happy and satisfied 
with themselves (only) on the testimony of others, rather than on their own (Rousseau, 1984: 136). 
This pathological need for recognition is a result of a foundational recognition pathology, 
precipitated by a merely contingent, anthropological catastrophe. 
A secondary species of recognition pathology, subtly distinct from the former, is the rise of 
Amour-Propre relative to Amour-de-soi and Pitie (Rousseau, 1984). It is worth distinguishing this 
framing of pathology from the aforementioned. The titanic rupture of the monological self-
relation is not, in itself, a cause for suffering. In a utopian social world all subjects may, 
potentially, be able to realise themselves through the recognition provided by others. Indeed, 
Rousseau’s Social Contract aims to present a means of regulating Amour-Propre for the good of 
the republic. It is worth stressing that the conflagration of Amour-Propre, while a direct 
consequence of the breach of humanity’s natural self-regard in Rousseau’s narrative, does not 
necessarily have to develop in the manner Rousseau described. That ‘natural pity … suffered 
dilution’ (Rousseau 1984: 132) is not an inexorable consequence of the primary breach, the 
foundational recognition pathology. There is a contingent basis to the current pathological 
recognition order. While The Social Contract would be unable to heal the original rupture, it 
seeks to ameliorate this secondary species of recognition pathology.    
Thirdly, there is a framing of recognition pathology in the manner closest to its usage today, 
of an irrational recognition order which impedes subjects’ self-realisation. People are esteemed, 
not for their humanity and kindness, but for their relational standing. For Shaver this directly 
precipitates Rousseau’s critique of private property and the division of labour (Shaver, 1989: 
268) The sole metric of recognition has become esteem itself. Amour-Propre has come to run 
amok. Such is the case with property as much as with people; as Emile’s tutor instructs, use value 
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has been displaced, the bourgeoisie only values that which will further its social standing:  nolo 
habere bona nisi quibus populus inviderit (Rousseau, 1911: 149).66 
A sentiment memorably expressed in Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert,  
…nothing appears good or desirable to individuals which the public has not judged to be such 
(Rousseau, 1960: 67). 
Again, it is worth distinguishing this framing of recognition pathology from the two expressed 
above. This sub-set of recognition pathology does not refer to the foundational rupture of self-
regard (1). Neither does it refer to the imbalance of Amour-Propre, Amour-de-soi and Pitie (2). 
Rather, this refers to the manner in which Amour-Propre is bestowed, the way in which social 
subjects are granted esteem. As Rousseau establishes above, it is not merely the case that 
Amour-Propre has come to dominate: it is the case that the desire for esteem can only be met 
by being esteemed itself. At the Palace of Fountainbleu, kindly, natural sentiment is not 
regarded. Rather, it is those who are esteemed by others that are respected, regardless of the 
content of their character, or the naturalness of their sentiments (as Rousseau would frame it).  
I am not claiming to present a complete list of the multiple framings of recognition pathology 
that exist within Rousseau’s work. Neither have I attempted to produce a complete account of 
the multiple framings of pathology more broadly which undergird Rousseau’s rich and 
penetrating social critique. Rather, the purpose of this section has been to sympathetically 
reconstruct the most potent and pertinent framings of social pathology diagnosis in Rousseau’s 
work.  
 
Rousseau’s framings of social pathology diagnosis pace the dominant recognition orthodoxy  
I commenced this chapter by justifying my turn to Rousseau as an initial point of departure for 
the project of resurrecting the theoretical infrastructure required for a potent, critical, social 
pathology diagnosis. Developing from this, I drew out five distinct framings of social pathology 
which can be found throughout Rousseau’s work which harbour the potential to challenge the 
dominant ‘recognition-cognitive’ and ‘pathologies of recognition’ framings. In this third and final 
section of this chapter, I seek to explicitly articulate how Rousseau’s corpus offers today’s social 
theorists the resources to challenge the contemporary orthodox framing of social pathology. I 
make three claims:  
a) Through Rousseau’s analysis of pathological social dynamics (established above), he 
demonstrates the importance of thinking of pathologies of the social which are not 
                                                          
66 I translate this as ‘I only want a good if the people want it’. 
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exclusively cognitive. Rather, there exists pathologies which transcend the individual: 
there are pathologies of the social realm itself. 
b) Drawing on from the above, Rousseau’s analysis of social logics colonising distinct social 
spheres demonstrates how, even when there is a cognitive aspect to social pathologies, 
these maladies may be most appositely located in social processes themselves. They are 
thus not to be diagnosed solely ‘within the head’ (Freyenhagen, 2015: 136) of the 
individual. 
c) Finally, I return to my central submission: that Rousseau’s turn to a plethora of non-
recognition framings of social pathology can only serve to support my critique of an 
exclusively recognition framing. That Rousseau, a (if not the) central figure in the 
development of recognition in social theory (Neuhouser, 2008), finds such a paradigm, 
without alternate theoretical resources, untenable, is deeply significant.   
 
The Importance of Pathological Social Dynamics  
It is worth stressing the true disconnect between Rousseau’s critique of pathological social 
dynamics and today’s dominant ‘recognition-cognitive’ lens. A targeted reading of Neuhouser’s 
(2012) analysis can help clarify the true breadth of this distinction. While for Zurn (2011) and 
Honneth (2014a, 2014b), the champions of the ‘recognition-cognitive’ paradigm, pathologies 
are best grasped as ‘second-order disorders’ (Zurn, 2011: 345). Such disconnects operate 
through a  
… [f]undamental disconnect between first-order contents and the subjects’ reflexive grasp of the 
origins and character of those contents, where that gap systematically serves to preserve otherwise 
dubious social structures and practices (Zurn, 2011: 348). 
Zurn is explicit that, 
… [w]ithout the second-order disconnect, what we might generically call “bad” acts of recognition 
(misrecognition, non-recognition) are not ideological … and [therefore] cannot count as social 
pathologies (Zurn, 2011: 349).  
Rousseau’s analysis sits in direct opposition to this narrow framing of social pathology, which 
necessitates a) a recognition framing b) a cognitive disconnect and c) such a disconnect furthers 
a deliberately manipulative or exploitative logic. In contrast, for Rousseau,  
[T]he feature[s] of societies that makes them susceptible to falling ill … [are] … the presence of social 
forces that easily escape the consciousness and control of the individuals subject to them[,] and that 
bring about consequences not intended by social members themselves, including the most powerful 
among them (Neuhouser, 2012: 637 – my italics). 
 
95 
 
For Rousseau, these social dynamics often occur when no individual intends ‘pernicious 
consequences’ or ‘approves’ of their ultimate outcome (Neuhouser, 2012: 637). Ultimately such 
pathologies are the result of ‘social forces’ beyond the subject (Neuhouser, 2012: 637). In total 
accord with Neuhouser, I argue that Rousseau’s diagnosis is explicitly one of ‘social’ currents, of 
logics and dynamics which have gone awry, independent of human cognition, independent of 
human agency. These are not necessarily ideological dynamics, and do not necessarily have to 
further the interest of a set class of social actors. Social pathologies, in such a framing, are held 
to exist in a register removed from the cognition of social actors, are held to exist at an 
ontological level distinct from that of the cognisant subject. Such pathologies occur unmediated 
by human action, akin to the dynamic between the first and last terms of a geometric 
progression” (Rousseau, 1968: 103). These are pathologies of a different ontological strata: they 
are pathologies of the social itself.67 Thus, Rousseau’s framing of social pathology here sits at 
substantial variance to the dominant, ‘recognition-cognitive’ orthodoxy. 
That stated, while such social ills may occur entirely disconnected from logics leading to 
human gain, and disconnected from any human cognition, they do not have to. While Zurn 
(2011) introduced, and Honneth (2014a) endorsed, tight, restrictive framings of social 
pathology, Rousseau’s critique of pathological social dynamics is substantially more open ended. 
Indeed, such dynamics may function entirely to the benefit of a social class, and to the detriment 
of another. It may involve an explicitly cognitive aspect. Or it may not. The crucial analysis here 
is that Zurn and Honneth’s framing damagingly excludes alternate, non-ideological, aspects of 
social pathology. A return to Rousseau’s social-theoretical infrastructure once again makes 
these social maladies visible and intelligible.  
Indeed, Rousseau’s perspective is particularly useful because both framings may occur 
concurrently: the pathology may exist beyond the level of the thinking subject, but, due to the 
operation of ingrained social structures, may operate so as to further the material advantage of 
a particular class. This may be the case even where neither group explicitly intends to exploit 
the other. One can extract such a commentary from Neuhouser (2012): 
Under certain conditions a free market, for example, can systematically produce (and reproduce) 
undesirable consequences—huge inequalities, widespread poverty, the loss of social cohesion—
without any of its participants foreseeing or intending them as consequences of their collective action. 
And, under easily imaginable circumstances, the inequality, poverty, and social dissolution produced 
at t1 virtually guarantee that, even when all future exchanges are uncoerced and formally just, those 
initial ills will only be worse at t2 (Neuhouser, 2012: 637). 
                                                          
67 For a further example see Young (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference, Chapter Three.  
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This is a powerful analysis. Once again, echoing Neuhouser, I submit that these pathological 
dynamics are located in the systems of social reproduction itself and occur at a higher level of 
social reproduction than that of the subject. This is not to state that the ultimate manifestation 
of the social pathology will not be experienced by the social subject: of course, social reality is 
perceived only by cognisant beings. The distinction that I am at pains to mark here is that while 
it is ultimately the social subject that suffers the ill effects of the pathological dynamic, this 
dynamic is not rooted in the subject itself. This is a crucial distinction, and a real limitation of the 
recognition-cognitive framework. Extending Neuhouser’s earlier analysis, the cycles of crisis that 
Marx outlines in Capital are ultimately experienced by social subjects: that does not mean that 
the social pathology is best located in the social subject; or in the cognitive capacities of the 
social subject. Rather, the social pathology exists in the process of social reproduction; on a 
different ontological plane.  
As my earlier analysis drew out, it is not merely market related dynamics which threaten 
society; rather there are numerous species of self-perpetuating damaging social dynamics: from 
the relationship between artists and audiences, or the city and the countryside. An engagement 
with Rousseau’s work is of true utility as it serves to displace the restrictive and limiting 
recognition-cognitive framing of social pathology by clearly articulating how social pathologies 
exist substantially removed from the cognisant individual. Pace Zurn and Honneth, and in total 
accord with Neuhouser (2012), I contend that when Rousseau conducts such analysis, his 
scholarship can ‘most convincingly be described in the language of [social] pathology’ 
(Neuhouser, 2012: 637). Such social maladies are damagingly unintelligible to today’s dominant 
‘recognition-cognitive’ framing of social pathology. 
 
An added nuance: the importance of Rousseau’s rationality colonising pathologies   
While very few of the pathological social dynamics Rousseau describes are located at the level 
of the subject’s cognitive functioning, Rousseau’s analysis of colonising rationalities adds a 
crucial nuance to the discussion. As repeatedly stated, the dominant ‘recognition-cognitive’ 
approach presents all social pathologies as cognitive disconnects, as errors in the subject’s 
cognitive functioning, which impedes their optimum engagement within the recognition order. 
As established, this framing has numerous limitations (Chapter Two and Chapter Three). As 
discussed above, this approach locates all social pathologies ‘in the head’ of the social subject 
(Freyenhagen, 2015: 136). Rousseau’s analysis of pathological social dynamics is of vital 
importance, in that it demonstrably locates various social pathologies as existing beyond these 
narrow parameters: in the social world itself.  
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Yet, while Rousseau’s analysis of negative social dynamics serves to directly contradict the 
restrictive nature of the Zurn-Honnethian framing, it is Rousseau’s diagnosis of rationality 
colonising pathologies which adds true nuance to this discussion. Put most simply: while subjects 
may suffer from impeded cognitive functioning; the true origin of these pathologies must be 
located in the social world itself. Thus, many cognitive pathologies are mere ‘symptoms’, rather 
than the pathologies themselves. The true pathology, as with negative social dynamics, is 
located in the social world and experienced by the subject, but not fundamentally of, or located 
in, the subject. 
To further understand this subtlety, it is worth engaging with some of the subsequent 
framings of social pathology which utilise Rousseau’s infrastructure more substantively. Of the 
numerous diagnoses which demonstrate a relationship between the impeded cognitive 
functioning of the subject and inappropriate forms of social rationality colonising the life world, 
it is perhaps Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1997) Dialectic of Enlightenment that is the most 
renowned. For the co-authors,  
[The Enlightened] intellect … perceives the particular only as one case of the general (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997: 84-85). 
This contradiction elides with an emboldened instrumental rationality, so that 
… [M]an discards his awareness that he … is nature, all the aims for which he keeps himself alive … are 
nullified, and the enthronement of the means as an ends … is [irreversible] (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1997: 54).  
Adorno and Horkheimer are indebted to a critique of instrumental reason which stems directly 
from Rousseau, via Hegel (Horkheimer, 2013).68 The pathology central to Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s diagnosis is of an instrumental rationality run amok; a process which, for the co-
authors, has anthropological origins as ancient as the Roussean rupture of the monological self-
relation. The crucial distinction here is that Adorno and Horkheimer are fundamentally 
presenting a totalising cognitive impediment; a failure of the subject to engage with the external 
world beyond the rationalities of a teleogically-driven utility calculus. This impedes both direct 
engagement with the social order, and equally restricts the subject’s capacity for reflexivity. Yet, 
as with Rousseau, while the pathology is experienced, and best diagnosed through an analysis 
of the cognitive malfunctioning of the social subject, the foundational pathology is not one of 
the subject: it is of the social. For Adorno and Horkheimer, this is a social lifeworld where, 
… the capacity of representation is the vehicle of progress and regression (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1997: 35). 
                                                          
68 Della Volpe (1979) has gone so far as to suggest one is best placed to read Marx directly through Rousseau, 
substantially displacing Hegel. 
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I submit that the mischief [Unwesen] preventing the reconciliation of the general and the 
particular is not a personal ‘capacity’; a personal error: rather a social capacity. That, as with 
Rousseau’s primary diagnosis, it is not a personal failure to utilise a suitable form of reason, but 
a social pathology. Thus, for Adorno and Horkheimer; as with Marius’ introduction of capital into 
the legions, the form of reason is one of social reason. The dominant recognition-cognitive 
framing of social pathology lacks the theoretical resources to engage with such an 
understanding. Ultimately, an engagement with Rousseau’s theoretical infrastructure enables 
the true limitations of the recognition-cognitive paradigm to be borne out. More importantly, 
an engagement with Rousseau presents theoretical infrastructure which can enable these 
domesticating lacunas to be plugged.    
 
The Crucial Lesson from Rousseau: Recognition does not Necessitate Myopia 
This engagement with Rousseau serves to destabilise the current, limited social pathology 
paradigm on three counts. First, as established, Rousseau, despite being the supreme 
recognition theorist, and having a social philosophy based around a foundational breach of 
recognition relations, turns to multiple framings of social pathology removed from a recognition 
optic. Rousseau presents, inter alia, pathologies of colonising rationalities, of social dynamics, 
of dependency, of culture, and of recognition in a much broader sense than it is utilised today. 
That Rousseau turns to these alternate framings of social pathology is truly telling: the most 
prominent classical recognition theorists does not attempt a critique of the social without 
alternate, non-recognition framings, to support his analysis. This serves to further illuminate the 
restrictive, and entirely unnecessary boundaries placed on the pathology framework as 
practiced by today’s dominant critical social theorists. Rousseau demonstrates that it is not 
essential to stick rigidly to a recognition optic to analyse the pathologies of the social; even when 
you are basing your entire philosophy on a foundational recognition pathology.  
Further, as established, Rousseau’s scholarship underscores two additional limitations of the 
current framework. Firstly, social pathologies can be located in the social body itself, in 
processes of social reproduction. It is important to analyse social pathologies that are not 
located only in the subject. This is not to state that the subject cannot suffer from, or indeed be 
the location of, social pathologies. Rather, it is to state that only analysing social pathologies 
that are ultimately located within the subject, serves to artificially and damagingly restrict the 
social theorist’s capacity to engage with the breadth of maladies existing in the social realm. 
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Secondly, while not all pathologies are located at the level of the subject’s cognitive capacity, 
many are best diagnosed through an analysis of the impeded state of the social subject’s 
rationality. There may indeed be cognitive disconnects, which are essential to the social 
pathologist’s diagnosis. That stated, social subjects failing to grasp the reality of their 
environment, or utilising an inappropriate form of reason for a certain social domain, does not 
necessitate that the social pathology is, essentially, located within the subject’s critical 
capacities. Rather, there may be crucial social dynamics which are only experienced, and 
determinable, through an analysis of the subject. That does not mean that the foundational 
social pathology exists in the subject. There may be foundational, anthropological bases for the 
sub-optimal operation of a social subject’s cognitive capacity.  
Rousseau’s scholarship serves to underscore the importance of social pathology diagnosis. 
His analysis transcends the ‘liberal’ framings of ‘justice’ and ‘legitimacy’ (Neuhouser, 2012). 
Through this engagement with Rousseau’s social theory, and his social theoretical infrastructure, 
I have outlined the import of utilising Rousseau’s work to draw out the limitations of today’s 
dominant, ‘recognition-cognitive’ framing of social pathology.   
 
Conclusion   
A critical engagement with Rousseau is an essential point of departure for an attempt to regain 
the potency of social pathology diagnosing critique, and to expose the limitations of the 
dominant recognition-derived frameworks. Rousseau has been presented as the social 
pathologist par excellence. While his oeuvre is ultimately animated by his diagnosis of a 
foundational recognition pathology, his analysis is never limited to a singular, restrictive, 
recognition optic. While the rise of an inflamed Amour-Propre is central to his diagnosis, 
Rousseau’s engagement is never restricted to the subject, nor to the cognitive. As the citoyen 
de Geneve’s ‘protosociology’ (Noone, 1980: 90) demonstrates, a critical engagement with 
society that seeks to ‘go beyond’ the questions of legitimacy and injustice (Noone, 1980: 67) 
necessitates a form of analysis which is not artificially restricted to the recognition order, or to 
the cognitive. Rather, as Rousseau’s breadth, and indeed the beauty of his prose, draws out, a 
polycentric approach to social critique has been superior from the inception of social theory.   
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Chapter Five 
Pathologies of Reason: Left-Hegelianism and Social Pathology 
Introduction 
This thesis started out by outlining the importance of social pathology diagnosing critique 
(Chapter One) and exposing the limitations of the dominant recognition-theoretical approach to 
social theory (Chapter Two). It then tracked how the contemporary study of social pathologies 
has come to be dominated by a limited, recognition-theoretical imagination (Chapter Three). To 
counter the transition to viewing social pathologies solely in this restrictive manner, I first turned 
to Rousseau, who I identified as the progenitor of pathology diagnosing social critique. I drew 
out an important irony: that while Rousseau is held today as the recognition theorist par 
excellence, he operated with a plurality of framings of social pathology unintelligible within the 
recognition paradigm (Chapter Four). My engagement with Rousseau started my exploration of 
alternate framings of social pathology which are needlessly excluded by the recognition lens 
(Chapters Four to Six). The objectives behind such research are twofold: a) to recover lost 
pathology diagnosing resources, and b) to further the case for moving beyond the restrictive 
recognition perspective. In keeping with these aims, this chapter presents an engagement with 
the various ‘pathologies of reason’ framings, seeking to extract the useful insights common to 
the competing approaches. As with the previous chapter on Rousseau, through this discussion, 
I seek to recover efficacious framings of social pathology which have been lost in the recognition 
turn. 
While this thesis is strongly opposed to the dominance of an exclusionary recognition 
approach to engaging with the social world, it is impossible to deny the lucidity and simplicity of 
the recognition model (Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo, 2015). This is central to the intuitive 
appeal of Honneth’s own Critical Theory (Anderson, 1995).  Such clarity is not in abundance in 
the literature on pathologies of reason: this is philosophically dense material, rife with seemingly 
contradictory definitions and competing interpretations (Freyenhagen, 2015).69 Further, the 
very meaning of the word ‘reason’ as utilised by Critical Theorists, is at considerable variance 
from its colloquial usage.70 In contrast to the common English definition, for Hegel, Adorno, 
Lukacs and Honneth, inter alia, ‘reason’ is understood in a ‘thick’ and ‘social’ manner, manifest 
                                                          
69 Honneth’s Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory (2007b) brings together eleven previously 
published essays, all of which utilise a subtly distinct understanding of a pathology of reason. This text underscores 
how the language of ‘pathology of reason’ is used without specificity and more as a vague nod to a left-Hegelian 
legacy. 
70 I would present the colloquial understanding of reason to be something akin to the mind’s capacity to understand 
and form judgements. 
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as much in forms of social organisation as in subjects’ cognitive capacities (Honneth, 2007b; 
Strydom, 2011). For the Critical Theorist, ‘reason’ thus has a distinctly social inflection (Marcuse, 
1969). To draw out this understanding in the associated literature this approach to ‘reason’ is 
often referred to as ‘historically mediated reason’, or ‘socially mediated reason’ (Marcuse, 1969; 
Guess, 2004; Honneth, 2007b, 2007c, 2010).71  
Honneth has repeatedly revised his understanding of what constitutes a pathology of reason, 
both in his writings on the history of Critical Theory (1991, 2000, 2004a, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 
2007d, 2010) and in his own Critical Theory of Recognition (1995, 2008, 2014b) (Freyenhagen, 
2015). This has served to further complicate an already inaccessible literature (Freyenhagen, 
2015: 131-132). There are thus multiple competing and contradictory understandings of what 
constitutes a pathology of reason in both contemporary and classical scholarship (Laitinen and 
Särkelä, 2019: 81). To bring some much-needed clarity, the first of this chapter’s three sections 
is more clarificatory in nature. Section one, ‘What is a pathology of reason?’ reconstructs five 
different framings of pathologies of reason. This exercise is undertaken to explore central 
commonalities and to seek useful resources that can be incorporated in a revitalised pathology 
diagnosing endeavour. I thus engage with pathologies of reason framed within the following 
approaches: 
(a) the left-Hegelian tradition, 
(b) the pathologies of recognition framing,  
(c) the dominance of instrumental rationality, 
(d) the presence of socially induced category mistakes, and, 
(e) Dialectic of Enlightenment style critiques. 
Despite divergent philosophical convictions, I argue that a clear reconstruction of these different 
framings exposes two important commonalities. First, I identify a shared understanding of 
reason as ‘thick’ and ‘social’; reason is held to be a fundamentally social ‘process’ which is 
capable of developing its own pathologies (Guess, 2004: 124).72 Second, I argue that each 
reconstruction is centred around a primary dynamic or logic. In each case the subject internalises 
a form of impeded cognition, and then, through their own social action, serves to further enforce 
the conditions which precipitated their own cognitive impairment. Throughout this chapter I 
argue that recovering such an understanding is useful for revitalising social pathology 
scholarship.  
                                                          
71 In an attempt to show the connection between the noumenal and the socially manifest, Delanty and Harris (2018) 
have connected this to the Kantian notion of ‘regulative ideas of reason’. 
72 One can immediately see how this sits at variance from the understanding of reason posited by the conservative 
tradition, or as understood in broader society (Guess, 2004; Heywood, 2007). 
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The second section of this chapter, ‘Critiques and Rejoinders’, engages with three oft-
repeated weaknesses of pathologies of reason accounts. The arguments that pathologies of 
reason approaches are, inevitably,  
(a) woefully inaccessible, or, worse, obfuscating, 
(b) unjustifiably teleological, and 
(c) unjustifiably metaphysical 
are sympathetically presented and responded to. Through an extended rejoinder, this section 
argues that a pathologies of reason approach need not be needlessly complex or committed to 
a totalising and acritical account of progress. By drawing on Thompson (2016), a brief discussion 
follows on whether a renouncement of metaphysics is either necessary or desirable. 
This draws the chapter into its third and final section, ‘Pathologies of Reason: beyond 
recognition-theory’. Having established that there are no foundational philosophical or political 
critiques which void the utility of a pathologies of reason approach, this final section articulates 
the utility of the twin characteristics presented as essential to a pathologies of reason approach. 
First, the importance of engaging with reason as ‘thick’ and ‘social’ is discussed: there is a need 
for critical theorists to contemplate reason more broadly as a meta-social process which impacts 
societal organisation as much as the subject’s cognitive capacity. Second, I argue for the need 
to engage with the social dynamics that reinforce impeded individual cognition. I outline the 
utility of both insights, and demonstrate their displacement by, and incompatibility with, the 
ascendant recognition-derived orthodoxy.   
 
What is a pathology of reason?  
Much of the literature pertinent to the various pathologies of reason framings is philosophically 
dense and inaccessible (Schopenhauer, 1909; Santayana, 1916; Russell, 2015). For 
Schopenhauer (1909), this is not merely incidental, such presentation is deliberately abstruse to 
hide the reality that the authors have nothing of merit to say. In the ‘general mystification’ of 
Hegelian thought, Schopenhauer saw only ‘pure nonsense’ (Schopenhauer, 1909: 22). The fact 
that readers saw meaning, let alone utility, in the ‘senseless and extravagant mazes of words’, 
was, for Schopenhauer, an embarrassing ‘monument to German stupidity’ (Schopenhauer, 
1909: 22). Yet, pace Schopenhauer, Critical Theorists have long identified merit in pathologies 
of reason approaches (Honneth, 2004a: 336-338), and, in so doing, routinely return to the 
foundational Hegelian insights which animate their broader project (Marcuse, 1969). For 
Honneth, the diagnosis of pathologies of reason is the ‘explosive charge’ of Critical Theory in 
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that it connects the interdisciplinary research project with a foundation in radical left-Hegelian 
philosophy (Honneth, 2004a: 338). The pathologies of reason perspective can thus be 
understood as being both foundational for Critical Theory, but also problematically inaccessible 
(Guess, 2004; Honneth, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). With such a realisation, it becomes apparent that 
there is an urgent need to transpose the unyielding philosophical approach into a more pliant 
and lucid social-theoretical register. In this exercise I grant disproportionate space to 
reconstructing the left-Hegelian engagement with pathologies of reason. This is because 
Hegelian insights recur with varying degrees of centrality in the four remaining framings. Indeed, 
Honneth has gone so far as to argue that,  
In all … approaches to Critical Theory, the same Hegelian idea … is continually incorporated, only in 
different characterizations of the original human practice of action (Honneth, 2007c: 25). 
It is therefore unsurprising that the literature on pathologies of reason focuses overwhelmingly 
on the left-Hegelian approach (Marcuse, 1969; Guess, 2004; Honneth, 2007b).  
I present two fundamental commonalities across the five rival framings. First, I argue that 
one can read an understanding of ‘reason’ as ‘thick’ and ‘social’ in character, existing as much in 
the manifest social world as in ‘the head’ of the social subject (Freyenhagen, 2015). In each 
perspective, the cognition of the agent is held to be fundamentally socially mediated. This is in 
direct opposition to the autonomous, atomistic agent of liberal thought, or the limited fallen 
agent of conservative theory (Heywood, 2007). Indeed, one can argue that all pathologies of 
reason approaches sit closer to Marxist or post-structuralist understandings of the relationship 
between the subject’s cognitive capacities and broader, external dynamics. Second, I argue that 
in each perspective one can read a common logic: the subject internalises a form of impeded 
thinking, and then, through their social action, proceeds to further enforce the social conditions 
which, in full or in part, precipitated their own cognitive impairment.73 Through the transposition 
of the abstruse philosophy into a more accessible sociological register, this reconstructive 
exercise seeks to disclose these two commonalities as the central insights offered by a 
pathologies of reason perspective. 
While this chapter admits to the difficulty of the literature, pace Schopenhauer (1909), I do 
not view this complexity as synonymous with obfuscation or worthlessness. The challenge for 
                                                          
73 For the purpose of this present project, I simply wish to outline how a dynamic exists where deficient forms of 
cognition are internalised (with regularity, if not total uptake) which then can lead to subjects acting in a manner 
which reaffirms the pathological social conditions which precipitated their impeded cognition.  In this crude framing 
the suggested dynamic seems overly deterministic and unnuanced. In a broader project I would be keen to add 
further timbre to this dynamic, suggesting a more detailed account for how the subject is interpellated, to different 
degrees, by deficient forms of rationality by engaging with competing Althusserian, Gramscian and Giddensian 
framings. 
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my reconstructive exercise is to achieve a lucidity and clarity while retaining the philosophical 
richness of the left-Hegelian tradition.  
 
Left-Hegelianism: on the pathologies of the socially mediated present  
Critical Theory’s engagement with pathologies of reason has clear origins in the left-Hegelian 
tradition (Marcuse, 1969: 7; Honneth, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2014a). First generation Frankfurt 
School scholars produced seminal work on both Hegel and the left-Hegelian tradition more 
broadly (Marcuse, 1969). The origins of the left-Hegelian approach to diagnosing pathologies of 
reason lie across Hegel’s socio-political philosophy (1970, 1991), his philosophy of history (1953) 
and his logic (2015). The aim of this section of the chapter is thus to explicitly draw out the left-
Hegelian approach to diagnosing social pathologies, and, through doing so, to clearly articulate 
the fundamental steps which lie at the heart of this mode of pathology diagnosing critique.  
A form of ‘Reflective History’ called ‘Universal History’ is of central importance to Hegel 
(Hegel, 1953; Solomon, 1970).74 Such a discipline focuses on one meta-process, namely the 
inexorable unfolding of reason [Geist] over time. This meta-process is central to Hegelian 
philosophy and holds a foundational role in the left-Hegelian diagnosis of pathologies of reason 
(Marcuse, 1969). From the perspective of Hegel’s ‘Universal History’, reason [Geist] is 
understood metaphysically. While Geist is famously hard to define (Marcuse, 1969; Solomon, 
1970; Houlgate, 2012), it is perhaps best understood by Houlgate (2012) as an amalgam of the 
English words ‘reason’, ‘self-understanding’ and ‘spirit’. For Hegel, the entirety of human culture 
and history can be understood as the process of abstract Geist finding form (‘being actualised’ 
[Verwicklichung]) in institutions and forms of cognition.75 It is through overcoming (‘sublating’ 
[Aufheben]) the internal contradictions of the present (inadequacies in societal organisation, 
limited forms of thought etc) that Geist unfolds. In this process irrational (or pathological) forms 
of thought and societal organisation are displaced by more rational forms of social existence.  
There is a clear eschatological nature to the Hegelian imaginary (Tucker, 1964: 45-48). In 
Hegelian terms, spirit continues unfolding until the ‘rational universal’76 is attained across all 
societal institutions (Marcuse, 1969; Honneth, 2007a, 2007c). The ultimate destination of the 
                                                          
74 ‘Universal History’ is presented in contrast to ‘Original History’ (written by a historian living in the time depicted), 
or the ‘Pragmatic’, ‘Specialized’, or ‘Critical’ forms of ‘Reflective’ History. This is a particularly Hegelian demarcation, 
distinguishing his approach from the preceding Kantian understanding established in ‘Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784, see Kant, 1996: xx).   
75 As Tucker words it, for Hegel, ‘world history is thus the unfolding of Geist in time, as nature is the unfolding of 
Geist in space’ (Tucker, 1964: 47). 
76 Where there is no lacuna between the rational potential inherent in a process and the means of its material 
manifestations: where society, or an aspect of society, is functioning as perfectly as it is possible for it to do so.  
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Hegelian social-philosophical [Rechtsphilosophie] project is ‘reconciliation’ [Versöhnung]: both 
of Geist with the world and of humanity with modernity (Hegel, 1991: Preface; Hardimon, 
1992).77 Marcuse argues that Hegel truly ‘believed that such objective concepts and principles 
exist’ (Marcuse, 1969: 7).78 For left-Hegelians, the development of reason, and the diagnosis of 
its ‘pathologies’ needs to grasped relative to the ‘totality’ of this expansive imagination 
(Marcuse, 1969: 7).  
From the Hegelian perspective, Geist is manifest in both social structures and in individual 
cognition; a mediating metaphysical substrate which both gives form to social life and is 
manifest within social life (Hegel, 1953). ‘Reason’ [Geist] is thus a mediating presence between 
the subject and the organised social world, which is constantly unfolding its contradictions. It is 
only from the position of ‘Universal History’ that the true development of reason can be grasped. 
While this remains an admittedly vast, imprecise definition, it is enough to demonstrate the core 
features of the Hegelian understanding. One can see how the development of individual 
cognition is fundamentally tied to the development of the social world, and, in particular, to the 
organisational rationality of social institutions. There exists a mediating process (the unfolding 
of Geist) between the individual and their capacity for optimal cognition (what would be called 
‘reason’ to a liberal) (Hegel, 1953). It is the socially mediated reason of the present, the unfolding 
of Geist, which determines the cognition of the subject. From such a position, one can see how 
the subject’s capacity for cognition is fundamentally mediated, and how ‘reason’ is understood 
in a ‘thick’ and ‘social’ manner. 
For Hegel, ‘Universal History’ had (allegedly) reached its conclusion in the early nineteenth 
century with Junker-dominated Prussia. ‘Reconciliation’ [Versöhnung] was held to have 
occurred: the unfolding of spirit was complete. There were no more social pathologies in 
existence, as, for Hegel, 
social pathologies were to be understood as the result of the inability of society to properly express 
the rational potential already inherent in its institutions, practices, and everyday routines (Honneth, 
2007c: 23). 
 
However, for Hegel, within the Prussian state, the rational potential had been attained. There 
were thus no more social pathologies, at least not in the manner understood by Hegel. The 
challenge was simply for individuals to realise the rational perfection inherent in the social 
                                                          
77 For an extended discussion, see Tucker (1964). 
78 Pippin’s (1981) account is more figurative, focusing on the realm of ideas, rather than an actual moment of 
eschatological rupture. In this regard Pippin seems to follow Haym’s canonical Hegel Und seine Zeit.  
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system: for the individual to be reconciled with the modern world (Hardimon, 1992: 165-167),79 
and to personally attain the knowledge of the contemporary unfolding of reason, or, as Hegel 
phrased it: to work through the Phenomenology of Spirit. Through reading Hegel’s text, the 
social subject would be able to attain the perfection in their own manner of thought that was 
reached by the organisational structure of society. Hegel’s two most famous texts, Philosophy 
of Right and Phenomenology of Spirit might, therefore, both be considered deeply politically 
conservative. For Hegel, when the reader has read (and understood) the Phenomenology of 
Spirit they will (allegedly) be able to achieve the highest possible standard of rational outlook in 
their own cognition. Equally, through a reading of Philosophy of Right, the reader will be able to 
comprehend the perfection of the Prussian system. There is limited, if any, need for further 
transition.  
However, Hegel’s work has long been subject to conflicting interpretations (Pippin, 1981: 
509-510; Houlgate, 2012). While conservative elements utilised his texts to justify the political 
conjecture of the day (the so-called ‘Right-Hegelians’), many progressives saw the utility of 
Hegel’s texts in their method rather than in his conclusions (Harris, 1958). Those who utilised 
Hegel’s approach, yet disagreed that the Prussian state was the ‘reconciliation’ [Versöhnung] of 
the unfolding of Reason [Geist] in the world [Welt], are referred to as ‘left-Hegelians’.80 Such 
figures famously included Feuerbach, Bauer, Stirner, and of course, Karl Marx. The foundational 
tenets of such an approach remain central to many of the pathologies of reason approaches 
utilised by Critical Theorists today (Honneth, . 
For left-Hegelians,  
… [t]he existence of … such social suffering, is explicable only as the given social world exists as an 
‘insufficient appropriation’ of an ‘objectively’ already possible reason (Honneth, 2007c: 23). 
Thus, the development of spirit is held to be continuing: social suffering remains, therefore, 
Geist must not have completed its unfolding (Harris, 1958). With this awareness, the task then 
becomes to further the development of the unfolding of spirit, by engaging with, and critiquing 
the obstacles to, reason’s development. Strydom (2008) presents this as the ‘Gordian knot’ 
which left-Hegelians seek to unpick. For a purist left-Hegelian, the challenge is to identify the 
pathologies of reason in the present, enabling the organisation of society to be restructured in 
accordance with the full force of reason. Indeed, there is a political and an ethical imperative to 
do so (Harris, 1958: 609). As Honneth words it, 
                                                          
79 In my conclusion I argue that such reactionary forms of Hegelianism have come to hold an unhealthy influence on 
contemporary Critical Theory. 
80 They are also referred to as ‘Young Hegelians’, however for simplicity I stick to the term ‘left-Hegelian’ in this 
project.  
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Any deviation from the ideal [non-pathological] … must lead to a social pathology insofar as subjects 
are recognisably suffering from a loss of universal, communal ends (Honneth, 2007c: 24). 
From such a position it becomes possible to understand the limitations of the contemporary 
capitalist world in purely Hegelian terms, where 
… [the] pathological deformation by capitalism may be overcome only by initiating a process of 
enlightenment among those involved (Honneth, 2007c: 21). 
The left-Hegelian Critical Theorist is able to provide such ‘enlightenment’ by diagnosing the 
pathologies of reason in the present, by exposing the areas of the social world where the 
‘rational universal’ is yet to be attained and where the immanent reality of the form of social 
organisation falls short of the standards of ‘objectively possible reason’ (Hegel, 1953; Marcuse, 
1969). The task is to ‘practically remedy’ the gulf between the organisation of the social world 
and the rational potential latent within it (Honneth, 2007c: 21). In Marcuse’s words, 
As long as there is any gap between real and potential, the former must be acted upon and changed 
until it is brought into line with reason (Marcuse, 1969: 11). 
Such pathologies in the development of reason can exist in any social domain: in the 
organisation of sexual relations, in the modes of economic exchange, or in the forms of aesthetic 
appreciation (Hegel, 1953: Part Three: Section C; Honneth, 2007c: 23-27). Thus, the challenge is 
to subject society as a ‘totality’ to continual, rigorous critique (Honneth, 2007c: 24).81 82 For 
example, for Honneth (2007c), Marx’s critique of the irrationality of the capitalist system can be 
read as deeply left-Hegelian, that is as a diagnosis of a pathology in the dominant form of reason. 
Transposed into the left-Hegelian register, Marx’s critique of the capitalist economic system can 
be understood as the argument that the current form of economic organisation is inferior to the 
potential for a more rational form of exchange which is practically attainable (Honneth, 2007c: 
24). Similarly, Honneth reads Freud’s critique of the inadequacies of the repressive form of 
sexual relations can be comprehended as an argument that the current, immanent practices of 
expressing sexuality were inferior to the potential for a more rational form of sexual life, which 
had already been made possible by the unfolding of Geist (Honneth, 2007c: 24-26). Returning 
to Honneth’s explanation: 
In all … approaches to Critical Theory, the same Hegelian idea – namely, that a rational universal is 
always required for the possibility of fulfilled self-realization within society – is continually 
incorporated, only in different characterizations of the original human practice of action (Honneth, 
2007c: 25). 
Within the left-Hegelian approach to diagnosing pathologies of reason, the potential for 
transcendence is implicit in the critique of the contradictions immanent to the lifeworld 
                                                          
81 Hegel frames this as the need to look all the ‘negatives in the face’ (Hegel, 1970: 36). 
82 For Freyenhagen (2013), Adorno’s radical negativism in Negative Dialectics (1966) retains a sensitivity to the 
centrality of negation, and of negativity, in Hegel’s dialectical method.  
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(Strydom, 2011). It is with reference to the diagnosis of social pathologies of reason that Critical 
Theorists developed their distinctive framing of ‘immanent-transcendence’. For Hegel, it was 
essential that the theorist sought to ‘penetrate into the immanent content of the matter’ (Hegel, 
1970: 52), to explore the latent potentialities (the more sophisticated forms of reason) within 
the present. Diagnosing pathologies of reason presents opportunities for ‘immanent-
transcendence’ (Strydom, 1989). Through an analysis of the latent potentialities for a more 
rational society that exist within the present, the possibilities of a more rational future can be 
articulated (Strydom, 1989: 2). From such a perspective the potential for transcendence of the 
given lies dormant within the immanent lifeworld, which can be attained by the ‘sublation’ 
[Aufheben] of the contradictions of the lifeworld. 
The final component of the left-Hegelian approach to diagnosing pathologies of reason that 
needs to be explicated is the relationship between the individual subject and the broader social 
totality.83 How precisely does the individual’s journey through the Phenomenology of Spirit 
connect with the Philosophy of Right, considering the central mediating and connecting role of 
Geist? How does the social actor fit into this grand Hegelian paradigm (Hardimon, 1992)? I argue 
that one can understand the relationship between the individual and the social as expressing a 
particular dynamic, and that this particular logic occurs, in varying manifestations across all the 
pathologies of reason approaches.   
For the left-Hegelian, individual cognition is mediated by Geist. When the subject engages 
with the wider world, their cognitive capacities reflect both their own socialisation (within the 
society: a society which has reached a certain development of rationality) and presents the 
development of their own reason/self-consciousness (as expressed in the stages of the 
Phenomenology). The actions of the social subject thus proceed to further the form of reason 
which they, and the social world, have attained. Both of which are fundamentally mediated by 
the unfolding of Geist. Ultimately, one sees a dynamic of mutual reinforcement: where both the 
social organisation and the self-consciousness of the subject serve to mutually reinforce 
obstacles to spirit’s unfolding. The diagnosis of a social pathology of reason is thus doubly 
‘social’: the cognitive impairment in the subject is derived from a ‘thick’ ‘social’ understanding 
of reason. This can be presented as a negative reading of the Doppelstatz: if what is rational is 
socially determined, and what is socially determined is predicated upon the unfolding of reason 
(Bristow, 2014), this must also account for the presence of social pathologies of reason.84 The 
                                                          
83 As acknowledged above, this is a problem of real complexity which requires a more extended analysis. See Pippin 
(1981), Taylor (1989) and Wood (1990).  
84 Tentative nods in this direction in Honneth (2010). 
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subject themselves, through their engagement with the social world, with their impeded 
cognitive capacity, serves to reassert, or reaffirm, certain pathological irrationalities. 
Despite there being substantial divergences across the various framings of pathologies of 
reason, this foundational logic is consistently central. To restate the dynamic: the limitations in 
the cognition of the individual actor are produced by their socialisation; similarly, when the actor 
engages with their social world, they serve to reinforce the pathologies of reason which they, 
themselves imbibed from the social totality.  
 
Pathologies of recognition as pathologies of reason  
The dominant recognition-derived approach for furthering social theory has a clear origin in 
Hegelian philosophy (Honneth, 1995; Chapter One). This heritage is particularly salient in the 
work of the Jyväskylä School (Laitinen, Särkelä and Ikäheimo, 2015). From such a perspective, 
the social world is presented as a ‘recognition order’, in which the fundamental subjecthood of 
social actors is acknowledged (‘recognised’) according to irrational socially determined criteria. 
In this way, Honneth’s Critical Theory of Recognition serves to ‘sociologise’ Hegel’s parable of 
the struggle for recognition of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Anderson, 1995). The social world is held to be pathological if it fails to offer recognition 
networks commensurate with the highest level of reason attained by the social body.85  
In Honneth’s (1995) Struggle for Recognition, the importance of recognition relations that 
provide love, esteem, and respect is underscored. Such requirements are presented as 
foundational for the social subject to enjoy a healthy relation to self.86 Fundamentally, by virtue 
of their membership of the human race, all subjects deserve to be treated with love, esteem, 
and recognition.87 As the pathologies of recognition paradigm makes clear, due to pathological 
recognition relationships, not all social subjects are granted access to these three foundational 
requirements. Be it due to racial, gendered, or class dynamics inter alia, or to intersections 
between them, various social actors find themselves disadvantaged by the exclusionary nature 
of the recognition order. Where the recognition order fails to provide these essential facets of 
recognition to social subjects, the recognition theorist speaks of a ‘pathology of recognition’.88  
                                                          
85 While I argue throughout this thesis that the Honnethian recognition paradigm is an inadequate incarnation of 
the left-Hegelian tradition (Chapter Two), in this chapter my objective is merely to chart the centrality of the two 
central logics outlined above as central to the rival pathologies of reason framings. 
86 Honneth here extends the Hegelian reflections on the conditions for ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. 
87 Having presented an ethical framing, this analysis proceeds to introduce a more Kantian morality [Moralitat] to 
the discussion. Honneth (2007d) expands upon his rationale in an article in Critical Horizons, ‘The irreducibility of 
Progress: Kant’s Account of the relationship between Morality and History’.  
88 This is expressed in greater detail in Chapter One. 
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Transposing this approach into the discourse of its latent Hegelianism, one can view the 
recognition order as expressing varying degrees of rationality (Ingram, 2010). As with the left-
Hegelian framing more broadly, the recognition theorist seeks to locate the means for transition 
and transcendence within the immanent.89 Within the social world, norms exist which insist on 
the equal right to ‘love’, ‘respect’, and ‘esteem’ of all agents (Honneth, 1995).90 Recognition 
orders which exclude subjects from attaining these essential forms of recognition are held to be 
indicative of social pathologies of reason. The divide between the innate rational potential of 
the normative horizons of the social world and the failure of various recognition relationships to 
replicate these norms, mimics the structural divide between the capacity for reason latent 
within society and the structure of social relations more broadly for the left-Hegelian.  
Once again, one can see how the understanding of various ‘recognition orders’ serves to 
frame ‘reason’ as ‘social’ and ‘thick’. Subjects are granted, or denied, various forms of 
recognition on the basis of social logics and understandings. For example, as critical race 
theorists have argued, racism is not merely grounded in the ignorance of an atomistic individual 
(Du Bois, 2016). Rather, as expressed above, the pathologies of reason approach holds to an 
understanding of the subject as one whose cognitive capacities are fundamentally tied to the 
development of societal norms more broadly. Transposing racist denials of recognition to non-
white people into a left-Hegelian register, one could argue that the racist’s cognitive capacities 
are impeded by the inadequate instantiation of the already possible standards of reason which 
exist in normative social order (of universal equality), but which fail to be present within the 
racialised recognition order (where denials of respect to subjects on the basis of their race is 
socially sanctioned).   
One can see the presence of a foundational dynamic between the social world and the social 
actor, which serves to mutually reinforce pathologies of reason. The social subject is socialised 
into a world of recognition relationships. Subject X spends their entire life observing subjects Y 
and Z being denied recognition, being disrespected and unloved. Unless subject X themselves, 
through an act of their own critical capacity, notices the disconnect between broader social 
normative horizons and the recognition order, it is more than likely that subject X will proceed 
to reinforce these norms in their interactions with subjects Y and Z. The socially precipitated 
cognitive impairment which subject X suffers from is then continually reinforced by X’s own 
social action. 
                                                          
89 I have explored the limitations of these claims in Chapter Two. As stated, in this section my objective is merely to 
underscore the common factors to the rival understandings of pathologies of reason in circulation.  
90 Especially Chapters One, Two and Three. 
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That said, as with traditional left-Hegelianism, there remains space for the resolution of these 
pathologies. According to Honnethian recognition theorists, through an exploration of subjects’ 
experiences of disrespect and of denied recognition, immanent-transcendent critique remains 
possible. By examining the occasions where recognition-relationships are not developed to 
support love, rights and esteem (where there are pathologies of recognition), one can determine 
a disconnect within the immanent lifeworld. The theorist can identity an immanent 
contradiction between the broader social norms for equal recognition (the conditions of Ethical 
Life [Sittlichkeit], and the pathological recognition relationships which inhibit healthy 
recognition. Through a rigorous immanent critique of said contradictory recognition 
relationships, recognition theorists seek to push towards a more rational lifeworld.91 
However, as this thesis argues, the pathologies of recognition approach is deeply problematic 
(Chapter Two, Chapter Three). While recognition approaches can harbour utility, for Honneth a 
recognition perspective alone is able to capture the totality of the pathologies of the social 
(Fraser and Honneth, 2001). There is thus no space for alternate modes of engagement (Chapter 
Three). As expressed, numerous forms of social pathology are hidden from the recognition lens 
(Chapter Two, Chapter Four, Chapter Six). Various philosophical critiques have been levelled 
against the paradigm’s capacity to adequately engage with the complexity of power 
relationships which extend far beyond recognition (Chapter Two). Further, recent developments 
have seen the recognition approach increasingly tied to a restrictive cognitivism (Chapter Three). 
Thus, the radical potential of diagnosing pathologies of reason through a recognition-derived 
approach, as part of a more ‘polycentric’ and ‘multilateral’ Critical Theory has been lost (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001: 209). My final chapter (Chapter Seven) seeks to recover this potentiality. 
As this reconstructive exercise has brought out, viewing pathologies of recognition as 
pathologies of reason has an innate appeal (Ingram, 2010). Once again, one can see how this 
approach to pathologies of reason necessitates an understanding of reason as ‘thick’ and as 
‘social’, that is as built into recognition orders which mediate subjects’ interactions. And, yet 
again, one can see in this framing of pathologies of reason the presence of a clear logic of mutual 
reinforcement. The subject who suffers from a cognitive impairment (impeded reason) insofar 
as they have been raised to consider (e.g.) all poor people beneath contempt, will then, with 
their own social action, serve to reinforce the illogicality of a social world which victimises, or 
                                                          
91 I express the profound limitations of this approach, and its ‘domesticating’ implications, in Chapter Seven and in 
the Conclusion. What is important here, however, is how the key features of the approach attempt to connect a 
thick form of reason with an immanent-transcendent approach.   
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does not recognise, working class subjects. The presence of this foundational social logic remains 
an essential social-theoretical insight to all diagnoses of pathological irrationality.   
 
The dominance of instrumental rationality  
Generations of Critical Theorists have argued that capitalism is dogged by a particular pathology 
of reason, the undue dominance of instrumental rationality (Held, 1980; Schecter, 2010). The 
hegemony of market logics across social institutions means that the social world is ruled by logics 
of equivalence in which the innate worth and distinctive features of subjects and entities are 
‘written off as literature’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 7). Only the characteristics essential 
to facilitating the achievement of defined ‘ends’ of exchange are engaged with (Lukacs, 1972). 
From the perspective of this pathological episteme, life, beauty, even tragedy are engaged with 
epistemically as exchangeable ‘dead matter - a heap of things’ (Horkheimer, 1993: 81). Such a 
perspective strips social action of its essential humanity: concerns of identity and individuality 
are entirely negated (Fromm, 1963; Horkheimer, 1993; Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997). Today, 
the social subject is acculturated within a world dominated by such transactional, instrumental 
logics (Adorno, 1978; Bronner, 2011). Adorno’s (1978) Minima Moralia sought to expose the 
minutiae of this process through a series of vignettes. Children are taught from infancy how to 
survive in an instrumental world: act instrumentally. They must achieve the salient targets at 
schools, and then play the REF at university. Rationality has become synonymous for 
‘efficiency’92 of productive labour. For Han (2012), there is thus a damaging loss of the potential 
for an ‘erotic’ engagement with the lifeworld: the social subject is unable to experience mimetic-
erotic forms of rationality as there is an ever-decreasing space for alternate forms of social 
action.  
The subject who has been raised in a lifeworld riven by instrumentality will likely engage with 
the social realm in an instrumental manner (Adorno, 1978; Horkheimer, 2014). Their 
socialisation leaves them ill-equipped to comprehend the hic et nunc, the particular, the 
mimetic. More damagingly, in a neoliberal social order, if a child is raised to truly appreciate 
alternate forms of reason, they will be unable to function in the lifeworld (Ratner, 2019). Imagine 
a ten-year old who fails to accept that land can be owned, or who refuses to accept that one can 
exchange capital for meat or for labour. Sadly, such a child would be unable to function in today’s 
society; and, ironically, the child would be held to be subject to a personal pathology (Fromm, 
                                                          
92 This connects to Beck’s analysis of how such ‘rationalisation’ (in terms of streamlining and instrumentalising) in 
risk society has led to a new ‘rationalisation’ (in terms of the need for new justifications and explanations for social 
action, where they are increasingly disconnected from basic human needs and desires) (Beck, 1997: 16).  
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1963, 2010). Following Fromm, it seems essential to be able to speak of an ‘insane’, 
‘pathological’ social order: crucially it is the society, rather than the child, which suffers from the 
pathology (Fromm, 1963, 2010).  
The dominance of instrumental rationality, akin to the other species of social pathology of 
reason articulated, evinces a logic of reinforcement between the social subject and the broader 
organisation of society. The child who has been socialised to accede to the dominant normative 
horizon, inflected as it is with instrumental logics, will in all likelihood, through their own social 
action, serve to reinforce and legitimise instrumental social logics. Through engaging in capitalist 
exchange practices, in setting and attempting to achieve targets, in the prioritisation of certain 
forms of ‘meaningful’ social action, the subject will reinforce the dominance of the instrumental 
logics which precipitated their own cognitive impairment.   
It is essential to stress that when subjects engage with the social world through solely (and 
damagingly) instrumental logics, the subject reflects the deeper social pathologies (Adorno, 
1978; Fromm, 2010). As with the discussion of the left-Hegelian understanding of pathologies of 
reason, or the pathologies of recognition approach when transposed into the left-Hegelian 
register, one can see how the dominance of instrumentality is predicated on a ‘thicker’ 
understanding of reason than the liberal concept of reason as an atomistic potential dominant 
today. Yet again, to engage with the pathology of a dominant form of rationality one must 
understand ‘reason’ to be socially manifest, to exist within, or be embodied by, social institutions 
as much as within the forms of cognition of social actors. An essential component of the 
diagnosis of instrumental rationality qua a pathology of reason, is the understanding of ‘reason’ 
as ‘thick’ and ‘social’.  
One can thus again see the presence of the two essential features of the pathologies of 
reason approach. There remains an understanding of reason which is ‘thicker’ and ‘social’, which 
vastly diverges from with the popular, colloquial framing of reason which understands it solely 
as an epistemic capacity of the autonomous atomistic subject. One can also see the centrality of 
the logic of mutual reinforcement: the social subject serves to reproduce the conditions which 
precipitated their own cognitive impairment.  
 
Socially induced category mistakes 
While the term ‘category mistake’ derives from Ryle’s (2002) critique of Cartesian dualism, the 
framing has recently been developed by Critical Theorists as an appropriate signifier for a range 
of social pathologies including commodification, reification and dominant logics of false 
equivalence (O’Sullivan, 2016). Lukacs’ (1972) work on reification and false equivalence is 
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perhaps the most accessible and widely engaged with diagnosis of socially induced category 
mistakes.93 For Lukacs (1972), capitalist relations require a necessarily reifying outlook. For the 
social actor to survive within capitalist society they must engage with the world through a lens 
of ‘phantom objectivity’ (Lukacs, 1972: 6). The capitalist ‘form of social life’ (Jaeggi, 2018) 
necessitates a species of cognition where the social subject is unable to engage with the world 
in a manner compatible with the correct identification of external subjects and objects (Adorno, 
1978). For first generation Critical Theorists, this represented a clear social pathology of reason 
(Honneth, 2000).  
As Marx (1976) expressed in his writings on the commodity form, the market order is based 
on logics of equivalence and exchange, rather than on use value. This produces a damaging 
discordance for the social subject, who is naturally aware of both the distinct ontologies existing 
within the social world and (according to the Marxist account of human nature) is 
anthropologically inclined to utilise the social world on its functional merits (Mehrotra, 1991). 
For a subject to survive in the capitalist market they must be able to accept that three hours of 
their labour time is exchangeable for four sirloin steaks, or thirty-six pounds sterling. They must 
further be able to accept that those four sirloin steaks, at point of sale, possess an equivalent 
value (a shared equivalent worth) to any other commodity of equivalent market price. This 
foundational market logic is entirely at variance with the knowledge of the distinct ontological 
categories of the lifeworld. Ultimately, as Lukacs states, the necessity to obviate our 
understanding of the ontological distinctiveness of the constituents of the world leads to ‘the 
reification of all human relations’ (Lukacs, 1972: 6); to the ‘fragmentation of the object of 
production’ and, ultimately, to the ‘fragmentation of … the subject’ (Lukacs, 1972: 89). Thus, 
implicit within Lukacs’ work is the warning that when the subject loses the ability to distinguish 
between ontologically distinct entities, they risk losing their own coherent relation to self 
(Lukacs, 1972). 
Schecter draws out how such reification is not just an individual failure of cognition, but a 
social pathology. It must be understood as  
… an epistemological problem which can no longer be solved philosophically … [I]t is … an absolutely 
fundamental problem about knowledge which requires a practical political solution because the 
moment for its theoretical resolution as a knowledge problem has been made redundant by history 
(Schecter, 2010: 51 – my italics).  
As Schecter stresses, social processes precipitate this ‘fundamental problem about knowledge’ 
(Schecter, 2010: 51). Critical Theorists thus argue that the cognitive capacities of the subject 
must be understood as being crucially impacted by logics which exist beyond the subject’s 
                                                          
93 It should be noted that Lukacs himself does not utilise the terminology of ‘socially induced category mistakes’. 
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consciousness. There is a form of reason which exists, or is supported by, market logics (reifying, 
commodifying, equivalence based). As Schecter argues, it is not possible to provide a solution to 
these forms of irrationality simply through a correction of the ‘knowledge problem’ they 
represent (Schecter, 2010: 51). Rather, it is essential to understand such reificatory logics as 
requiring a ‘practical political solution’ (Schecter, 2010: 51). To cure socially induced category 
mistakes, the solution is to change the forms of reason which are embodied by the logics of the 
social world. Reason, thus, once again, is understood as being instantiated in processes and 
logics; once again a vastly more ‘expansive’, ‘thick’ and ‘social’ conceptualisation than that 
adhered to by the liberal canon. 
For capitalist subjects to efficaciously navigate their social lives they must internalise the false 
equivalences of the market, which, in turn, necessitates a reifying outlook. The subject, having 
internalised these dynamics, then engages in the lifeworld reinforcing the social logics which 
precipitated their own cognitive impairment. We can thus see how market logics induce 
category mistakes (social subjects need to engage in calculations predicated on false 
equivalences). The social actor then reaffirms the irrational social world through their 
engagement with irrational social processes, that is, by engaging in transactions which are 
predicated on an ontologically reductive logic of false equivalence. 
 
Civilisational critiques 
The final approach to engaging with pathologies of reason presents as something of a return to 
coda. There is a clear ‘World-Historical’ inflection to the diagnoses of Adorno and Horkheimer. 
Sadly, another common feature between Dialectic of Enlightenment and Hegel’s philosophy is 
their inaccessibility (Bronner, 2011). That said, as with the preceding discussion on Hegel, many 
contemporary Critical Theorists still consider it to be of great merit to engaging with their text: 
Bronner considers that Dialectic of Enlightenment is ‘perhaps the great critical encounter with 
modernity undertaken from the left’ (Bronner, 2011: 51 – my italics).  
Similarly to Hegel, Adorno and Horkheimer present their work relative to a universal 
historical time: from ‘Homeric myth’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 55) to the Culture Industry. 
While Hegel presents the driving force of history to be the unfolding of Geist, for the co-authors 
of Dialectic of Enlightenment the propulsive force of history is ‘Enlightenment’. Adorno is a 
philosopher of extreme negativity (Freyenhagen, 2013),94 and it is unsurprising that his 
                                                          
94 For instance, the co-authors write that the ‘curse of irresistible progress is irresistible 
regression’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 36). 
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characterisation of ‘enlightenment’ is deeply pessimistic. For Adorno and Horkheimer, 
‘Enlightenment’ is understood as the process through which the ‘mythic mode of apprehension’ 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 6) is displaced by subsumptive rationalities. A direct result of 
this is that the living, the affective, and the qualitative become redundant, so that the world is 
reduced to ‘dead matter – a heap of things’ (Horkheimer, 1993: 81). An essential part of this 
process of Enlightenment, and core to its pathological nature, is that humanity starts to locate 
itself outside of nature: 
… [a]s soon as man discards his awareness that he … is nature, all the aims for which he keeps himself 
alive … are nullified, and the enthronement of the means as an end … is already perceptible in the 
prehistory of subjectivity (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 54). 
For Adorno and Horkheimer the move to ‘Enlightened’ thought is deeply pathological. It is not 
just a pathology of reason, it is the overdetermining pathology of reason. What is distinctive 
about Adorno and Horkheimer’s imagination, relative to other contemporaneous theorists, is 
that their pathology of reason is no modern phenomena, rather it can be traced back into the 
depths of human pre-history (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 43-45). There is an entire excurses 
of the text dedicated to the argument that it is possible to ‘recognize enlightened thought even 
in the most distant past’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 45) In their rendition of the myth of 
Odysseus, one can see enlightened thought existing through the relation between ‘naked 
power’, ‘subjectivity’ and alienation (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 45-47). Humanity is already 
seen to be isolating itself from the hic et nunc, from the biological species, in its self-created 
fictive prehistory. For the co-authors this pathology of reason exists as much in Weberian 
capitalist bureaucracies as in the Homeric myths: 
... [t]he irrationalism of totalitarian capitalism, whose way of satisfying needs has an objectified form 
determined by domination which makes the satisfaction of needs impossible and tends toward the 
extermination of mankind, has its prototype in the hero who escapes from sacrifice by sacrificing 
himself (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 55 – my italics). 
For the co-authors, the ascent of subsumptive rationalities is typified by Odysseus, ‘the self who 
always restrains himself and forgets his life’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 55). The epic hero 
suffers from a living alienation; a prototypical petrified subject. Odysseus is tied to the mast of 
history, unable to embrace ‘instinct’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 69), to return once again 
to the immediacy of existence. What further follows from the pathology of enlightened reason 
is the ‘elimination of qualities’ from the subject’s perception, viewed solely as their ‘conversion 
into functions’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 36). Before long, the capacity for a holistic, 
mimetic or erotic encounter with the present is ‘written off as literature’ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997: 7), incommensurate with the dictates of subsumptive rationalities. One can 
thus read Dialectic of Enlightenment as presenting a foundational pathology of reason: a direct 
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critique on Enlightened thought as unduly subsumptive and incapable of furthering true 
happiness.  
There is a particular form of Enlightened cognition, the conceptual domination of the 
particular, which epitomises the violence of Enlightenment thought. The pathology is where the 
subject engages with the lifeworld through a conceptual form of cognition to such an extent that 
the ‘thing in itself’ is negated. In the co-author’s turn of phrase, the conceptual ‘liquidates’ the 
particular (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 17).  This foundational pathology of reason is endemic 
to Enlightened cognition; there is a fundamental ‘incongruence of concept and actuality’ 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 30). As the Enlightened ‘intellect … perceive[s] the particular 
only as one case of the general’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 84-5), it opens the possibility to 
engaging with the individual solely in the abstract.95 
In a very similar way to the Hegelian imaginary, for Adorno and Horkheimer ‘reason’ is 
understood as both ‘thick’ and ‘social’ in character, it is found in the very recesses of subjectivity, 
in the forms of engagement with the social, and in the mode of communion with the aesthetic. 
Equally, the pathological forms of rationality invade the physical architecture of the present, in 
the way a door is closed, or the layout of chairs to desks in an office (Adorno, 1978). Indeed, the 
spread of subsumptive reason was held to be so pervasive for Adorno and Horkheimer that it 
posed methodological challenges for their critique (Honneth, 2000). The anthropological 
narrative, and obscure manner of presentation aside, it remains clear that Adorno and 
Horkheimer view ‘reason’ as more than just a cognitive process. Rather, ‘reason’ is held to be a 
social process, mediating the individual and the world. The pathologies of Enlightened 
rationality, epitomised by the conceptual domination of the particular, are thus almost 
impossible to avoid.96 
Finally, it is worth reasserting the relationship between the individual and the social recurring 
throughout all these framings of pathological reason. Because reason is framed as more than 
just the cognitive capacities of the individual and is held to be manifest in forms of social life and 
organisation, the individual’s social action perpetuates pathological irrationalities. The subject 
is socialised to accept and perpetuate Enlightened forms of cognition to the detriment of their 
capacity to engage with the world, and express an unalienated humanity. As Adorno wrote in 
Minima Moralia, ‘happiness [itself] is obsolete’ (Adorno, 1978: 217). 
                                                          
95 Roberts expresses this well when he argues that Enlightened cognition (as understood by Adorno and 
Horkheimer) ‘enables conceptuality to dispense with individuality in favor of the ability to perform a 
function’ (Roberts, 2004: 63 – my italics). 
96 For Adorno, context-transcending art was perhaps the sole remaining possibility. To this end he developed a 
passionate interest in the atonal music of Alan Berg (Held, 1980).  
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Concluding thoughts on this reconstructive exercise 
This reconstructive exercise drew out two features common across the five rival framings. I 
presented a common understanding of ‘reason’ as ‘thick’ and ‘social’ in character, which sits in 
clear contrast to the colloquial, broadly liberal, understanding. This awareness that the form of 
reason dominant in the lifeworld may itself be pathological is an important social-theoretical 
insight. Second, I drew out a shared dynamic of mutual reinforcement between the subject and 
the social world common to each understanding. Having been socialised with a cognitive 
impairment, the social subject then proceeds to act in the lifeworld in a manner that reinforces 
the conditions which precipitated their impeded cognition.  
 
The limitations of a pathologies of reason approach: critiques and rejoinders  
This section of the chapter sympathetically presents three of the most prominent critiques of 
the pathologies of reason approach.  
a) That a pathologies of reason approach is inevitably mired in complexity and 
inaccessibility (and is thus exclusionary), 
b) is necessarily based on an unreflexive and politically problematic understanding of both 
‘reason’ and ‘progress’,  
c) and that such approaches necessitate a problematic commitment to a form of 
metaphysics. 
Having outlined these common (and reasonable) fears, I offer rejoinders. The purpose of this 
exercise is to confirm that there is no irremediable weakness to a pathologies of reason 
approach, before I chart the problematic exclusion of the perspective’s insights from the 
‘recognition-cognitive’ and ‘pathologies of recognition’ framings. 
 
The critique of inaccessibility and obfuscation 
It is routinely stated that the pathologies of reason approach, particularly in its Hegelian and 
Adornian manifestations, is particularly impenetrable (Bronner, 2011). It is often pointed out 
that the literature is overburdened by philosophical complexity, made worse by the fact that 
there are various terms which have multiple, and at times, contradictory meanings (Popper, 
1945). One can draw a thread from Schopenhauer’s acerbic caricature, through Santayana’s 
Egotism in German Philosophy (1916), through the logical positivists, through Bertrand Russell’s 
A History of Western Philosophy (1945), to Karl Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies 
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(1945). Philosophers and theorists from otherwise divergent schools of thought have united to 
condemn the pathologies of reason approach as primarily obfuscation and not worth engaging 
with. Fundamentally, the pathologies of reason approach is held to be irreconcilable with the 
requirements of lucid, accessible social theory. 
There is a second aspect to this critique which builds upon the first submission of obfuscation: 
the work is inaccessible. If the aim of Critical Theory is to provide radical change, of actual social 
praxis, how can this be pursued with theoretical resources which are incommunicable to the 
wider social world? To these entirely reasonable and recurring critiques, I offer three responses. 
It should be noted that often the Critical Theorists’ unorthodox style is not merely down to a 
laissez-faire attitude to the clarity of their argumentation, rather the author may desire the 
reader to engage with their text beyond the conventional analytical register (Honneth, 2000). 
Often, the work is in a deliberately ‘obscure manner of presentation’ (Habermas, 1982: 14): 
think of Dialectic of Enlightenment or Minima Moralia. These are not texts to reduce to 
numbered theses with varying sub-arguments.97 Diagnoses of pathological irrationality 
deliberately do not explicitly draw out ‘causal links’, or, such links are simply ‘absent’ (Herf, 2012: 
86). Texts that present a critique of the dominant form of reason face a logical conundrum. If 
the hegemonic forms of understanding are damaged by colonising logics or foundational flaws, 
how can such a critique be expressed? Communication and cognition sit in such close proximity. 
Honneth (2000) suggests that Critical Theorists have sought a means out of this dilemma 
through ‘Disclosing Critique’. Instead of utilising the dominant mores of exchange and 
presentation, and thereby being limited by exactly the flaws in reasoning the authors’ seek to 
illuminate, Critical Theorists have sought to diagnose pathologies of reason more obliquely, 
through appeals to literature, to sensation, or through exaggeration and allegory (Honneth, 
2000).98 For Honneth (2000), Dialectic of Enlightenment represents an ideal-typical work of 
‘world disclosing’ critique. For van den Brink (1997), there are crucially important components 
to this work which must be appreciated as both linguistic and philosophical devices. One can 
thus argue that exaggeration and excurses are utilised to draw out the pathologies of reason 
without falling victim to the same perversions of reason the authors seek to critique.  
This is not to state that clarity is abound, or that such texts are effortlessly approachable. 
Indeed, one must admit that aspects of the pathologies of reason literature are simply poorly 
                                                          
97 To do so would be akin to presenting Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony in Wave lengths and frequencies rather than 
as music. As Hegelian scholars, Adorno and Horkheimer would be well aware of the dangers of seeking to 
disconnect content from form.  
98 One can detect further contemporary resonances of this strategy in Sloterdijk’s (2012) consciously ‘hyperbolic’ 
The Art of Philosophy. 
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written, and unduly complicated (Schopenhauer, 1909). As commented above, the pathologies 
of reason approaches do not hold the intuitive appeal of Honneth’s Critical Theory of 
recognition. Much of the literature is complicated, unwieldy, and hard to engage with. Further, 
the very idea of reason as ‘thick’ and ‘social’ is difficult to connect with: it sits so far away from 
the mainstream understanding. However, as I have stressed previously, just because a text is 
inaccessible, or at odds with broader dominant mores, does not of itself mean that it is not of 
considerable merit. The challenge becomes to draw out the essential components of the 
pathologies of reason approach and to present them in a more accessible register. This has been 
a central objective of the preceding section of the chapter. 
Finally, the question must be raised as to how a work may present itself as a ‘powerful 
manifesto’ (Roberts, 2004: 72) for liberating people from oppressive conditions when the people 
the text desires to liberate are unable to comprehend it. At the very least, this presents 
methodological questions surrounding the critical distance of the theorist to the immanent 
lifeworld (Honneth, 2000; Celikates, 2018). In response, I would argue that pathologies of reason 
approaches retain a clear connection to the immanent conditions of the lifeworld through the 
methodological centrality of immanent-transcendence.  
 
Predicated on compromising teleological and universalist understandings of reason 
With the rise of postmodernism, and, more recently, of decolonial and post-colonial scholarship, 
the idea that the theorist can identify a singular form of reason unfolding over time has been 
increasingly contested (Lyotard, 1984; Allen, 2016). These represent two distinct critiques, 
united in their scepticism that history can be charted as the development of the singular 
unfolding of reason. This seems particularly damaging: the explicitly Hegelian form of pathology 
diagnosis is wedded to an undeniably universalistic narrative. Further, in Hegel’s texts, it is not 
merely one universal logic which effects human cognition and human society; it is the same logic 
which impacts nature. Recall that for Hegel nature is the unfolding of Geist in space. For 
postmodernists, critical of universal grand narratives, the idea that a singular process can be 
identified in the unfolding of human life is both highly doubtful and politically suspect (Lyotard, 
1984). The idea that the same process can be charted to be determining the development of the 
natural world additionally, risks appearing simply self-parodic. Further, for post-colonialists and 
de-colonialists there is a deep suspicion of ‘Enlightenment narratives’ (Allen, 2016). For Allen, in 
her recent, and highly influential, The End of Progress (2016), Enlightenment logics are held to 
be inseparable from the imposition of Western, colonial knowledge systems, and have been 
utilised repeatedly to discredit and supplant local knowledges. 
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These are serious critiques and require thoroughgoing rejoinders. Indeed, if the diagnosis of 
pathologies of reason is fundamentally, and irremediably, a tool for colonial domination, 
perhaps it is simply best forgotten. Further, if the framework is inextricably tied to a singular 
notion of reason, unfolding universally, without located spatiotemporal distinctions, again, 
perhaps it is irreconcilable with the insights of contemporary decolonial, postcolonial and critical 
race theories. In response to these challenges, I raise three rejoinders.  
First, in response to the challenge that the pathology of reason approach adheres to a 
dangerous and unjustifiable universalism, one can argue that while such a universal outlook was 
undeniably present in the initial Hegelian framework, it has been substantially obviated in its 
later reincarnations. The theoretical infrastructure is not static; it has evolved in response to 
broader progressive scholarship. For example, the diagnosis of pathologies of reason qua the 
diagnosis of reifying logics, or of instrumental rationalities, can be engaged with without any 
such grand universalising notions.  
In response to post-colonial or decolonial challenges, one might add that engaging with such 
realities qua social pathologies may add a further theoretical lens to the arsenal of theorists 
seeking to engage with the petrifying and objectifying dynamics of racial hierarchies. This 
response is then both an acknowledgement and a modification: true, in its purest reading, Hegel 
presents universalist arguments.99 However, this does not mean that such arguments are 
irredeemable: one can simply jettison the universalising aspects of Hegelian philosophy and 
retain the insightful theoretical apparatus. Or, put differently, just because the original Hegelian 
framing had universalist components does not mean that the apparatus presented more broadly 
is irredeemably connected to universalist assumptions.  
Second, several responses can be raised to the challenge that the diagnosis of social 
‘irrationalities’, or the desire to further ‘Enlightened’ thought, is fundamentally inseparable from 
racialising and colonial logics (Allen, 2017). There has long been an investment in Marxist and 
explicitly left-Hegelian themes in post-colonial and critical race theoretical texts (Said, 1978; 
Chibber, 2013). But more importantly, one could simply reject Allen’s contention: an investment 
in the notion of progress, does not in itself, necessitate a colonial mindset. The roots of the 
Critical Theoretical project in left-Hegelianism are not irretrievably colonialist. Delanty’s (2009) 
The Cosmopolitan Imagination, for example, demonstrates how such insights from Critical 
Theory can be used to support an explicitly difference-sensitive approach to social theory. For 
                                                          
99 There is an increasingly intense debate on the utility of ‘progress’ and ‘universality’ across the academy. See 
Pinker’s (2018) Enlightenment Now. Regardless of one’s take on this issue, it is certainly not uncontested: see Bell 
(2018), Gray (2018), and Monbiot (2018).  
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Delanty and Harris (2018), Critical Theory and a difference-sensitive Cosmopolitanism are neatly 
aligned; their foundational insights and convictions sit in harmony rather than in conflict.         
Third, in response to both critiques, one can argue that the pathology of reason perspective 
has developed so far from the original Hegelian insights that neither criticism remains pertinent. 
Adornian philosophy, for instance, is explicitly aware of its ‘located-ness’. Indeed, the founding 
premise of Frankfurt School Critical Theory is an awareness that all social theory exists within 
space and time, within a politically demarcated society (Horkheimer, 1975). That is perhaps its 
key defining feature in comparison to ‘traditional’ theory (Horkheimer, 1975). Thus, much ‘first 
generation’ work is at pains to address the located nature of their own diagnoses (Held, 1980). 
The desire to avoid specific demarcations can be read as part of a deliberate strategy of 
unorthodox, world-disclosing presentation (Van den Brink, 1997).  
 
Commitment to an unjustifiable metaphysics  
Another oft-cited critique of pathologies of reason approaches is that they rely upon a strong, 
partisan, metaphysics. As Honneth has written, this sounds very jarring to the contemporary 
audience, to whom nothing might sound ‘more foreign’ (Honneth, 2007c: 20). Since Habermas, 
social theory has been expunging metaphysics from its texts in favour of a move to formal 
pragmatics and critical hermeneutics. As Habermas expressed in Post Metaphysical Thinking, 
the reliance of the ‘First Generation’ on metaphysically weighty left-Hegelianism was to 
henceforth remain ‘unambiguously in the past’ (Habermas, 2000: 12 – my italics).  
To deconstruct this analysis, there are two claims at play here: a) that the pathologies of 
reason approach, based on a thick and social account of reason, is inescapably tied to a 
metaphysics, and that b) this is philosophically unjustifiable or undesirable. Both assumptions 
can be questioned.   
First, I contend that while the pathologies of reason approach holds to a concept of reason 
which is ‘thick’ and ‘social’, it does not necessarily need to accede to any broader substantive 
grand metaphysical claims. While it is entirely the case that Hegel’s approach is predicated on 
the unfolding of metaphysical Geist, this does not mean that all subsequent framings have to 
retain an identical Hegelian commitment to metaphysics. The (undeniable) insight that the 
organisation of the social world serves to further particular forms of thinking can (obviously) be 
productively engaged without needing to believe a singular spirit drives all nature and humanity 
on its predetermined unfolding. A brief survey of the literature demonstrates that this is the 
case, sometimes to a fault. Honneth’s Freedom’s Right attempts to decouple Critical Theory 
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entirely from the metaphysics of its heritage, with reactionary results (Thompson, 2016; 
Bollenbeck, forthcoming). Perhaps less controversially, I submit that it is possible to redact the 
metaphysical understanding of Geist while arguing that normative value positions are implicit 
within, and reinforced by various forms of social practice, which serve important functions in 
the acculturation of social subjects to broader societal goals (the logic I have repeatedly drawn 
out).  
This leads me on to my second rejoinder: it is not necessarily ideal to seek a Critical Theory 
which is entirely absent of metaphysical content. Indeed, Thompson’s (2016) Domestication of 
Critical Theory is very clear on the merits of re-centring a critical social ontology as a pivotal 
component of a reinvigorated Critical Theoretical endeavour. For Thompson,  
… an essential aspect of the neo-Idealist turn in critical theory has been its turn away from metaphysics 
and towards a pragmatist conception of social practice (Thompson, 2016: 179). 
By detaching itself from the ontological questions that Hegel and Marx had pursued, neo-Idealists are 
unable to secure a rational, universal understanding of the dynamics of a rational social order 
structured by truly free agents (Thompson, 2016: 180). 
In keeping with Thompson’s broader project, one can see how a return to a critical social 
ontology would be of true merit for comprehending the impact of social structures on processes 
of socialisation (in Thompson’s terms, their ‘constitutive power’). Thompson further justifies his 
position, 
… we obtain rational (i.e. critical) cognition about the world only by estranging ourselves from it, not 
by being folded into its immediacy. Only conceptual thought can mediate the object domain, and as 
concept-users, the central task is to find those concepts that can mediate the world rationally 
(Thompson, 2016: 180). 
One may thus question whether it is indeed desirable to show how one can discard the 
metaphysical heritage of a pathologies of reason approach. I have argued that a pathologies of 
reason engagement can be conducted entirely shorn of any metaphysics. Yet, following 
Thompson (2016), I am tempted to agree that one is able to discover ‘a much more 
comprehensive and more critically engaged form of social critique’ (Thompson, 2016: 180) with 
a critical metaphysics, rather than within the neo-Idealist horizons of contemporary Critical 
Theory. 
 
The Displaced Utility of the Pathologies of Reason Approach 
As this chapter has drawn out, despite holding to divergent philosophical premises, and utilising 
different theoretical registers, the pathologies of reason approaches reconstructed here all 
display two important commonalities.  
124 
 
First, there is the understanding of ‘reason’ as a ‘thick’, ‘social’ domain. It is worth briefly 
reaffirming this commonality. In the left-Hegelian imagination, reason is understood explicitly 
as Geist, as the unfolding world-spirit, which drives human history. To the recognition theorist, 
recognition relationships themselves represent manifestations of the various forms of reason. 
It is the deficiencies of such relationships that are grasped as pathologies: where the social world 
fails to live up to the standards of recognition that are already possible within the development 
of reason more broadly. With the diagnosis of dominant forms of reason, a la the critique of 
instrumental rationality, yet again ‘reason’ is held to be socially manifest as much as subjectively 
practised. With the presence of socially induced category mistakes, it is the form of life itself 
which is held to manifest a certain form of deformed, pathological rationality. The social subject, 
that performs such defective cognition is responding to and reinforcing the pathologies of 
reason in the broader social domain. Finally, the civilizational critiques, offered by Adorno again 
hold reason as a broader, macro social process. The capacity for Enlightened thought, while 
individually practised, is again, socially internalised and solidified in the forms of social 
institutions (very much akin to the Hegelian approach).  
Second, I drew out the presence of a logic common to all social pathologies of reason. The 
pathological irrationality of the social world serves to impact the socialisation of the subject so 
that they internalise the pathology (for instance, an unerringly instrumental approach to life). 
Then, through the subject’s own social action, they then serve to further the form of pathological 
irrationality in the social world (uncritical market logics, false equivalences etc) which 
precipitated their own cognitive defect. Again, it is worth reaffirming the presence of such a 
dynamic across the various framings. I demonstrated how, for the left-Hegelian, the social 
subject is socialised within a lifeworld where the development of a form of reason enables, or 
hinders, the social subject from furthering the development of their self-consciousness. Further, 
the developments of the subject’s self-consciousness determines their capacity to appreciate 
the benefits, or limitations, of the current form of social organisation. If the organisation of the 
social world fails to attain the highest possible standards of rationality made possible by the 
unfolding of Geist, then inevitably the subject will fail to attain the standards of cognition (self-
consciousness) otherwise open to them. Their conduct will then proceed to reinforce the limited 
instantiations of reason in the present, irrational social conjecture. Similarly, with the 
pathologies of recognition approach, the subject will be raised to consider various recognition 
relationships normal: they will thus be more likely to further such affirmations or or denials of 
recognition. Again, such a logic is clearly visible with the dominance of instrumental rationality 
(the subject is socialised so as to have a defective form of cognition insofar as they fail to engage 
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with the world in non-instrumental ways, they thus proceed to engage in forms of social action 
which further instrumental logics). An identical logic is present with pathological category 
mistakes. With the Adornian, or civilizational pathology, the logic echoes the pre-stated Hegelian 
framework: the subject in an Enlightened society is likely to further Enlightened forms of social 
action. 
The merits of both insights are substantial. First, the idea that ‘reason’ exists as a social 
presence beyond the merely cognitive opens up a crucial part of the social world to critique. 
With such an insight, the presence of pathologies within the presuppositions of social structures, 
and within normative horizons becomes possible. That the social world may itself present as an 
insufficiently rational form of life offers an exciting opportunity for a broader Critical Theoretical 
enterprise (Jaeggi, 2018). Further, such an insight crucially offers a foundation for a critique of 
the social world on grounds other than legitimacy and justice (Honneth, 2000; Jaeggi, 2018). Put 
more simply, the capacity to understand reason as ‘thick’ and ‘social’ furthers the capacity for 
radical critique.  
Second, the focus on the particular logic of reinforcement of pathological irrationalities gives 
the Critical Theorist a particularly potent social theoretical avenue of enquiry. The utility of such 
an approach returns to the previous discussion on how social pathologies often evince a 
particular negative dynamic (Chapter Four). The theoretical infrastructure the pathologies of 
reason approach provides is particularly meritorious as it singularly presents a means of 
identifying social pathologies, while further presenting a way of understanding their 
perpetuation.  
Both insights are totally inaccessible to the ‘recognition-cognitive’ paradigm. Reason, for 
Zurn, is purely a cognitive capacity, and, further still, it is only impeded reflexive capacities that 
are presented as social pathologies. Even if Zurn’s approach was expanded to view reason in a 
social and thick manner (which would require substantial reimagining), the approach would still 
restrict much of the theoretical insights offered by the pathologies of reason approach insofar 
as it merely engages with impeded reflexive ‘second-order disconnects’ (Zurn, 2011; 
Freyenhagen, 2015).100 Further still, as established, the recognition-cognitive approach is 
annexed tightly to an exclusionary recognition lens (Chapter Two, Chapter Three). Thus, the 
utility of the pathologies of recognition approach presented in this chapter would also fail to be 
incorporated, as it is solely failures of the subject to understand the emancipatory potential of 
recognition logics through a ‘second-order disconnect’ that constitutes a social pathology. 
                                                          
100 See the extended discussion of this point offered by Chapter Three.  
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The idea that there may be a dynamic stemming from a problematic societal irrationality writ 
large across forms of social organisation and manifest in subject’s cognitive processes is simply 
inaccessible to an approach which focuses solely on processes ‘in the head’ distanced entirely 
from processes occurring ‘in the world’ (Freyenhagen, 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that a pathologies of reason approach does not have to be restricted to 
an inaccessible philosophical lexicon. Through a detailed reconstructive exercise, five rival 
framings of social pathology were presented, all of which were held to share two important 
social theoretical insights. I have argued that the pathologies of reason approach centres an 
understanding of ‘reason’ which transcends the liberal understanding of individual cognitive 
capacity. Rather, to the Critical Theorist invested in diagnosing pathologies of reason, ‘reason’ is 
understood in a much ‘thicker’ and ‘social’ manner. Reason is thus understood as being 
embodied in forms of societal organisation as much as it is manifest in the cognition of subjects. 
Further, I have argued that all pathologies of reason approaches draw out the presence of an 
important social logic: a dynamic in which social irrationalities are internalised by actors, who, 
through their own social action, proceed to reaffirm the very irrational social processes which 
initially precipitated their cognitive impairments.  
Through the sympathetic presentation of the common critiques presented against the 
pathologies of reason approach, and through offering measured rejoinders, this chapter has 
argued that the insights offered by the pathologies of reason approach are philosophically and 
politically justifiable. This is not to say that the various manners of diagnosing pathologies of 
reason are without reproach. Rather, the very real complications and complicities which are 
evinced (a trend towards universalism, for instance) can be distanced from the more insightful 
social theoretical material.  
Ultimately, this chapter thus concludes in concord with the previous chapter on Rousseau: 
the dominant recognition-derived approaches to diagnosing social pathologies serves to 
needlessly exclude efficacious forms of engagement with social pathologies. There is thus an 
urgent need to reconsider the restrictive framing of social pathologies prevalent today so that 
the insights of the pathologies of reason approach, as much as the various framings of pathology 
presented by Rousseau (Chapter Four) and Fromm (Chapter Six), can be utilised in a broader, 
‘polycentric’ and ‘multilateral’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 209) Critical Theoretical endeavour.   
 
127 
 
Chapter Six 
Reconstructing Erich Fromm’s ‘pathology of normalcy’ 
Introduction  
This chapter argues that Erich Fromm’s study of ‘pathological normalcy’ offers promising social-
theoretical resources to help transcend the contemporary, ‘domesticated’, diagnosis of social 
pathologies. I present Fromm’s framework as comprising three distinct but interconnected 
components: 
a) an analysis of the social world as incommensurable with the demands of ‘normative 
humanism’,  
b) where subjects fail to realise this due to ‘socially patterned defects’, and 
c) where such a pathological state is reinforced as the norm through the process of ‘consensual 
validation’. 
Having distinguished these elements of the social pathology of normalcy, I show their potent 
aggregation in Fromm’s framing of alienation.101 In Fromm’s understanding of alienation, ‘the 
cognitive’ and ‘the material’ are not merely united but are explicitly connected to social-
structural dynamics. I explicitly draw out how Fromm’s approach to social pathology can offer a 
palliative to the limitations of the dominant ‘recognition-cognitive’ and ‘pathologies of 
recognition’ approaches to social pathology scholarship.  
The chapter then defends Fromm’s framework102 from the dominant criticisms which have 
dogged his work. Fromm presents as a thinker steeped in gendered discourse, and as entirely at 
odds with the ethical-cultural relativism of post-modernity (Thompson A, 2009: 43; Thompson 
M J, 2014; Ratner, 2014). I argue that it is both possible to substantially expiate Fromm from 
such charges, and that the utility of his social theoretical infrastructure exists independently of 
his substantive philosophical commitments. Before concluding, I argue that the failure of 
Fromm’s approach to social pathology to attain greater traction might be due to contingent 
aspects of his biography, rather than limitations in his scholarship.  
In light of Fromm’s approach, I reaffirm my central argument: the need to rectify the 
restrictive, recognition-derived framing of social pathology which dominates contemporary 
                                                          
101 In a larger project it would be productive to bring Fromm’s framing of alienation into dialogue with Jaeggi’s 
(2016) more recent formulation. Fromm is more ‘orthodox’ in terms of his Marxian heritage, while Jaeggi’s sits apart 
from Fromm’s normative-essentialist-Marxist-humanist foundations.    
102 While I briefly engage with Fromm’s broader philosophical commitments, due to limitations in space this can 
only be done incompletely. The core submission offered by this chapter is to point to the displaced utility of 
Fromm’s social-theoretical infrastructure for furthering pathology diagnosing social criticism.  
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scholarship. This would enable Fromm’s meritorious insights to be incorporated within a 
revitalised, ‘undomesticated’, social theoretical arsenal (Thompson M J, 2016). Only then will 
Critical Theorists be able to engage with the true breadth of the pathologies of the social.     
 
The social pathology of normalcy: a sympathetic reconstruction 
Fromm’s framework is comprised of three distinct conceptual insights: 
a) an understanding of the social world as pathological insofar as its conditions serve to 
alienate subjects from their true nature, and the wider social reality, conditions which 
are incommensurable with the requirements of ‘normative humanism’, 
b) where individual subjects suffer from ‘socially patterned defects’ to the extent that they 
are incapable of realising their own alienation, and, 
c) where such a pathological state is reinforced as ‘the norm’ through the process of 
‘consensual validation’; a social dynamic exists which drags potentially critical minds 
into conformity. 
While these three insights each carry immense social theoretical value, Fromm’s conception of 
social pathology achieves its real potency through their seamless aggregation. The three 
framings are presented with varying emphases across Fromm’s oeuvre. While one can locate 
traces of the ideas of normative humanism, consensual validation, and socially patterned 
defects across The Sane Society (1955), Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962), and Fromm’s lecture 
series The Pathology of Normalcy (1991), there is no single grand exposé uniting the three 
analytics. Fromm’s failure to unite the core insights constituting the pathology of normalcy in an 
accessible singular work must be a substantial factor in the comparable lack of attention paid to 
his conception of social pathology.  
 
Objectively sub-optimal social conditions 
Originating in a lesser known paper, ‘Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis’ (1944), but most 
extensively articulated in The Sane Society, Fromm is famous for his strident submission of a 
‘normative humanism’ (Fromm, 1963: 12).103 For Fromm, there are ‘right and wrong’ solutions 
to the question of ‘human existence’ (Fromm, 1963: 14).104 Advancing the need for a ‘science of 
                                                          
103 For an extended sympathetic discussion on normative humanism see Michael J Thompson’s (2017) ‘Normative 
Humanism as Redemptive Critique’. 
104 Fromm’s universality, his normative-essentialism, and his clear rejection of social constructivist accounts all place 
him in opposition to post-modern and post-structuralist approaches to the social theory (Ratner, 2014). I engage 
with these concerns later in the chapter. 
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man’, Fromm submitted that there exists discoverable ‘laws which govern … mental and 
emotional functioning’ (Fromm, 1963: 12). Through extended interdisciplinary investigation, 
such optimal conditions could be discovered. For Fromm, there were certain societies that were 
fundamentally more or less compatible with these requirements of a happy and meaningful 
(‘sane’) human life (Fromm, 1963, 1979, 1983, 2010). Such an analysis was presented as 
simultaneously normative, ‘objective’ and universal. Fromm’s corpus built towards his ‘road to 
sanity’ (Jeffries, 2017: 293), demonstrating the ‘objective’ inferiority of our current form of social 
existence, and presenting the possibility of a new, ‘saner’ form of post-capitalist community. 
The core of Fromm’s framing of pathological normalcy is his analysis that the accepted, ‘normal’ 
objective social conditions are found-wanting, relative to the attainable superior conditions 
dictated by normative humanism (Funk, 2010: 9).105  To reiterate, Fromm’s foundational insight 
is that the current, ‘material’, social world, in its everyday, ‘normal’ functioning, is incompatible 
with the conditions of normative humanism: it prohibits social subjects from living a meaningful 
and happy life. This can be read as the primary condition of Fromm’s diagnosis of pathological 
normalcy: that there are objective social realities present in societies’ routine, ‘normal’ 
operations which can objectively be deemed pathological or insane and which induce neuroses 
and alienation. In The Sane Society Fromm also describes the subject as suffering from ‘insanity’ 
as a result of the pathological state of the social order.106  
One cannot overstress the import of Groddeck’s (1929, 1977, 2012, 2013) work to Fromm’s 
approach; one could argue that it was Groddeck’s (1929, 1977) particular fusion of sociology and 
Freudian psychoanalysis that inspired Fromm’s theoretical infrastructure and his substantive 
social theory (Biancoli, 1995). Fromm is directly following Groddeck’s (1913, 1929, 1977) reading 
of Freud when he argues that objective social conditions precipitate ‘social neurosis’, and, 
therefore, it is the objective social conditions which require critique (Fromm, 1983: 56; Biancoli, 
1995).107 For Groddeck, clearly drawing on Freud, 
… many illnesses are the product of people’s lifestyles. If one wants to heal them, one has to change 
a patient’s way of life; only in very few cases can the illness itself be tackled through so called specifica 
[sic] (Will, 1984: 22).  
                                                          
105 The substantive content of these conditions was to be explored through Fromm’s ‘Science of Man’, an attempt 
to combine the insights of sociology and biology in a ‘total’ analysis (Fromm, 1963: 14). Such a project never 
achieved sufficient institutional traction. 
106 While this analysis is particularly prominent in The Sane Society, in other texts and lectures Fromm does not refer 
to social subjects as ‘insane’, rather the subject is described as being ‘alienated’ or suffering from ‘neuroses’. When 
commenting on Fromm’s complete works it is better to speak of the ‘insanity’ of the social order rather than the 
‘insanity’ of the social subject.    
107 Freud argued in Civilisation and its Discontents that the fundamental ‘system of civilization’ has become 
‘neurotic’ (Freud, 1953: 142). 
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It is through Groddeck’s (1977) reading of Freud as necessitating a critical sociology that Fromm 
develops his psycho-analytic-sociological paradigm. It is the ‘insane society’ that produces 
insane subjects; society itself that is pathological: ‘mens sana in societate sana’ (Fromm, 2010: 
86).108  
The cornerstone of Fromm’s framing of ‘pathological normalcy’ is that the objective social 
order is found wanting: it fails to provide the conditions necessary for ‘sane’ human life as 
determined by normative humanism. Drawing on Freud, Fromm argues that it is our social 
conditions which precipitate dominant neuroses and insanities (and other non-medicalised 
impediments to our general wellbeing).109 Uniting Freud and Marx, psychoanalysis and critical 
sociology, Fromm argues that a particular component of the objective social reality, the 
capitalist economic system, is overwhelmingly responsible for precipitating a particular form of 
‘insanity’ and discomfort: alienation. The pervasiveness of late capitalism means that such 
alienation is not restricted to one’s employment. Rather, with the subsumptive commodifying 
and ‘abstractifying’ rationalities of the market, man is constantly alienated from himself, from 
his fellows, and from his capacity to live itself.110       
 
A socially patterned defect: where individuals are unaware of their own alienation 
While the foundational diagnosis of Fromm’s ‘pathological normalcy’ is that the objective 
conditions of capitalist society are contradictory to the demands of normative humanism, 
Fromm’s account contains two further meritorious insights. For Fromm this ‘pathological’ 
condition developed into a normalcy because social processes acculturate subjects to consider 
their daily pathological reality both ‘unproblematic’ and ‘normal’. Expressed most simply, an 
essential part of Fromm’s framing of ‘pathological normalcy’ is that, at the level of the individual 
subject, due to a ‘socially patterned defect’ (Fromm, 1963: 15), subjects are unaware of their 
own alienation. There is no personal, individual realisation, let alone recognition, that the social 
order is ‘insane’, that is, antithetical to the optimal conditions for human sociality and well-
being. 
                                                          
108 I translate this from Latin as ‘a healthy mind requires a healthy society’. 
109 See Honneth’s (2014: 698) commentary on Mitscherlich and Freud for a further discussion on this point. 
110 In a broader project it would be interesting to connect this with Bertell Ollman’s Alienation (1971). As with 
Jaeggi’s (2016) more recent account, Ollman is less orthodox in his Marxism than Fromm, however he is more 
invested in a dialectical approach to understanding alienation (Ollman, 2003). For Ollman it is perhaps clearer to say 
that the pathological alienation of capitalist society arises from the inability of capitalist society to satisfactorily 
subflate the contradiction that capitalist alienation is more clearly understood as the problematic lack of 
unalienation (Ollman, 2003).       
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To further this analysis, Fromm again unites Freud and Marx. Social subjects are held to be 
complicit in their own alienation insofar as they perpetuate illusions about their own conditions; 
hence the title of Fromm’s Beyond The Chains of Illusion. As Fromm states towards the start of 
the work, for both Marx and Freud,  
man lives with illusions because these illusions make the misery of real life bearable (Fromm, 1983: 
15).  
‘Man’ (or better, ‘people’) are complicit in deluding themselves so they may forget their 
‘dependency, … [their] alienation, [their] … slavery to the economy’ (Fromm, 1983: 14). Finding 
similar cause again in Marx and Freud, Fromm thus presents ‘truth’ as a weapon to induce social 
change.111 The animus of his work thus becomes to ‘enable [the reader] … to wake up and act 
as a free man’ (Fromm, 1983: 16). Fromm makes a broader, anthropological point, which, while 
factually dubious, underscores his conviction:  
all the human race has achieved, spiritually and materially, it owes to the destroyers of illusion and to 
the seekers of reality (Fromm, 1983: 152).  
Quoting Marx’s chiasmus liberally, Fromm elaborates, man’s  
demand to give up the illusions about … [his] condition is the demand to give up a condition which 
needs illusions (Marx, 1959: 16; c.f. Fromm, 1983: 105).  
Thus, ‘truth’, and an awareness of the latent desire for truth, can be wielded as a weapon of 
praxis to achieve social change.112 Uniting insights from Marx and Freud, but drawing more 
extensively on Marx,113 Fromm’s analysis is that pathological normalcy is re-inscribed through 
illusions functioning as ‘opiate(s) against the socially patterned defect’ (Fromm, 1963: 17). In the 
words of Fromm’s former student, and biographer, Rainer Funk,  
the fact that we do not experience the emptying and devaluation of the subject, as well as the dependency 
on the market as something abnormal anymore is a central indication for what Fromm ultimately calls 
‘the pathology of normalcy’ (Funk, 2000: 11). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
111 This is reminiscent of the more problematic Lenin quote, ‘The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true’ 
(1977: 21). To restate, this thesis prefers to champion pathology diagnosis as a methodology, and to connect this 
with the Critical Theoretical approach of exploring possibilities for immanent-transcendence. I am less invested in 
the claims to the explicit ‘truth’ of any social pathology diagnosis, this seems potentially politically suspect. Reading 
Fromm charitably, we can see traces of the methodological aspect of the search for truth in his methodology, the 
desire to sweep away illusions. This is not to state what will be discovered will be an unmediated truth.  
112 For Honneth (2007c), drawing on Freud, there is a foundational, even anthropological desire to grasp for the 
truth of our conditions, as a means of overcoming neuroses. Honneth appeals to such libidinal cathexis to provides 
animus for Critical Theory itself (Honneth, 2007b, 2007c). 
113 Fromm repeatedly suggests Marx is the superior thinker of the two, he states at one point: Freud ‘did not reach 
the heights of Marx’ (Fromm, 1983: 12). 
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A dynamic of consensual validation: where mass acceptance of the norm serves to inhibit critique 
The third constituent of Fromm’s framework is a dynamic of ‘consensual validation’ (Fromm, 
1963: 14). This is expressed most extensively in the second chapter of The Sane Society (1963: 
12-21), yet there are references to this dynamic in Fromm’s lecture series, The Pathology of 
Normalcy (2010). The essential argument here is that, within the social order, dynamics arise 
which retard critical awareness of the pathological norm. As Fromm argues, 
What is so deceptive about the state of mind of the members of a society is the “consensual validation” 
of their concepts. It is naively assumed that the fact that the majority of people share certain ideas or 
feelings proves the validity of these ideas and feelings. Nothing is further from the truth (Fromm, 1963: 
14). 
Further, 
Just as there is “folie a deux” there is “folie a millions”. The fact that millions of people share the same 
vices does not make these vices virtues. The fact that they share so many errors does not make the 
errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same forms of mental pathology 
does not make these people sane (Fromm, 1963: 15). 
Yet, the fact that millions of people do share the same errors, do suffer from the same vices, 
does serve to impede critical awareness of the broader pathological conditions. In one of his 
earliest lectures at The New School, Fromm related Wells’ (1904) tale, The Country of the Blind, 
to prove this point (Fromm, 2010: 17).114 Paraphrasing Fromm’s own paraphrasing of Wells, the 
story proceeds thus: a healthy stranger lost in a rainforest stumbles into a village home to an 
isolated tribe. Due to a genetic defect among the population, the local population is blind. They 
have clearly defined smooth, silky skin growing over their eyelids, and none of the tribe has ever 
heard of sight. In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is not king, rather he is an insane 
lunatic, with his phantasmal, psychotic visions. Further, he is stigmatised for the unseemly 
nature of his pupils, rather than the desirable, smooth skin to which the populace are 
accustomed. The ease with which the ‘hysteria of hate’ (Fromm, 1983: 6) was whipped up 
against the hapless migrant is furthered by the dynamic of consensual validation. All of those 
present in the village, save the one, weary traveller, are mutually reassured of their factual 
accuracy, and remain ignorant to the possibility they are living a less than optimal human 
existence. Even if the stranger was exceptionally persuasive, and unprecedently biologically 
insightful, people are unable to simply ‘look at the facts’ (Fromm, 1963: 3). The social subjects’ 
understanding remains deeply socially located; for Fromm, ‘individual psychology is [thus] 
fundamentally social psychology’ (Fromm, 1941: 20).  
                                                          
114 Fromm also presents a secondary anecdote (Fromm, 2010: 18). Paraphrasing, Fromm tells of a man who goes to 
the doctor and, contextualising his systems, details his morning routine. He incidentally details how he brushes his 
teeth and vomits every morning. For the patient, accustomed as he is to daily retching, this is the normalcy, and 
neither merits concern, nor non-incidental comment. He is only aware of the pathological nature of his newer, in his 
mind, more troubling symptoms. 
133 
 
While ‘consensual validation as such has no bearing on reason or mental health’ (Fromm, 
1963: 14-15), it is accompanied by dynamics which serve to protect the subject from developing 
a personal manifestation of the social neurosis.115 Using the example of Calvinism, Fromm 
suggests societies develop in such a manner that the individual’s commitment to the polity’s 
pathological demands is ultimately elevated, rather than obscured. Not only is the social subject, 
while suffering from a ‘socially patterned defect’, ‘not aware’ of this reality; but ‘his very defect 
… [is thus] … raised … [as] …  a virtue’ (Fromm, 1963: 15). For A Thompson, this is best 
characterised as ‘a process of dynamic adaption between social structures and individual 
psyche’ (Thompson A, 2009: 101). In Fromm’s words,  
What he may have lost in richness and in a genuine feeling of happiness, is made up by the security of 
fitting in with the rest of mankind – as he knows them (Fromm, 1963: 15). 
Thus, a crucial aspect of the pathology of normalcy is the extent to which capitalist dynamics are 
the normalcy: the social subject draws succour from compliance with the normal. Pathological 
normalcy is harder to overthrow because its status as normalcy comforts and supports the 
subjects to accommodate the polity’s pathological defects.  
For Fromm, then, ‘the irrationality of human mass behaviour’, evinced though the proclivity 
of the social subject to conform to any norm (Fromm, 1983: 8), is an antecedent, almost an 
anthropological, flaw. Fromm’s manumission of the social subject from the chains of illusion 
thus necessitates inducing a primary scepticism to ‘common thought’ (Fromm, 1983: 14): the 
social subject must no longer concede to the irrationality of consensual validation. 
Two years after Beyond the Chains of Illusion was published, Stanley Kubrick’s black-comedy 
Dr. Strangelove was premiered. With its immortal line from President Muffley (Peter Sellers), 
‘Gentlemen, you can’t fight in here! This is the war room!’ (Kubrick, 1964), one can sense the 
extent to which Fromm’s work may have had a particular resonance in Cold War America. What 
aesthetic critics may deem the ‘dramatic irony’ of Muffley’s line, Fromm may have seen as an 
epitomic symptom of pathological normalcy. For Fromm, the solution to the siren call of 
consensual validation, paraphrasing Marx once again, is: De Omnibus Dubitandum Est [above 
all, one must doubt] (McLellan, 1985: 457).116   
 
 
                                                          
115 Fromm implicitly presents this as essential to the analytic, but one can clearly foresee scenarios where such a 
dynamic could exist, without such additional palliatives. 
116 Marx was given a set of questions to answer by his daughters Jenny and Laura. In addition to revealing his 
favourite food was fish, he revealed that his favourite motto was ‘De omnibus dubitandum’ (Marx [1865]). This 
quote, of course, is a paraphrasing of Descartes.   
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The centrality, and social-theoretical utility, of Fromm’s framing of alienation  
Jeffries argues that Marx’s concept of alienation is central to Fromm’s diagnosis: ‘the 
overcoming of alienation’ (Fromm, 2010: 85) is the true momentum propelling the reader along 
Fromm’s ‘road to sanity’ (Jeffries, 2017: 293). Drawing on Marx, Fromm’s insight is that,  
what is good for the function of today’s economic system proceeds to be damaging to the 
maintenance of man’s mental health (Funk, 2010: 9-10).  
For Funk, Fromm is explicit in his analysis,  
current production methods and … [the] psychic efforts to conform … [with the] … demands of the 
current economy ... make … [man] psychically ill (Funk, 2010: 9).117 
It is worth tracing the development of Fromm’s thought here. Fromm’s focus on alienation, 
precipitated by the economic system of ‘abstractification’118 (Fromm, 2010: 63) is most 
extensively espoused in Marx’s Concept of Man and Beyond the Chains of Illusion. In these 
works, Fromm locates his understanding within the left-Hegelian imaginary. It is well known that 
for Hegel, God exists in man, and that history is the process of God returning to himself. For the 
‘Young Hegelian’ Feuerbach, pace Hegel, ‘God’ represents man’s own powers. For Feuerbach 
(2008 [1841]), as espoused in The Essence of Christianity, the more humanity ascribes its power 
to God, the weaker man becomes. For Marx, the same occurs with alienation in the material 
realm through the processes of capitalist production: 
… the worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces and the more his production increases in 
power and extent (Marx, 1961: 95; c.f. Fromm, 1983: 42). 
This…    
follow[s] from the fact that the worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object. For 
it is clear on this presupposition that the more the worker expends himself in work, the more powerful 
becomes the world of objects which he creates in face of himself, the poorer he becomes in his inner 
life and the less he belongs to himself: it is just the same as in religion (Marx, 1961: 95-96; c.f. Fromm, 
1983: 42-43). 
Further: 
The worker puts his life into the object and his life then belongs no longer to himself but to the object. 
The greater his activity, therefore, the less he possesses … The alienation of the worker in his product 
means not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists 
independently, outside himself, that it stands opposed to him as an autonomous power. The life which 
he has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force (Marx, 1961: 95-96; and 
c.f. Fromm, 1983: 43). 
For Marx, and for Fromm, the worker is alienated not just ‘from the products’ but also from ‘the 
process’ of production (Fromm, 1983: 43). Alienation thus appears ‘within productive activity’ 
                                                          
117 Such an approach seems to closely foreshadow Honneth’s (2004) conception of ‘organized self-realization’. It is 
further telling of Fromm’s contemporary intellectual ostracision that Honneth does not acknowledge, or engage 
with Fromm in his framing, despite their striking similarities (Honneth, 2004). 
118 Interesting to note the clear similarity to Lukacs’ (1972) work on ‘reification’, yet Fromm’s decision to use the 
term ‘abstractification’ instead. I have failed to find any further scholarship on this point. 
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(Marx, 1961: 99; c.f. Fromm, 1983: 43) and excludes man from productive activity. Fromm 
extends this analysis, arguing Marx is concerned with ‘man’s alienation from life, from himself, 
and from his fellow man’ (Fromm, 1983: 44). Citing liberally from the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts, Fromm utilises Marx to argue that the capitalist system of production produces a 
totally alienated subjectivity: alienated from himself, from the process of production, from his 
fellow humans, so that ‘life itself appears only as a means of life’ (c.f. Fromm, 1983: 44; Marx, 
1961: 101). Fromm reads Marx as ‘proceed[ing] to the concept of man’s alienation from himself, 
his fellowmen, and from nature’: ‘from the concept of alienated work’ (Fromm, 1983: 43). The 
pathological material, political-economic logics and realities of capitalism precipitate 
pathological cognitive states.  
To state it explicitly: such alienation is held to be in breach of the conditions of normative-
humanism and is therefore a social pathology. Again, in direct contrast to the recognition 
approaches’ neo-idealism, Fromm’s diagnosis of alienation is explicitly linked to the economic 
system of production. The psychic phenomena of alienation is a direct result of the objective 
social conditions. To support this position, Fromm again turns to Marx, this time to The German 
Ideology: 
As long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest man’s own deed becomes 
an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him (Marx and Engels, 1939: 220; Fromm, 1983: 44). 
Fromm explicitly locates the cause of such alienation in the ‘contemporary mode of production’ 
(Fromm, 1983: 56). Alienation119 can only be overcome through ‘the complete change of the 
economic-social constellation’ (Fromm, 1983: 56). For Fromm, the market ‘has reached such 
proportions’ that ‘all participants have been moulded by it’ that ‘all experiences’ have ‘become 
abstract as commodities’ (Fromm, 2010: 63).120 Jeffries paraphrases Fromm thus: the ‘external 
social structures’ of the market are pathologically ‘shaping the inner self’ (Jeffries, 2017: 292). It 
is this crucial awareness that is fundamentally lacking in the neo-idealist, recognition-cognitive 
diagnoses of social pathology.  
In Fromm’s analysis, the foundational social pathology, the driving force perpetuating 
conditions anathema to normative humanism, is the capitalist mode of production. Thus, la 
Maladie du Siecle, the cognitive ‘estrangement of man from his own humanity’ (Fromm, 1983: 
56), can only be rectified through a foundational change in the rationality of the economic 
                                                          
119 See my later comments on Fromm’s broader eschatology. Here, alienation is used in an immanent, material 
context. 
120 In such analysis one can see the prefiguration of Habermas’ (1984) understanding of the colonisation of the ‘life-
world’ by the logics of the ‘system’ in his Theory of Communicative Action. 
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system. For Ratner, it is clear that for Fromm’s diagnosed pathological normalcy to be ‘cured’ 
there needs to be foundational changes to ‘macro-cultural forces’ (Ratner, 2014: 300).  
As established, today’s dominant framing of social pathology presents a troublingly ossifying 
dichotomy between social maladies existing ‘in the world’, and those existing ‘in the head’ of 
the social subject (Freyenhagen, 2015: 136). To repeat, today’s mainstream scholarship views 
merely the latter, recognition-cognitive maladies, as social pathologies (Zurn, 2011). Further, as 
M J Thompson’s critique of neo-Idealism elaborates, today’s approach fails to engage sufficiently 
with the impact of social structural logics on the capacities of the social subject. These artificial 
restrictions dogging today’s scholarship are transcended through Fromm’s three central 
analytics:  
a) alienation as a condition induced by objective social conditions (‘world’), which is 
b) unintelligible to the pathological, ‘insane’, social subject who suffers from a socially patterned 
defect (‘cognitive’); 
c) said defect is further re-inscribed by the siren allure of the modalities of consensual validation 
(‘world’ and ‘cognitive’).  
Fromm’s substantive diagnosis is thus simply one of alienation: he writes ‘we are aliens to 
ourselves’ (Fromm, 2010: 46), alienation is ‘the sickness of man’ (Fromm, 1983: 45), and that 
‘every neurosis can be considered an outcome of alienation’ (Fromm, 1983: 53). Fromm thus 
develops and deploys his secondary analytics, consensual validation and socially patterned 
defects, to further his diagnosis of alienation. Cognitive and material are united, seamlessly 
reproducing each other. As with Jaeggi’s (2016) phenomenologically grounded study of 
alienation, Fromm’s diagnosis portrays how a critique of social-structural logics discloses the 
helplessness and despondency of the capitalist subject. The pathological material logics 
precipitate a pathologically impaired mental state. This process is seamlessly captured through 
Fromm’s framing of alienation.  
Such comments are warranted to demonstrate the centrality of alienation, and its Aufheben, 
to Fromm’s broader work, not merely its dominance in his united psycho-analytic and critical 
sociological scholarship. This is not intended as an advocation of the sentiments of Fromm’s 
eschatology, or his metaphysics: the submission here is merely that Fromm provides a 
stimulating substantive philosophy, consideration of which can help revitalise social pathology 
scholarship. While this chapter thus presents the merit of engaging with Fromm’s substantive 
considerations, the primary attachment here, as established, is to his social theoretical 
infrastructure.  
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Thus far, the chapter has presented a highly sympathetic engagement with Fromm’s work. 
Yet, today, Fromm’s scholarship is often excluded from discussions of social pathology on 
various, prima facie, highly damaging counts. The next section acknowledges the manifold 
critiques of Fromm’s philosophy, and indeed, the multiple critiques levelled at his social theory 
and his psychoanalytic insights.121 
 
The Problems faced when engaging with Fromm’s work today122  
Fromm’s work may seem ‘almost archaic’ at first encounter, both stylistically and substantively 
(Thompson A, 2009: 25). This section presents three areas where Fromm scholarship sits at 
variance from contemporary theoretical insights. Having outlined these areas of divergence I 
expiate Fromm’s core social-theoretical infrastructure. In crude summary, progressive 
academics may be ‘wary’ engaging with Fromm (Thompson A, 2009: 20) because: 
a) Fromm routinely uses gendered language, think of Marx’s Concept of Man or, Man for 
Himself. There is a recurring concern that this is indicative of broader, problematic 
patriarchal complicities.  
b) Perhaps even more problematically, Fromm’s substantive theories are held to be at 
odds with the dominant presumptions of ethical-cultural relativism intrinsic to the post-
modern, post-structural academy (Ratner, 2014). Thus, to the contemporary eye, 
Fromm’s work may seem both dated, and flawed. His unrepentant universalism and 
ethical partisanship (a la normative humanism) falls into sharp relief against the 
background of the extended crisis of normativity (Butler, Laclau, and Zizek, 2000; 
Honneth, 1999, 2005).   
Drawing on Thompson (2009), the submission here is that one can extricate Fromm’s insightful 
analysis from his problematic, only incidentally patriarchal, lexicon. In response to the post-
modern and post-structural critiques of Fromm’s (apparent) universality, two responses are 
presented. First, Fromm’s philosophy could be redeemable despite his ethical partisanship and 
his unchecked claims to universality, through a turn to Honneth’s ‘patch’ of a weak formal 
anthropology. Second, even if Fromm’s philosophical commitments are untenable in light of the 
insights of post-modern and post-structuralist scholarship, Fromm’s social theoretical 
infrastructure can be extricated from his more divisive theses.  
                                                          
121 And indeed, with the psychoanalytic orthodoxy more broadly. See my engagement with Selby (1993), Butler 
(1997), Miller (1974), Lacan (1975) and Zupančič (2017). 
122 Obviously, this list is not exhaustive. One might also comment on how Fromm’s scholarship has been displaced 
by left-scholarship too, for instance by the rise of Althusserian anti-humanist Marxism.  
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Gender critiques of Fromm 
Fromm repeatedly speaks of ‘man’ where his meaning is more broadly ‘people’ or ‘humanity’. It 
is disconcerting for the contemporary reader, and a source of conflicting critical discussion 
(Burston, 1991; Thompson A, 2009: 25-26). While such a charge could be levelled at most 
thinkers of the socio-philosophical canon (Alanen and Witt, 2004), the critical literature 
surrounding Fromm focuses on this theme with particular interest, hence my engagement here. 
Further, the purpose of my analysis in this section is to demonstrate the extent to which 
Fromm’s scholarship is needlessly negated, hence my engagement with what may seem to 
some, prima facie, superficial critiques. My submission is that, ultimately, such charges are 
indeed overstated. 
 Thompson explicitly addresses the issue of Fromm’s ‘“sexist” language’, commenting that it 
seems ‘at odds with his humanist principles’ (Thompson A, 2009: 25). While she does not argue 
for negating this possibility entirely, she does raise three points worthy of consideration.  
First, Fromm came to English from a German background. In German the word ‘Mensch’, 
while often grammatically gendered male, has a meaning closer to ‘humanity’: it undoubtedly 
sounds less jarring to the contemporary ear. Similarly, the German ‘Mann’ functions in German 
closer to the English word ‘one’ rather than ‘man’. Thompson comments that there is simply no 
perfect translation, no ‘appropriate English term’ (Thompson A, 2009: 25). For Fromm, his use 
of ‘Man’ is as close as he can get to his intended German ‘Mensch’. One can argue that his 
analytic infrastructure was developed independently from this incidentally patriarchal prose; a 
result of the relative limitations of the English language.  
Second, A. Thompson (2009) points to Fromm’s (1976) own discussion on this point in his To 
Have or To Be? Fromm claims that he explicitly sought to ‘restore [Mensch’s] non-sexual 
meaning’ (Fromm, 1979: 10). For Thompson, it is worth reading Fromm’s own words on this 
topic. Engaging with this argument with Neil Wilson’s (1959) ‘spirit of charitable interpretation’, 
one should perhaps read Fromm as consciously aware of this lacuna in English prose, and as 
seeking to surmount it, rather than reinforce it. Admittedly, not all scholars advance the same 
degree of charity (Thompson A, 2009). 
Third, Thompson raises the point that ‘this usage was common in [Fromm’s] time’ (Thompson 
A, 2009: 25). When the problematic prose is incidental to Fromm’s argumentation (if one 
accepts the reasonable position that it is as close to the German ‘Mensch’ as Fromm could reach) 
it would be uncharitable to judge the work anachronistically. Just as Darwin’s (1871) The Descent 
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of Man utilises gendered language, the substantial content of his manuscript is irrefutably 
worthy of engagement; the same follows for Fromm.  
While I consider that these three positions respond adequately to the charge of Fromm’s use 
of gendered language, feminist engagements with Fromm, and with psychoanalysis more 
broadly, have suggested a deeper complicity in patriarchal structures (Miller, 1974). Recall 
Lacan’s pronouncement that ‘there is no such thing as woman’ (Lacan, 1975: 68). While this 
extends beyond the scope of the current chapter, in brief response I point the reader towards 
Selby’s (1993) article, Psychoanalysis as a Critical Theory of Gender. I do this to reinforce that a 
substantial debate exists on this point, and that many in the academy successfully reconcile the 
patriarchal complicity of psychoanalytic orthodoxy with its undeniable insights for critical social 
theory (Butler, 1997). 
 
 ‘The Road to Sanity’ and Normative Humanism: Ethical partisanship and Universality123 
Forms of social pathology diagnosis which are predicated on partisan ethics are now justifiably 
subject to intense philosophical suspicion (Honneth, 1999, 2015). Such ethically derived critique 
is controversial in today’s conditions of normative crisis (Thompson M J, 2014). There remains 
no philosophical consensus upon acceptable foundations from which to ground ideas of the 
good life (Honneth, 1999, 2005). Fromm’s commitment to the contrary presents a significant 
challenge for contemporary engagements with his work (Thompson M J, 2014). 
Remember that core to Fromm’s diagnosis of pathological normalcy is his contention that 
the existent conditions of society fall foul of the objectively essential social conditions needed 
for a ‘sane’ and meaningful life. For Fromm such conditions were ascertainable through 
normative humanism, and substantively articulable through ‘the science of man’. Such a 
methodology is an explicit invocation of a partisan ethics: Fromm’s account here is predicated 
on his assertion that he has access to a superior ethics.  
Fromm commits a second cardinal sin in the eyes of social-constructivists: unjustifiable 
universalism. Not only does Fromm suggest that society X is failing, but he also presents it as 
failing for all human beings. Further, he suggests there are essential human characteristics which 
are identical across time and place (the underlying core of his normative humanism). Such a 
                                                          
123 While the dominant critiques of Fromm’s work occur from a broadly social-constructivist post-modern 
framework (Ratner, 2014) and it is thus to those that I respond, one could sidestep such critiques with a strident 
defence of a critical realist framework. Indeed Vandenberghe (2013) has written extensively about the untapped 
potential of using a critical realist account to further critical social theory.  
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position is fundamentally incompatible with both strong social-constructivism124 and the basic 
precepts of post-modernist thought. Writing before post-structuralist and post-modernist 
insights, Fromm felt comfortable presenting his universalist and ethically partisan theories 
without such considered justifications.125 
For Ratner, Fromm’s work is thus needlessly discarded today in its entirety, for his oeuvre sits 
in opposition to the prevailing ‘constructivist-relativism’ (Ratner, 2014: 301). Today’s ‘diversity-
constructivist’ normalcy makes it impossible to pass judgement on the conditions needed for 
the good life (Ratner, 2014: 301). Ratner gives the example that it is now philosophically 
unjustifiable to consider a morbidly obese individual to be suffering from a form of pathology 
(Ratner, 2014: 301), as someone living an objectively impeded existence (O’Hara and Gregg, 
2012). For the committed post-structuralist, attuned to a world lacking normative anchoring, 
one cannot comment that such an individual is suffering from a pathology, that they are 
objectively suffering from a condition impeding their quality of life. Today, such an approach to 
‘objective biological illness’ would be held to be both politically dangerous and philosophically 
unjustifiable (Honneth, 2014a: 684). For Foucault, such ‘pathologising’ discourse is utilised 
predominantly to bring forth subjectivities for ‘disciplining’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 173) 
and to perpetuate and legitimate governmentality. For Foucault, Fromm’s framing of normative 
humanism would be pernicious and philosophically unsound: a mere reflection of the dominant 
discursively constructed value-horizon of Fromm’s contingent historical moment, rather than a 
guide to objective reality. Even more troublingly for Foucault, such insight, while academically 
worthless,126 could ultimately prove of utility for pernicious authoritative assemblies, who could 
mobilise such sentiments to further coercive governmentality.  
While the post-modern127 insight served to displace the philosophical acceptability of ethical 
partisanship and universality, it failed to institute an alternate conception of subjectivity, 
attuned to its foundational insights. Rather, the academic mainstream today holds to a 
                                                          
124 There is an increasingly articulate counter-position emerging amongst psychologists. Pinker’s (2003) The Blank 
Slate provides a strong critique of the dominant social constructivism, and argues for the existence of an accessible, 
and universal, human nature. 
125 Fromm comes closest to such a justification in his Marx’s Concept of Man, however, to subject such an account 
to the insights of post-structuralism would be both anachronistic and unproductive. Fromm’s submissions here are 
best understood as located within the concerns of his time. 
126 Of course, it is not merely Foucault and post-structuralists who would reject Fromm’s normative humanism, and 
the methodology of the ‘science of man’. M J Thompson (2014) comments how Weberian sociologists, for example, 
would be critical of Fromm here, in that he risks the non-separation of ‘fact’ and ‘value’. That said, it would seem 
arbitrary to direct any impassioned challenge at Fromm on this account, considering said is/ought separation is 
programmatically breached by the entire ‘First Generation of Critical Theory’. 
127 Admittedly, I am using these terms rather loosely. A larger project would have more space to disaggregate post-
structuralist and post-modernist critiques, however, I suggest that for the purposes of this chapter, the desired 
argument (that Fromm’s theoretical infrastructure can be expiated) can made without such an extended discussion.  
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‘subjectivity [that] is autonomous, personal, and self-directed’ (Ratner, 2014: 301); a view 
entirely opposed by post-structural, and Critical Theory. Ironically, today, the dominant ‘position 
that denies the very existence of pathology is rooted in a broad social philosophy of individual 
freedom, authenticity, personhood, ageing, and subjectivity’ (Ratner, 2014: 301). I concur with 
Ratner that such a ‘social philosophy is essentially post-modernist and neoliberal’ (Ratner, 2014: 
301). In light of such developments, I turn to Honneth’s conception of a ‘weak-formal 
anthropology’ (Honneth, 2007a: 42) as a means to square the circle of the unjustifiability of, but 
the essential need to, base our critique in a normativity to be able to conduct social pathology 
diagnosing critique.128  
Honneth believes that social theorists can operate within the horizons of ‘a weak formal 
anthropology’ to facilitate philosophically justifiable engagement on ‘conceptions of ethical life’ 
providing that such an anthropology is sufficiently abstract (Honneth, 2007a). If the weak formal 
anthropology remains suitably open, the post-structuralist charge of privileging particular 
visions of the good life can be temporarily displaced (Honneth, 2007a). The normative challenges 
are neither solved nor obviated, rather they are ‘patched’ to enable the crucial continuance of 
critique. For Foucault scholars Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), the post-structuralist normative 
critique holds most strongly against ‘meta-theory’.129 The challenge then is to maintain a weak 
formal anthropology that is substantive enough to enable social pathology diagnosis, yet weak 
enough to avoid the charge of bloated meta-theoretical universalism.  Such an approach may 
work as effectively when applied to Fromm’s account as it does when utilised by Honneth. Thus, 
to substantially expiate the charge that Fromm’s work unjustifiably makes universalising and 
ethically partisan commitments, one may retro-actively redact Fromm’s formal conception of 
normative humanism, and instead displace it with a weak-formal anthropological account of 
normative humanism. For Honneth, at least, and for those who follow in his intellectual 
footsteps, such a charge of normative and universalising untenability would then be temporarily 
abated.130   
                                                          
128 The reader may have thought it more amenable to turn to Habermas’ (1998) discursive justification of the 
content of (moral) norms; however, following M J Thompson (2014), I consider such an approach unsatisfactory. 
While Habermas’ presentation purports to determine the objective content of morality, it fails to extend beyond 
the confines of the merely cognitive. Habermas’ solution seems insufficient for my purposes here, for it fails to 
determine any ontologically grounded objectivity to claim making beyond the structure of language. Further, such 
an approach could rightfully be critiqued as neo-Idealistic, insofar as the linguistic dimension is held to contain 
emancipatory potential untarnished by the structural modalities of the system; modalities Habermas himself earlier 
argued were colonising the communicative sphere. 
129 See the interview with Foucault at the end off Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. To some extent this is a 
development of Foucault’s (1975) Discipline and Punish, but I find this figuration of particular clarity. 
130 Such an approach would sit comfortably with the work of Durkin (2014) and Wilde (2004) who suggest that 
Fromm’s account is already sufficiently ‘thin’ to counter the social-constructionist critique.  
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This approach would, however, fail to satisfy committed social-constructivists. To such a 
critique, I offer a secondary reply. The purpose of my engagement with Fromm is to articulate 
the strength of his social theoretical infrastructure. This social-theoretical infrastructure can be 
used to great impact for critical social theory, shorn of Fromm’s philosophical content. Indeed, 
one may isolate Fromm’s foundational methods, his incidental language, and his eschatology, 
from the social theoretical infrastructure at the core of his conception of social pathology. 
Fromm’s normative humanism can be displaced by an alternate basis for ethical critique. For 
instance, one could submit that the present social order evinces immanent contradictions 
(which is already the basic methodological commitment for most Critical Theory). From such a 
foundation, the two other essential features of Fromm’s framing are: a) that the social body has 
a dynamic in existence of consensual validation so that the social body is unaware of these 
internal contradictions; and b) that at an individual level subjects are unaware that they are 
living anything other than the fullest, most flourishing life, can effortlessly be integrated. Such 
an approach would retain the fundamental utility of Fromm’s social theoretical infrastructure, 
while providing distance from the more troublesome aspects of Fromm’s substantive 
philosophical convictions.  
Ultimately, this chapter advocates the first of these two routes: Fromm’s substantive 
submission can be of real potency and clarity. However, if the reader is not convinced by this 
earlier discussion, the foundational infrastructure Fromm provides can be seamlessly extricated. 
In either case, there are undeniable meritorious insights in Fromm’s framing of social pathology 
that go unappreciated in the dominant contemporary literature. 
 
Erich Fromm: ‘The Forgotten Intellectual’  
Before concluding, I wish to briefly argue that the failure of Fromm’s approach to attain greater 
intellectual traction, and indeed his ultimate ‘anathematization from Critical Theory’ (Jeffries, 
2017: 294) can be accounted for by the contingent facts of his biography. Fromm always felt at 
once removed from the society he described, while simultaneously invested in actively 
supporting its progressive development. This was as true of his relationship to ‘Critical Theory’ 
as it was to modernity writ large. As Thompson states,  
the theme of the stranger, of not quite belonging [,] and of alienation played an important part 
throughout his [own] life (Thompson A, 2009: 4).  
After developing a reputation as an incisive interdisciplinary progressive thinker, Fromm was 
invited to join the Institute of Social Research. The origins of Fromm’s eventual intellectual 
ostracision can be traced to his initial meeting with Theodor Adorno; from their very ‘first 
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acquaintance, Fromm … developed a marked aversion’ to the philosopher (Funk, 2000: 97). Their 
mutual dislike is well charted (Thompson A, 2009: 12). Adorno effectively engineered Fromm’s 
departure from the institute, which was but the first of multiple blows to Fromm’s academic 
standing (Jeffries, 2017).  
Perhaps the bloodiest of such contretemps was the ‘bitter dispute’ between Marcuse and 
Fromm that played out in the pages of Dissent in the second half of the 1950s (Jeffries, 2017: 
289). For Witenberg, The Dissent debate damaged Fromm’s reputation internationally, and with 
it, diminished substantive scholarly engagement with his work (Witenberg, 1997: 334). 
Marcuse’s disagreement with Fromm was fundamentally over diverging readings of Freud 
(Jeffries, 2017: 289). In Jeffries’ prose, 
 Marcuse suggested that Fromm has smuggled capitalist values into his critique of the capitalist system 
(2017: 289). 
For Burston, the brutality of the debate can be attributed to ‘sibling rivalry’ between Freud’s 
heirs, both advancing revisions of Freud’s foundational works (Burston, 1991: 226-227). The 
dispute was so intense that decades after, Fromm ‘saw Marcuse on a train and studiously 
ignored him’ (Jeffries, 2017: 294). The intense ‘anathamezation [sic]’ of Fromm by the core 
figures of the Frankfurt School can only have served to damage the standing of, and engagement 
with, his work as serious, considered scholarship (Jeffries, 2017: 294).              
Beyond Critical Theoretical circles, Fromm’s latter works were attacked by the psychoanalytic 
orthodoxy for a lack of focus on ‘real life choices’, considered an essential prerequisite for 
psychoanalytic application (Margolies, 1996). While Fromm’s key works, especially Fear Of 
Freedom (1941)131, Man for Himself (1947), The Sane Society (1955), The Art of Loving (1956), 
Marx’s Concept of Man (1961), Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962), The Anatomy of Human 
Destructiveness (1973) and To Have or to Be? (1976) were widely read, from the early 1960s he 
was increasingly seen as ‘too provocative and disturbing to be readily assimilated into the 
analytic mainstream’ (Burston and Olfman, 1996: 321). Despite the undeniable ‘popularity of 
Fromm’s work’, the ‘traditional academic and psychoanalytic’ elite were ‘wary’ of Fromm’s style 
and argumentation (Thompson A, 2009: 20). 
Fromm died in 1980, aged 79, as ‘the forgotten intellectual’ (Braune, 2014: 3). Considering 
the extent of his output, and the devotion of his contemporary readership, that moniker remains 
apt today (Thompson M J, 2014). Indeed, a forthcoming paper in The European Journal of Social 
Theory presenting itself as articulating a complete typography of conceptions of social 
                                                          
131 Published in the USA as Escape from Freedom in the same year. For consistency, in this thesis I stick to either 
untranslated or English titles. 
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pathology, fails to engage once with Fromm (Laitinen and Särkelä, 2019). For Witenberg, Fromm 
‘lost some influence by crossing academic boundaries’ (Witenberg, 1997: 334), while for Jeffries 
the ‘deck was stacked against him’ from the very start (Jeffries, 2017: 294). Concurring with 
Jeffries, I argue that the merits of Fromm’s scholarship have been underexplored through the 
impact of contingent life events, in addition to the current unfavourability of the sentiments he 
espoused following the post-modern and post-structural turns. 
In keeping with his life, in death Fromm remains something of an outsider, neither fully 
integrated within the Critical Theoretical abode, nor fully excluded from it. Likewise, it is the 
case for his status relative to the psychoanalytic canon (Margolies, 1996).  Through my 
presentation of this briefest of biographies, I hope to have established that Fromm scholarship 
may be lacking, not merely due to aversions to his substantive work, but additionally due to 
contingent, unfortunate facts of his life. 
 
Conclusion  
Fromm is at pains to stress his approach is ‘not at all a psychological theory’ (Fromm, 1983: 
38).132 With this insistence, one may read Fromm as prefiguring Freyenhagen’s (2015) concerns 
over a dangerous ‘cognitive/material’ binary. Social pathologies are primarily socially induced, 
thus a meaningful analysis needs to extend far beyond the cognitive. Concurring with Fromm, 
the argument here is that a psychological/psychoanalytic theory absent a critical sociology risks 
becoming a futile endeavour. Such an approach hazards negating the centrality of social 
processes acting on the subject. A diagnosis of pathological normalcy must thus centre Fromm’s 
essential, Groddeckian insight: ‘individual psychology is [thus] fundamentally social psychology’ 
(Fromm, 1941: 20). In Beyond the Chains of Illusion, Fromm (1983) implicitly acknowledges the 
lineage of this dictum to Marx’s materialistic inversion of Hegel.      
Fromm’s framework offers real utility to the critical social theorist, and its exclusion from 
current conversations on, and typologies of, social pathology, is problematic. A Critical Theory 
seeking to transcend its current domesticated horizon could draw true support and vitality from 
Fromm’s oeuvre. While Fromm’s substantive social-theoretical and philosophical insights 
provide potent resources that can reinvigorate social pathology scholarship, it is Fromm’s social 
theoretical infrastructure which this paper triumphs. The ossifying recognition-cognitive 
                                                          
132 This particular phrasing seems to echo the introduction to Novak and Mandel’s The Marxist Theory of Alienation 
(1973), where the co-authors comment immediately that alienation is neither primarily, nor solely, of psychic origin 
and location. Fromm’s broader project can be read as a clear testimony to this fact; the pathology of normalcy has 
social structural origins.    
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approach to social pathology is effortlessly transcended in Fromm’s analysis of alienation, which, 
as I draw out, is crucially connected to his social-structural critique. Through the seamless 
aggregation of an analysis of: a) sub-optimal social conditions, b) the manner in which such 
conditions are obscured at an individual level, and c) the social dynamics retarding critique, 
Fromm presents a framework which can be applied to patriarchal, neo-colonial as well as 
capitalist structures.  
Fromm scholarship, while slowly growing, remains unduly limited. While the central tenets 
of his substantive philosophy may provide important resources for revitalising the diagnosis of 
social pathologies, the social theoretical infrastructure he provides is perhaps his most 
underappreciated legacy.  
In Ratner’s words, 
Pathological normalcy leads to valuable … insights for humanizing society on a practical, political level. 
Pathological normalcy provides us with a foundation for real social and psychological change (Ratner, 
2014: 302).     
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Chapter Seven 
Rethinking Recognition 
Introduction  
This chapter presents a way of incorporating the useful aspects of recognition theory as part of 
a broader social pathology diagnosing endeavour. As the preceding discussion has 
demonstrated (Chapters Four to Six), the dominant recognition perspective needlessly excludes 
potent theoretical approaches for engaging with social pathologies. The current recognition-
derived framework fails to engage with the socio-cultural pathologies explored by Rousseau 
(Chapter Four), pathologies of reason (Chapter Five), or Fromm’s work on pathological normalcy 
(Chapter Six). It is essential that any attempt to harbour the utility of the recognition approach 
as part of a broader ‘polycentric and multilateral’ Critical Theory does not replicate this 
needlessly exclusionary character (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 209). In Fraser’s words, the 
challenge is finding a way to incorporate the insights of recognition theory without ‘putting all 
… [of our] eggs in one basket’, i.e. without submitting to the exclusively recognition approach 
that Honneth advances (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 205). The exercise at the heart of this 
chapter is to identify and extract the utility of the recognition theoretical framework, without 
being constrained, pace Honneth, to only viewing the pathologies of the social world through a 
recognition lens. This chapter thus presents a way of integrating a reformulated recognition 
framing within a raft of other approaches to pathology diagnosing social critique. While the 
dominant recognition approach is highly problematic, I consider it worth engaging with the 
broader tradition for two reasons: a) to capture the utility of recognition-derived approaches to 
social theory beyond the Honnethian approach, and b) to potentially bridge the divide between 
rival social-theoretical camps, bringing together scholars who embrace, and those who 
excoriate, the dominant recognition account (Harris, 2019).  
This chapter has three sections. First, I briefly retrace the primary weaknesses inherent in 
mainstream recognition theoretical approaches and suggest potential palliatives. This exercise 
is important as one must avoid replicating these limitations in any proposed, more expansive, 
pathology diagnosing infrastructure. Second, I draw out the core utility of potential non-
monistic, non-neo-Idealist recognition accounts. It is worth ascertaining precisely what, if 
anything, recognition theory has to offer a rejuvenated Critical Theory. Third, borne out of this 
preceding discussion, I present a radically reconfigured recognition framing, capturing the 
insights, while cautious of the many weaknesses of, recognition theory.  
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In this third section, I argue that an analysis of recognition claims can potentially become part 
of a more inclusive pathology diagnosing analysis, not due to the alleged innate emancipatory 
potential of the ‘recognition moment’ (Honneth, 1995), but, on the contrary, precisely because 
such claims for recognition evince the workings of constitutive power while retaining a focus on 
the subject (Thompson, 2016; 2019). In my suggested reconfiguration, what to the 
contemporary recognition approach is a foundational weakness, namely that recognition claims 
are not immune to the effects of social-structural power (McNay, 2008), can become, in a 
reoriented account, a core asset. Analysing recognition claims could become a means for 
engaging with the impact of social-structures and their constitutive power upon the social 
subject. A reworked recognition approach can thus help identify pathological demands for 
recognition, rather than to expose solely pathological denials of recognition (Canivez, 2011). 
Through this proposed reformulation of recognition theory both pathological claims for 
recognition, and some of the pathological logics which produce them, can be identified. 
However, echoing Thompson, I hold that such ‘constitutive logics’ exist beyond the scope of the 
recognition register (Thompson, 2016; 2019). In my suggested approach, looking at recognition 
claims is helpful in that it offers an entry point to engaging with these alternate, deeper 
structural dynamics, without viewing these logics as primarily intersubjective. Thus, while the 
reformulation of recognition I advance here engages with subjects’ purported experience of 
misrecognition, the social theorist must immediately draw on other non-recognition 
frameworks to further their analyses. My reframing thus utilises recognition theory for two 
purposes: a) to draw out pathological demands for recognition, and b) to function as an entry 
point to identify the deeper social pathologies which produce these expectations. 
Through the presentation of this reconfigured recognition framework, this chapter offers a 
way in which recognition theory can potentially be utilised as part of a broader, non-
exclusionary, pathology diagnosing endeavour, while remaining aware of the serious limitations 
of the Honnethian paradigm. This chapter is also presented as a means of bridging otherwise 
siloed literatures. Contemporary recognition theorists have been loathed to accept the 
limitations of their approach and have thus failed to meliorate potent criticisms levelled at their 
theoretical foundations (Chapter Three). This chapter seeks to take seriously such concerns and 
considers possibilities for radically reorienting the recognition approach, while remaining 
committed to a ‘undomesticated’ Critical Theory.  
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The pitfalls to avoid  
it is worth retracing the core limitations of mainstream recognition approaches to avoid 
replicating these weaknesses in a broader pathology diagnosing infrastructure. In this section I 
argue that many of the core principles of contemporary recognition approaches are problematic 
and must be discarded.  
Current recognition approaches: 
1. are damagingly, and unnecessarily exclusionary, 
2. have developed a restrictive cognitive framing, 
3. afford an unjustifiable ontological primacy to the intersubjective moment,  
4. are neo-Idealist in that they present recognition relationships as harbouring a unique, 
intrinsic emancipatory potential, and, 
5. contend that all aspects of the social world can be grasped through a recognition optic. 
 
The Exclusionary Nature of the Recognition Paradigm 
As the preceding three chapters have stressed (Chapters Four to Six), a key weakness of 
dominant recognition theoretical approaches is that they exclude other, more potent means of 
engaging with social pathologies. Fraser submitted as early as 2001 that the central weakness of 
dominant recognition approaches is that they are absolutely ‘convinced that the terms of 
recognition must represent the unified framework for [the Critical Theoretical] … project’ (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2001: 113, my italics). From such an exclusionary recognition optic, even 
‘distributional injustices must be understood as the institutional expression of … unjustified 
relations of recognition (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 114). Yet, as my engagements with 
Rousseau, Hegel and Fromm have demonstrated, the distribution of social resources is much 
more complex than this position allows. Dominant recognition approaches fail to acknowledge 
that there any many forms of social pathology which cannot be captured by the recognition 
optic, while there are more which, while partially-intelligible to recognition frameworks,133 are 
more cogently and intuitively theorised through other social-theoretical infrastructure. I have 
justified this point at length in Chapters Four to Six. As argued in these chapters, there are potent 
alternate social theoretical frameworks to engage with species of social pathology which are 
                                                          
133 For instance, Schaub and Odigbo (2019) have recently attempted to present a taxonomy of the pathologies in 
the economic sphere solely utilising the recognition approach. Even if this endeavour was entirely successful (I 
argue elsewhere it was not) they could surely have made a more intuitive analysis of the pathologies of the 
economic realm utilising a non-recognition derived approach. 
149 
 
completely incompatible with, and invisible to, recognition-derived approaches (Chapters Four 
to Six).  
It is essential that in their inclusion of recognition insights as part of a broader pathology 
diagnosing endeavour, Critical Theorists do not view society solely, or primarily, as the social 
manifestation of recognition relationships (Fraser and Honneth, 2001; McNay, 2008; Thompson, 
2016). Yet, to date, many theorists maintain a staunch fidelity to a strictly recognition-derived 
approach, which serves to exclude all other modes of engagement with social pathologies 
through the needlessly restrictive definition advanced for ‘social pathology’.134 In contrast, for 
Critical Theorists to benefit from the breadth of efficacious framings of social pathology 
available, it is essential for recognition theorists to surrender the claim to be able to comprehend 
the social totality through the recognition optic (Fraser and Honneth, 2001). The social world is 
much more than an interconnected web of recognition relationships, there are important 
hierarchies that impact subjects beyond the intersubjective register (Thompson, 2019). This 
realisation is essential for social theorists to begin to understand the social realities which 
produce pathological demands for, and denials of, recognition.    
 
The Recognition-Cognitive Turn 
The last decade has witnessed the ascendancy of a recognition-cognitive framing of social 
pathology (Chapter Three). While the antecedent recognition approach was restrictive insofar 
as it viewed the entirety of the social world solely through a recognition optic, the recognition-
cognitive perspective furthers this exclusionary tendency. As expressed in Chapter Three, an 
influential article by Zurn suggested that social pathologies should be defined as ‘second order 
disconnects’, as failures of the social subject to realise the emancipatory potential of mutual 
recognition relationships (Zurn, 2011: 345). Echoing Freyenhagen (2015), I commented how 
such an approach is unacceptable from multiple perspectives (Chapter Three). The recognition-
cognitive turn in social pathology scholarship must, therefore, be reconsidered. Such an 
approach is too restrictive not merely in its failure to engage with various types of problematic 
recognition relationships due to its narrow cognitivism (Freyenhagen, 2015; Laitinen, 2015), but 
more broadly in its inability to engage with the multiple framings of social pathology which are 
inaccessible to intersubjective approaches (as discussed above).    
 
 
                                                          
134 Schaub and Odigbo’s paper (mentioned in footnote 1, above) epitomises this position.  
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The Purported Ontological Primacy of Recognition 
As established in Chapter Two, a central criticism levelled at recognition theoretical approaches 
is of the ontological primacy afforded to the intersubjective moment (McNay, 2008; Thompson, 
2016). As a result of the foundational nature accorded to the recognition dyad, all other social 
realities are recast as ‘post hoc effect(s)’ (McNay, 2008: 47). Recognition-theoretical accounts 
which hold this ontological commitment are unable to engage with ‘a socio-structural account 
of power’ existing beyond, or antecedent to, recognition relations (McNay, 2008: 47-48). Such 
an approach is not only philosophically untenable considering the presence of broader and 
antecedent social hierarchies (Thompson, 2019), but, again, serves to further exclude alternate 
framings of social pathology which are held to be ‘exogenous factor(s) that comes to operate 
post hoc upon the recognition dynamic’ (McNay, 2008: 72). It is imperative to move beyond any 
claims to the ontological primacy of the recognition moment. if recognition insights are to serve 
a productive role as part of a philosophically justifiable broader pathology diagnosing 
endeavour.  
 
Emancipatory Potential 
A central facet of Honnethian recognition theory is the claim that the intersubjective moment 
has unique emancipatory potential (Honneth, 1995; Laitinen, Särkelä, and Ikäheimo, 2015). It is 
essential that such claims are dispensed with (Chapter Two). Recall that for recognition 
theorists, society is nothing more than ‘extrapolations of psychic dynamics’ (McNay, 2008: 138). 
As established above, with the ontological primacy placed on the recognition moment, 
recognition theorists posit a ‘unidirectional causal dynamic’ between the cognitive-
intersubjective and the social (McNay, 2008: 138). Emancipation thus necessitates interventions 
within the recognition order. As Thompson (2016; 2019) and McNay (2008) have argued, such 
claims are built upon philosophically unjustifiable foundations. For Thompson such purported 
emancipation-through-recognition is irredeemably neo-Idealist in that it ascribes to the subject 
cognitive capacities which are impervious to social power (Thompson, 2016). Yet, recognition is 
not the originary site of social life; there are structures and hierarchies antecedent to, and 
impacting upon, subjectivation (Thompson, 2016: 5-12; 2019). To incorporate the positive 
insights of recognition theory as part of a multilateral Critical Theory one must commence by 
renouncing the claim that the recognition dyad has unique, emancipatory potential. The 
cognitive and intersubjective capacities of the subject must be understood as impacted upon by 
social structural forces which transcend the intersubjective register.   
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The Untargeted Application of ‘Recognition’ to all Social Domains 
A constant theme in the foregoing discussion is the damaging trend within contemporary social 
theory to view all aspects of the social world through the recognition lens. In a recent paper in 
the European Journal of Social Theory, Schaub and Odigbo (2019) epitomise this tendency. They 
advance a ‘complete typology’ of the pathologies of the economic sphere utilising the 
recognition approach. For Schaub and Odigbo, the reliance of around a million people in the UK 
on foodbanks is evidence of ‘consumptive need misrecognition’. Such a commitment to the 
recognition approach seems absurd because, as Fraser has articulately argued, ‘not all 
maldistribution is a by-product of misrecognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 35). Indeed, the 
increasing need for the precariat to turn to foodbanks, pay-day lenders and support from family 
and friends, can be best understood as a direct result of the shifting ‘balance of power between 
labor and capital’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 215) due to political-economic dynamics which 
are once-removed from the intersubjective register. Further, Schaub and Odigbo’s recognition-
derived submission may be read as serving to occlude the political culpability of the actors who 
furthered the ‘Austerity’ agenda (Coulthard, 2014; Siddique, 2018). As has been established in 
the previous chapters, the logics and dynamics Fraser refers to are inaccessible to a restrictive 
recognition approach. The solution, again, seems immediately apparent. Where there is a 
plethora of alternate, non-recognition factors at work, adopting a primarily recognition optic is 
extremely counter-productive. Thus, for the insights of recognition theory to be of use to a 
broader, social pathology diagnosing project, it is essential that the recognition register is turned 
to when investigating pathological status differentials, or where a recognition approach can 
offer a useful entry point for a broader, polycentric enquiry.  
 
The utility to be harnessed 
While the limitations of the dominant recognition paradigm are substantial, I have offered 
plausible routes through which these can be mitigated. True, my engagement serves to radically 
reorient, and in some ways to neuter, the recognition paradigm. This may prove unacceptable 
to many of the committed recognition theorists who staunchly utilise the perspective regardless 
of the increasingly publicised accounts of its limitations.135 That stated, while the preceding 
discussion serves to negate many of the more radical claims of recognition theory, I argue that 
the following three features of the approach are of utility and can be incorporated as part of a 
                                                          
135 As I state in an introductory article to a special edition of The European Journal of Social Theory, the scholarly 
debate surrounding the utility of the recognition paradigm has become calcified and hotly contested. There would 
be a real utility for social theory more broadly if recognition theorists were to seriously engage with the arguments 
presented against their approach and enter into productive dialogue.  
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broader pathology diagnosing project. I submit that the central strengths of the recognition 
approaches are: 
1. the empirically agreed need for recognition, and how this awareness has been mobilised 
as a foundation for undergirding normative theory, 
2. their ability to engage with the affective experiences of social subjects, and, 
3. the ability to provide an entry point for broader social critique which centres the subject. 
 
The empirically agreed need for recognition 
Honneth has been consistent in pointing to the empirical evidence supporting the need for 
intersubjective recognition (Honneth, 1995).136 Honneth’s ground-breaking book The Struggle 
for Recognition was thus able to present a ‘social theory with normative content’ in ‘conditions 
of post-metaphysical thinking’ (Honneth, 1995: 1) in which normative claims can be derived 
from a weak formal anthropology: that is, in the biological need for recognition. Such analysis 
built upon Taylor’s successful popularisation of the language of ‘recognition’, but invested it 
further with empirical, scientific insights (Taylor, 1994). Through a turn to Winnicott (1965, 
1971) and Stern (1985), recognition-theorists have been able to argue, empirically, that 
recognition is important for the maintenance of a healthy self-relation throughout the entirety 
of the life-course. 
Such an approach has two key characteristics which can be productively incorporated into a 
broader, pathology diagnosing endeavour. The first is immediately apparent: there is clearly a 
need to engage with recognition where appropriate, and one must likewise accept that when 
the subject seeks recognition from irrational sources they are likely to encounter developmental 
and psychological problems.137 Further, the irrational denial of recognition is, as recognition 
theorists suggest, a social pathology. Social norms and values which serve to systematically 
denigrate subjects, such that they are irrationally denied respect, love and esteem are thus, 
undeniably, one species of social pathology (Hirvonen, 2015). 
                                                          
136 It is interesting that Honneth turns repeatedly to Donald Winnicott (1965, 1971) to further this point (Honneth, 
1995: 98-106), yet only mentions the work of Daniel Stern fleetingly (Honneth, 1995: 97). Stern’s The Interpersonal 
World of the Infant (1985) would appear, prima facie, to have been a more intuitive port of call.   
137 Yet a consideration which has not been thoroughly interrogated in the literature more broadly is the need to 
place the demands for recognition of a ‘confused’ or ‘anomic’ subject, or a subject socialised in a world with classed, 
raced and gendered power gradients, relative to the requirements for a rational society more broadly. This may 
require denying recognition claims from many subjects who will initially suffer as a result. How this should be 
managed while acknowledging that racist/sexist/classed demands for esteem are a product of social processes 
more broadly, requires further discussion.    
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Yet, contra to leading recognition theoretical approaches, it proves hard to determine when 
claims of misrecognition are, and are not, justified (Canivez, 2011). As Critical Theorists stress, 
both the dominant, irrational forms of social organisation, and the ideologically imbued, limited 
forms of consciousness they sustain, serve to impede the subject’s capacity to provide an 
unmediated, ‘objective’ account and analysis of their lived experiences.  While pathologies of 
recognition clearly do exist, and there is empirical evidence pointing towards the harm denied 
recognition can precipitate (Honneth, 1995), because of the complexity and irrationality of the 
social world it is less clear precisely what the theorist can do with this knowledge. Ultimately 
this central recognition theoretical insight is less productive that one might immediately be 
inclined to think. Extending my previous arguments, despite the empirical evidence pointing to 
the need for love, respect and esteem in, and from, recognition relationships, it does not follow 
that all pathologies are, in the final instance, derivative of problematic recognition relationships. 
Neither does it inevitably follow that the harms of denied recognition are always best theorised 
through an exclusively recognition paradigm. 
Further still, and perhaps most problematic for ardent recognition theorists, just because a 
subject is harmed by not being recognised in a certain way does not mean that they necessarily 
merit such recognition. A racist may genuinely feel aggrieved and injured when people of colour 
fail to show them significant respect, and the racist may suffer a genuine psychic injury as a 
result of the disconnect between his demand for recognition and his experience of its denial 
(see footnote 5). In Honnethian terms, the esteem a subject may enjoy from the subservience 
of others may form of critical aspect of their healthy self-relation. Yet it is absurd to argue that 
the bigot is entitled to recognition as racially superior because it aids their healthy relation-to-
self.138 It is thus much harder to action a research programme that is philosophically justifiable 
based on the analysis of subject’s claims to denied recognition than one might think.139 As I shall 
argue in the following section, Critical Theorists might productively commence their analysis by 
examining a subject’s claims of denied recognition, but such testimony alone is of limited use. 
Given that recognition relationships occur within a broader social world, shaped by social-
                                                          
138 Consider the final scene of the 1957 Henry Fonda film, 12 Angry Men.  ‘Juror 3’, an older white man, initially 
refuses to acknowledge the possibility of the defendant being innocent. The patient argumentation from Fonda 
(‘Juror 8’) gradually leads to all but Juror 3 accepting the likelihood of the defendant’s innocence. When it becomes 
clear that Juror 3’s opinion, laced with prejudices and ageist, classist bigotry, is not being respected by the other 
jurors, he breaks down in tears. The denial of esteem to subject’s can cause a rupture of their self-image, the 
disconnect between their expectations for, and experiences, of (mis-)recognition marking a true breach for the 
individual’s self-relation.   
139 Developing footnote 5 (above): This is not to state that recognition has not been productively utilised in the 
numerous instances eluded to in this paper. The point here, however, is that the precise theoretical framework may 
not present the optimum means of engaging with the constitutive powers that shape social subjects, and which 
thus impact greatly on their demands for recognition.  
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structural powers and hierarchies, such claims will always need to be engaged with relative to a 
broader analysis of constitutive power (Thompson, 2016; 2019). This necessitates moving 
beyond the intersubjective register (Thompson, 2016; 2019). Such considerations rarely feature 
in the dominant recognition approaches (Thompson, 2016: Chapter One-Three).  
Thus, a measured conclusion must be drawn here: recognition theorists have a valid insight 
insofar as the denial of recognition can cause subjects empirically verifiable harm. The presence 
of social logics which serve to irrationally deny subjects esteem, love and respect are therefore 
pathological. However, such a realisation needs to be measured, and soundly incorporated 
within the plethora of alternate social maladies which beset the social world. One cannot 
examine such social-structural logics solely through an engagement with subjects’ testimony 
(Canivez, 2011). As stated, the denial of recognition to a subject, while evincing a short-term 
harm, may in some instances produce a greater social good for the subject, and a longer term 
good for the broader society. The conclusions which can be legitimately drawn here is that 
recognition relationships merit analysis, and that subject’s claims of denied recognition can 
provide an important entry point to social critique. However, such analysis must always be 
measured and held as part of a broader polycentric pathology diagnosing framework.  
Second, emerging from the empirical work pointing to the need for recognition, there are 
advantages to the turn to a weak formal anthropology as the basis for conducting critical social 
theory. I have previously outlined the merits of such an approach, which has been best advanced 
by Honneth’s recognition theory (Chapter One). Yet, it must be stated that while a weak formal 
anthropology has perhaps been best incorporated in critical social theory through Honneth’s 
recognition approach, there is no essential need for such a ‘normative fix’ to occur through 
recognition. Indeed, Fromm’s ‘normative humanism’ (Chapter Six) could equally justifiably serve 
to provide such a framing (Thompson A 2009; Thompson M J, 2014). The empirically verifiable 
need for recognition thus brings two further beneficial insights for broader pathology diagnosing 
social theory: the utility of basing critical social theory with normative content in a weak formal 
anthropology, and the need to engage, as part of a broader project, with pathologies of 
recognition.  
 
Means of critically engaging with the subject’s affective experience  
Recognition theoretical approaches offer an intuitive way to engage with a truly immanent 
aspect of the social world: subjects’ lived reality of suffering and disrespect. The recognition 
approach allows the researcher to directly engage with the subject’s sense of hurt, or denied 
155 
 
esteem, across contexts. It has thus been utilised to further social research across the breadth 
of the social word, from elder care (Niemi, 2015) to music-schools (Elmgren, 2015), even into 
contemporary populist movements (Hirvonen and Pennanen, 2019). This adaptability is 
achieved while constantly retaining the focus on the individual’s psychological experience. This 
ability to engage with the subject’s lived reality is undeniably central to the popularity of the 
recognition paradigm. A broader social pathology diagnosing approach must learn from 
recognition theorists on the importance of being able to engage with the subject’s affective 
experiences, as and when appropriate.  
That stated, one must caution against blindly centring the purportedly injured subject, 
divining “social truths” from their affective responses to their perceived denied recognition. 
Harding’s ‘standpoint theory’, for instance, falls into the trap of privileging the truth content of 
marginalised subjects, viewing their narratives as inherently harbouring a ‘strong objectivity’ 
(Harding, 2004). For Harding, the voices of subaltern subjects are of greater value to the social 
theorist than the presentations of ‘non-oppressed’ social actors, as the ‘outsider-within’ 
experience produces ‘bicultural’ knowledge. In addition to the well-trodden critiques of 
essentialism which have dogged Harding’s work (Harraway, 1988; Code, 2008), one must also 
caution the multiple problems with determining who really is misrecognised, who really is the 
marginalised subject. Further, there are disconnects between the lived realities of precarious 
subjects (people of colour, for example) and their narratives of disrespect and misrecognition. 
Embodiment, subjecthood, and critical cognition do not exist in a coherent, predetermined unity 
or symmetry. Currently in the UK, for example, the Home Secretary, Sajid Javid, a second-
generation immigrant, is responsible for enforcing a racist immigration policy which separates 
migrant families, causing devastating consequences (Younge, 2018). The ability to engage with 
subjects’ affective realities has only served to bolster the popularity of the recognition paradigm 
among social researchers, however, as argued, engagement with affective experiences, as a 
theoretical and research focus, must not precipitate uncritically granting epistemic privilege to 
the accounts of those who purport misrecognition.    
 
A means to further social theory centring, but not limited to, the subject  
Perhaps the most useful aspect of a recognition derived approach for Critical Theory is that it 
enables the social subject to be centred as a springboard from which to conduct deeper, 
structural analysis. While above I commented on the utility of recognition accounts engaging 
with the subject’s affective experiences, this broader benefit can too easily be overlooked. While 
Honnethian recognition theorists problematically consider that the entirety of the social world 
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can be adequately theorised as a ‘recognition network’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001), their 
position has one clear benefit: it locates the individual’s experience (of denied recognition) 
relative to broader social-structural logics (the logics and structures of a broader recognition 
network). The immediacy with which such an approach enables the theorist to move between 
the individual’s affective experience and broader social logics is enviable. While I criticise the 
limitations of the recognition framing more broadly, the ability to shift focus between subject 
and social logics effortlessly is an important target to aim for in a reformulated pathology 
diagnosing Critical Theory. 
 
Concluding thoughts on the utility of recognition theory 
A considered recognition approach clearly harbours utility. The challenge is to engage these 
efficacious aspects of recognition theoretical accounts while addressing their manifold 
limitations. As this section has demonstrated, the key advantages of a recognition approach are 
the ability to engage with subjects’ real-world experiences of suffering and to use this as an entry 
point for broader social critique. This renewed focus could, for example, help Critical Theory 
overcome the criticism that it is overinvested in the analysis of social-structural logics and 
negates, and occludes, the lived realities of social subjects (Freundlieb, 2015). In contrast, as I 
suggest below, one can centre the subject’s experiences of misrecognition to facilitate broader 
social-structural analysis, and, by doing so, move beyond the recognition-register.  
 
Incorporating recognition as part of a broader social pathology diagnosing infrastructure  
From the preceding discussion it has become apparent that a radically reoriented recognition 
account is required for any of the recognition framing’s insights to sit happily as part of a broader 
pathology diagnosing endeavour. In the following section I will present a possible reformulation, 
seeking to appropriate the useful facets of recognition theory, while negating the philosophically 
untenable and social-theoretically restrictive features of the Zurnian-Honnethian paradigm. I 
suggest that Critical Theorists might productively engage the tools provided by recognition 
theory as one means amongst others for conducting pathology diagnosing social critique. Where 
a research subject, whether explicitly or implicitly, contends they are suffering from denied 
recognition, it makes complete sense for the Critical Theorist to commence their analysis 
utilising a recognition-derived framework. I diverge from the orthodoxy, however, by suggesting 
that the Critical Theorist should utilise the subjects’ claims of denied recognition as an entry 
point for probing the broader social conjecture, and, in so doing, swiftly transcend the 
157 
 
recognition framework. My core submission here is that the subjects’ purported denied 
recognition might productively be engaged with as testimony to the types of recognition they 
have been conditioned to expect by the constitutive power of their social world.  
In contrast to orthodox recognition approaches, which focus on subjects’ experiences of 
inadequate or denied recognition, I am arguing that the Critical Theorist should examine the 
pathological nature of irrational demands for recognition. Again, it is crucial to stress that I do 
not believe in some latent emancipatory potential lurking within a foundational dyadic 
relationship. In my suggested approach, the turn to the recognition register is of use only insofar 
as it offers an entry point to the social world, to help illuminate the mechanisms of constitutive 
power (Thompson, 2016). The subject’s testimony of having experienced denied recognition is 
of use to the Critical Theorist, not because it holds a determinate truth content, but because it 
demonstrates the belief of the social subject. The subject feels that they have been denied 
recognition; that, and that alone, is a promising entry point for critical social theory and social 
research. It is with this central insight that the recognition register offers a useful resource as 
part of a broader, pathology diagnosing endeavour.  
In contrast to the dominant approach which focuses on pathological denials of recognition, I 
following Canivez (2011), argue that it is essential that theorists realise the possibility that a 
subject’s claimed denied recognition, while felt intensely, may be due to their own irrational 
expectations of love, respect or esteem. One must thus consider the pathological nature of many 
claims for recognition. Consider for instance a racist, misogynistic white male’s expectations of 
recognition from black women. One must retain an awareness that the subject is socialised in a 
world impacted by logics of constitutive power which impact the subject’s expectations of 
recognition relationships. 
To give this approach more substance, imagine a second hypothetical scenario, where a 
sociologist is conducting research into the various social pathologies pertinent to Brexit. The 
researcher may engage with a subject who comments that they feel deeply disrespected by the 
foreign nationals living in ‘their’ community, who they see as failing to integrate, despite living 
in the same neighbourhood, or working for the same employer. The research subject may claim 
that they feel ‘disrespected’ as the foreign nationals seem ‘surly’, ‘unsmiling’ and ‘fail to catch 
the eye’ of the subject (see Burnett, 2017). While the traditional recognition perspective would 
be limited to engaging with this testimony as potentially demonstrating the failure of healthy 
recognition relationships to have developed in the more diverse community, my suggested 
approach would start from the subject’s testimony, and use it as an entry point to consider the 
158 
 
constitutive power relations which led to their expectations and precipitant sense of disrespect 
(Canivez, 2011).   
In contrast to viewing the purported denial of recognition as evincing a pathological failure 
in the development of relations of recognition, the researcher would use the testimony gathered 
as an entry point to consider broader social-structural logics. The researcher could thus consider 
the impact of the ‘hostile environment’ (Grierson, 2018), the impact of neoliberal casualisation 
of labour (Kapoor, 2013), and the breakdown of community institutions. The examination of the 
social irrationality, which was commenced by the testimony of denied recognition by the 
research subject, has thus cascaded outwards to consider the myriad of constitutive factors 
which impact upon the subject’s socialisation. Viewing the ‘failure to catch the eye’ as no longer 
a deficient part of a primary intersubjective dyadic relationship which should be accorded 
ontological primacy, but as the result of broader, social-structural processes which impact upon 
all social subjects, the failure of harmonious intersubjective relations is held to be symptomatic 
of deeper social pathologies.  
In my reconfigured account, an analysis of recognition claims may function as a possible entry 
point to a broader, multi-pronged analysis. I reiterate that I propose that recognition might 
function merely as one entry point to the social, not the sole, nor the dominant means of 
commencing social research. However, where explicitly relevant, as in the case of the 
hypothetical example above, and when suitably extracted from the dominant Honnethian 
approach, it can offer a meaningful manner to commence social theory and social research. 
Despite the manifold failings of the Honnethian paradigm, it remains the case that there are 
social pathologies which can be productively engaged with through the recognition register. This 
reality, however, does not mean that all pathologies are recognition-derived, or that the 
recognition framing harbours unique critical potency (Fraser and Honneth, 2001; Thompson, 
2016).  
My suggested approach can be summarised in four key steps. First, where appropriate, I 
propose that the recognition framework can be adapted and adopted as one possible entry 
point to the social world (amongst various others). Second, I suggest that the researcher must 
adopt a ‘value neutral’ engagement relative to recognition claims: they must jettison any notion 
that there lies some latent emancipatory potential lurking in the subject’s experiences of some 
purportedly ‘primal’ intersubjective dyad. The presumption that denied recognition is the 
attendant social pathology needs to be rejected. Third, the Critical Theorist then engages with 
the subject’s affective resonances to determine how and why they feel mis/un-recognised. The 
given responses are utilised to help draw out the workings and machinations of constitutive 
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power upon the subject. Fourth, through an analysis of the position of the subject, relative to 
the power gradients presented through an analysis of the dynamics of constitutive power and 
the broader social-structural realities, the theorist may comment on the rationality, or 
irrationality, of the subject’s claim for recognition. 
By viewing the subject’s claimed denied recognition relative to the workings of broader 
social-structural logics, the Critical Theorist comments not on the presence (or absence) of 
pathologically denied recognition, but on the rationality of the subject’s claim for recognition. 
The objective which is centred in my alternate approach to recognition is the development of 
analyses which help identify broader social-structural pathologies which lead to the 
development of irrational claims for recognition.  
 
How Such an Approach Avoids the Pitfalls of Contemporary Recognition Framings 
My suggested approach for harnessing the utility of the recognition approach avoids the pitfalls 
of neo-Idealism as it focuses on the content of the recognition claims themselves, offering a 
route to investigate constitutive power relations. Neither the intersubjective moment, nor the 
epistemic capacity of the ‘injured’ subject are granted ontological or epistemic primacy or 
privilege. In direct contrast to dominant approaches to recognition theory, in my proposed 
reframing the subject’s sense of denied recognition is held to be impacted by broader social-
structural logics. 
As stressed, my proposed approach does not echo the exclusionary tendencies of the 
dominant recognition-cognitive, or other recognition-theoretical framework(s). As presented 
throughout, I consider that this approach offers one possible route, but one possible route 
amongst many, for engaging with social pathologies. Perhaps more importantly, I do not argue, 
even when utilising the recognition framework, that the pathological aspect of society is to be 
located within the intersubjective dyad. In my presentation there is no antecedent ‘failure’ of 
recognition, from which a pathological society is projected. In contrast, the subject’s sense of 
denied recognition is presented as a means of engaging with irrational social logics more 
broadly. Such irrational social developments are best framed through the multiple species of 
social pathology which have been outlined through Chapters Four-Six. There is thus always a 
need to engage with multiple species of social pathology beyond recognition, even though, in 
certain instances, a recognition approach can be of great utility.  
As discussed, there has been a growing tendency to present all social pathologies as 
projections of irrational recognition relationships (Harris, 2019). My engagement with 
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recognition, as advanced here, would function solely to allow critical theorists the benefit of the 
theoretical infrastructure where it is apposite, but would have no bearing on pathological social 
dynamics where the intersubjective dimension is not a primary concern.  
 
How Such an Approach Harnesses the Potential of the Recognition Optic 
While I support Fraser’s assertion that there are many areas of social life which have ‘little to do 
with recognition’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 35), she herself states (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 
2-5), there are also occasions where a cautious recognition theoretical approach could be very 
useful to the Critical Theorist, if the foundational weaknesses of the Honnethian account could 
be vitiated. The reformulation of recognition presented above follows traditional recognition 
approaches insofar as it commences the analysis of the social world through initially centring 
the subject’s sense of disrespect, or misrecognition. The approached championed here retains 
this ability to engage with the affective aspect of the subject’s lived reality without unduly 
privileging the content of the subject’s testimony.  
While my reformulation here does not hold recognition relationships to be the primal, 
foundational core of the social order, it retains an awareness that irrational recognition 
relationships need to be incorporated in a broader pathology diagnosing infrastructure. By 
locating a subject’s claims for recognition within the broader social-structural reality, the 
theorist may determine whether the subject’s claim for recognition is itself irrational.   
My proposed reconfiguration of recognition rests on the social researcher placing the 
subject’s claimed experience of misrecognition within the broader social world. It is only when 
subjects’ purported claims of denied recognition are placed relative to the broader forms of 
constitutive power that the rationality of the recognition relationship as a whole can be 
analysed. What is distinct about my approach is that the social researcher would arrive at such 
a conclusion, not on the basis of the testimony of the ‘misrecognised’, or by examining the 
broader psychological impact of the intersubjective dyad, but by examining the constitutive 
power that ‘pulse(s) beneath the surface’ of social action’ (Thompson, 2016: 7).  
 
Conclusion  
As this thesis argues throughout, the dominant recognition-derived approaches for engaging 
with the social world are deeply problematic. This Honnethian paradigm is needlessly 
exclusionary and philosophically and social theoretically unjustifiable. That stated, as this 
chapter argues, a radically reworked recognition optic could play a partial role as part of a 
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broader ‘multilateral’ Critical Theoretical endeavour (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 209). For this 
to be possible, however, several of the central claims of the recognition approach would need 
to be dismissed. This chapter thus started by briefly retracing the central limitations of the 
dominant recognition approach, and provided possible solutions for their overcoming. The 
second part of the chapter then presented the primary merits of the recognition approach. With 
this groundwork completed, I was able to offer my suggested reformulated recognition 
approach, which I propose could play a small part in a broader theoretical infrastructure for 
engaging with social pathologies. 
Echoing Fraser, I ‘object in principle to any proposal to ground a normative framework on 
one privileged set of experiences’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 205 – my italics). My proposed 
reformulation of recognition did not confer an epistemic or ontological primacy to either the 
recognition moment, or to the subject’s post-hoc reflections on their affective responses to their 
intersubjective relationships. Rather, I suggested that recognition could play an important role 
in a broader pathology diagnosing endeavour as an entry point to the social world which 
illuminates the workings of constitutive power and the dynamics of social-structures.  
Far from placing ‘all its eggs in one basket’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 205), this reconfigured 
approach to recognition would utilise aspects of the recognition register, where appropriate, as 
part of a broader pathology diagnosing exercise. Engaging with subjects’ claims for recognition 
can be a useful starting point for theorists seeking to diagnose social pathologies as it offers an 
immediate presentation of the demands and expectations of the social subject and it offers a 
ready means of engaging with affective experience. My reason for engaging with recognition 
claims is thus highly divergent from the dominant orthodoxy. In my approach there is no 
presumption that the irrationality of the social world stems from denied recognition. In contrast, 
this chapter has argued that a reconfigured recognition framework can play a role in a broader 
social pathology diagnosing endeavour insofar as it can help identify the pathological nature of 
many subjects’ demands for recognition, and it can offer an entry point to analyse pathological 
social structural realities which transcend the recognition register.  
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Conclusion 
Social Pathology Diagnosis and the Future of Critical Theory 
This conclusion is divided into three sections. First, I comment on how a rejuvenated pathology 
diagnosing social theory can help inform future social research. Second, I argue for the 
importance of a polycentric pathology diagnosing approach for renewing the radicalism of the 
broader Critical Theoretical project. Third, I abstract the social-theoretical submission at the core 
of the thesis, which is presented as a distinctive and timely intervention in a contested literature.   
 
Social Pathology Diagnosis and Social Research 
As Chapter Six of this thesis drew out, one of the central research questions for the Frankfurt 
School was ‘how can people accept the brutalities of the present as an acceptable normality?’ 
(Fromm, 2010). Expressed more politically, first-generation Critical Theorists sought to answer: 
‘Why isn’t there revolutionary social change?’ (Bronner, 2002, 2011; Held, 2013; Jeffries, 2017). 
In response, they discovered various social pathologies which furthered subjects’ susceptibility 
to reactionary, even fascist, dispositions (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, 
1950; Fromm, 1963, 2010). For Adorno and Fromm, inter alia, the practice of Critical Theory 
itself, the very diagnosis of social pathologies, marked an important part in the reclamation of 
critical subjectivity. Critical Theory is how consciousness fights back (Jay, 2016). However, 
Critical Theory, from its inception, focused equally on researching the objective contradictions 
operating within social organisations and structures, in addition to exploring the ideological 
impediments to critical consciousness (Strydom, 2011). In the first section of this conclusion, I 
thus draw out the importance of undergirding social research with a multifaceted pathology 
diagnosing social theory, both for examining the impeded critical capacity of the individual and 
for investigating the pathologies of the objective social world (Delanty, 2011).  
For Hoy and McCarthy (1994), it is essential that the theoretical foundations provided by 
Critical Theorists can animate research projects on both concerns. It is only through the 
excoriating analysis of both objective societal irrationalities, and of the shared cognitive 
impairments which occlude them from popular consciousness, that Critical Theory can truly 
make its presence felt as a political force (Bronner, 2011; Delanty, 2011). It is thus important to 
establish how and why my proposed ‘multilateral and polycentric’ pathology diagnosing social 
theory can provide a robust foundation for social research (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 209). 
Throughout this thesis, numerous displaced framings of social pathology have been critically 
discussed, all of which, I have argued, are of utility for social theory. Before I demonstrate how 
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and why these framings can also help facilitate social research, I briefly recount the multiple 
efficacious framings of social pathology excavated throughout this thesis.  
 
The Multiple Framings of Social Pathology 
Chapters Four to Six drew out various framings of social pathology which are substantially 
excluded by the dominant recognition paradigm. While this was admittedly a partial and 
incomplete project (there are a multitude of alternate framings of social pathology), this 
engagement satisfied two objectives. First, it drew out the limited scope of the dominant 
recognition-derived approach to engaging with social pathologies. Second, it demonstrated the 
critical utility harboured by neglected framings of social pathology. 
In the analysis of Rousseau (Chapter Four), five distinct framings of social pathology were 
drawn out: 
f) self-perpetuating negative dynamics, 
g) unstructured dependency, 
h) cultural pathology, 
i) the colonisation of one social sphere by the logic of another, and 
j) multiple layers of recognition pathology. 
Developing Neuhouser’s argument (2012), I submitted that these framings provide an apposite 
means for engaging with the irrationalities manifest in today’s social world as they enable Critical 
Theorists to delve ‘deeper’ than liberal social critique and thus to move beyond the dominant 
concerns of justice and legitimacy.  
The discussion on ‘pathologies of reason’ (Chapter Five), drew out the utility of diagnosing 
discrepancies140 between the dominant organisational logics of the objective social world and 
the more rational potential latent within them (Honneth, 2007b: 21). The diagnosis of such 
‘pathologies of reason’ offers an important framework for social research, as it brings forth 
Critical Theory’s uniquely progressive methodology: immanent-transcendence. For Strydom, it 
is this future-oriented nature of Critical Theory, derived from this methodological commitment, 
which distinguishes Critical Theoretical social research from other research programmes 
(Strydom, 2011: 9).141 Such a focus can be carried out through a diagnosis of social pathologies 
of reason, and can thus propel social research in its uniquely future-oriented direction.  
                                                          
140 Perhaps ‘lags’ is a more apposite term. 
141 As Strydom draws out, neither empiricism not rationalism nor idealism are fundamentally annexed to a ‘forward-
looking’ social philosophy or social project (Strydom, 2011: 9-11). The focus on exploring potentialities for 
immanent-transcendence thus marks Critical Theory as methodologically unique in its future orientation.  
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Chapter Six, the discussion of Fromm’s (1963, 1979, 2010, inter alia) scholarship, drew out 
three key components of a society evincing ‘pathological normalcy’. These are: a) an analysis of 
the social world as incommensurable with the demands of ‘normative humanism’; b) where 
subjects fail to realise this due to ‘socially patterned defects’, and c) where such a pathological 
state is reinforced as the norm through the process of ‘consensual validation’. Fromm’s 
underappreciated theoretical infrastructure illuminates important concerns for social theorists 
which remain invisible to the dominant recognition-derived paradigm.  
Chapter Seven, my proposed reconfiguration of the recognition framework, also presented 
considerations for social research. In contrast to engaging predominantly with the 
intersubjective moment at the centre of a subject’s purported ‘denied recognition’ (Honneth, 
1995), I suggested that social researchers might profit from focusing on the deeper, non-
recognitive pathologies present within society, manifest in subjects’ often-irrational demands 
for recognition.  
As Turner argues, for Critical Theory to offer any significant prospect of aiding material praxis 
it is essential that it conducts social research built upon solid social theoretical foundations 
(Turner, 2009: 4-6). Of course, this is not to suggest that social theory without an attendant 
social research programme is impotent. Adorno would have viewed any such suggestion as 
epitomising the extractive, instrumentalising, and positivistic traits of a society riven by capitalist 
domination, a typical ‘compromise with “the given”’ (Durkin, 2019: 106). Rather, Turner’s (2009) 
submission, following Horkheimer (1975), is that an optimal Critical Theory requires the 
seamless interplay of social theory and social research. The social-theoretical project at the core 
of this thesis hopes to contribute to such an interdisciplinary infrastructure. 
Having outlined the core social-theoretical insights for social research presented in this 
thesis, I will now demonstrate how they can be deployed by way of the example of a pressing 
concern for social research: global warming.  
 
A Potential Area for Application 
The current social order is rich in pathologies, several of which are potentially existential in 
nature (Laitinen, 2015). Human-made global warming is perhaps the most obvious threat which 
endangers ‘the prospects of the continuity of human life’ (Chernilo, 2017: 44). In this section, I 
suggest that social research predicated on a pathology diagnosing theoretical infrastructure may 
provide new insights on this pressing concern. However, I stress that social researchers might 
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productively engage the pathology diagnosing register to interrogate a wider range of social 
problems.  
There is an intuitive allure to engaging with the logics and realities perpetuating global 
warming through the framings of social pathology (Neuhouser, 2012; Boyd, 2013). Social 
research could productively draw out the presence of multiple social pathologies on this 
pressing topic, and, through such research, might greatly heighten our understanding of the 
challenges and problems facing those who seek a more sustainable relationship with the global 
ecology. Returning to my analysis of Rousseau, social researchers could interrogate the self-
perpetuating negative dynamics which exist in the political economy inhibiting moves to zero-
growth (Malm, 2016; Monbiot, 2017). Equally, there is a mass of smaller scale, everyday lifestyle 
choices, that evince such a dynamic. Perhaps the most studied, and observably manifest 
example of such a dynamic, centres the increase in the popularity of air conditioning units in 
South Asia and North America (Pierre-Louis, 2018). Air conditioning units are in increasing 
demand due to increasing global temperatures. At first glance, it seems an example where the 
capitalist market produces and distributes a commodity of use and value to the community. 
However, upon closer examination, it is immediately apparent that a pathological dynamic is at 
work, both in the short and long-term. Air conditioning units operate by pumping hot air outside, 
into the street. As a result, the more residencies install air-con, the hotter the conurbation gets 
(Brownstone, 2014). This is in the immediate, short term. More substantially, the electricity 
required to operate the air-con units is still, overwhelmingly, produced by burning fossil-fuels. 
There is a thus a classic dynamic of negative infinity in operation: the hotter it gets the more 
people need air-con, the more people install air-con, the hotter it gets, ad infinitum. Such a social 
problem is best framed, and engaged with, through the rubric of social pathology.   
Equally, there are various forms of cultural pathology which serve to denigrate humankind’s 
relationship to, and dependence on, nature (Naess, 2008). The Western capitalist engagement 
with the broader ecology, for instance, is culturally worlds apart from a hypostatised Buddhist 
approach to nature (Schumacher, 1973). Neoliberal capitalism is predicated on the maintenance 
of unstructured relations of dependency between the human and the natural world which are 
unsustainable (Naess, 1989). The natural realm is conceptualised as a ‘sink’, an ‘externality’ to 
social production: this furthers exploitative logics which will ultimately be self-defeating due to 
inevitable resource scarcity (Schumacher, 1973).  
There are clear pathologies of reason existing when one considers the logics which 
precipitate and perpetuate climate change. Contemporary society is not ignorant to the social 
contradictions which further global warming (Kunstler, 2012); as Strydom’s recent work has 
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drawn out, there is a ‘mathematical-philosophical tradition’ attuned to the importance of 
understanding limit constructs (Strydom, 2017: 793). Yet growth-based economics is predicated 
on the possibility of infinite expansion in an admittedly finite system (Bookchin, 1962; Daly, 
1996).142 There is a clear pathology of reason here, a contradiction within the immanent, which, 
when researched from a left-Hegelian pathologies of reason perspective, points directly towards 
its own sublation [Aufheben] in forms of zero-growth or alternate-growth paradigms (Borchers, 
2006). The specifics of such dynamics urgently require social research (Dawson, 2019),143 and 
the pathologies of reason paradigm is of utility for such an endeavour.144  
Social researchers might productively consider the recognition pathologies which further 
exploitative, extractive relations towards the environment. While not adopting the terminology 
of ‘pathology’, Latour (1999) has already moved in this direction with his work on ‘spokespeople’ 
and ‘actants’ which draws on the broader ecological tradition (Stone, 1973). In contrast to the 
Honnethian paradigm’s impotence on this consideration due to its foundations in 
intersubjectivity, my suggested approach commences with the subject’s claims and attitudes in 
their interaction with the other, regardless of whether they constitute a subject. Those who 
engage in anthropocentric activities can be asked: ‘What do you think about the environment?’ 
or ‘Do you feel any obligation to the broader ecosystem?’ The responses can form part of a 
broader project of interrogating the social structures which produce subjects with explicitly 
anthropocentric politics.  
Further, one can research both the obstacles impeding subjects’ awareness of objectively 
pathological social dynamics and the deeper pathological normalcy which serves to foster socio-
political inaction (Boyd, 2013). The simultaneous awareness of the objective reality of global 
warming, when viewed together with sustained political inaction suggests that the 
contemporary juncture has developed the characteristics of a pathological normalcy (Chapter 
Six). Consider how, for example, there are a great number of academics who accept global 
warming as an existential threat, yet continue to fly to foreign countries on holiday, drive diesels 
and eat steaks. I fall into this category myself. Drawing on Fromm, the public at large are lured 
into a pathological dynamic of mass acquiescence life continues due to the pacifying logics of 
pathological normalcy (Fromm, 1963, 2010). The sustained functioning of social institutions 
                                                          
142 This text was originally published under the pseudonym Lewis Herber. 
143 While Dawson does not explicitly utilise the left-Hegelian approach, the clear focus on the contradictory state of 
our own awareness of crisis, and of the mathematical sophistication for modelling its likely outcomes, with such a 
degree of political inactivity, serves as apposite immanent critique.  
144 Lenin was famously sceptical of developing political analysis from Hegel’s metaphysics stating it could ‘not be 
applied in its given form … One must separate out from it the logical (epistemological) nuances after purifying them 
from Ideenmystik [mystical idealism]’ (Lenin: 1972: 226).    
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under such conditions could be fruitfully researched as evincing socially pattered cognitive 
defects (Fromm, 1983, 2010). Fromm would question whether those that happily conform to 
the continued, extractive anthropocentricism, central to the dominant neoliberal social order, 
are truly ‘sane’ (Fromm, 1963, 1979, 2010). Social research drawing on a social pathology 
diagnosing foundation might explicitly engage with, and expose, the dynamics which serve to 
impede progressive praxis. The question now becomes, how precisely is it that despite a 
scientifically verified wealth of knowledge which points towards the impending loss of the basic 
conditions necessary for life on earth within hundreds, not thousands of years, people continue 
largely unfazed (Klein, 2014). There are thus two distinct species of pathology here which require 
social research, both linking impeded cognitive capacity and broader social processes: a) the 
obstacles to subjects accepting the reality of human-made global warming, and b) the 
pathologies which impede those who have full awareness of the basic facts from making decisive 
changes to their lifestyles. Drawing on Fromm, one can see how a programme with a basis in 
diagnosing the pathologies of the normalcy can further and direct incisive social research. 
This briefest of expositions has drawn out how the social pathology diagnosing approach can 
identify a broad array of concerns which can productively animate social research. Critical 
Theorists must conduct social research exploring the pathological dynamics underpinning these 
‘ordinary everyday social practices’ (Strydom, 2011: 214). The focus on identifying social 
pathologies can offer a productive framework for social research into these pressing concerns. 
 
Social Pathology Diagnosis and the Internal Politics of Contemporary Critical Theory 
While this thesis primarily sits as an intervention in critical social theory, it also sits as a 
contribution to the broader debate igniting contemporary Critical Theory. There has been a 
decided shift in the core politics of the Critical Theoretical project over the past two decades. 
Such transitions are most clearly expressed in Thompson’s The Domestication of Critical Theory 
(2016). While first-generation Critical Theorists were explicitly opposed to capitalism on the 
grounds that it was held to be a force of social domination inimical to critical reason, and an 
obstacle to a more rational society, Third and Fourth generation Critical Theorists have 
 … receded from the confrontation with the primary source of social domination and the disfiguration 
of human culture: capitalist market society. The theories of discourse, of recognition, or of justification 
that contemporary critical theory has elaborated speak more to the concerns of mainstream political 
philosophy than to a radical challenge to its systemic imperatives and structures of power and 
domination; they play more into the very rhythms of the predominant social reality than seek any 
kind of social transformation. To retrieve critical theory is to make it accountable to these structures 
once again (Thompson, 2016: 2 – my bold). 
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This shift is made further problematic, considering that: 
The dominant trends in critical theory are domesticated in that they now seek not a confrontation 
with the forms of organized power that reproduce social pathologies, but rather to articulate an 
academicized political philosophy sealed off from the realities that affect and deform critical 
subjectivity. Safe in their respective philosophical systems, they search for an emancipatory theory 
within the striations of everyday life (Thompson, 2016: 3 – my bold). 
 
The Politics of Contemporary Critical Theory 
While for Thompson (2016) it is Habermas who commences this retreat from the critique of 
capitalism, it is Honneth who most explicitly articulates the purported benefits of the capitalist 
order.145 Honneth’s Freedom’s Right is particularly disturbing in its laissez-faire attitude to 
neoliberalism. The animus behind Freedom’s Right’s methodology of normative reconstruction 
is to    
examine contemporary reality in terms of its potential for fostering practices in which universal values 
can be realized in a superior, i.e. a more morally comprehensive and suitable fashion (Honneth, 2014b: 
8). 
Such an approach may prima facie seem similar to Critical Theory’s methodology of immanent-
transcendence, aiming to draw out latent higher forms of reason in the contradictions of the 
present, which point towards a more rational future (Strydom, 2011). However, upon closer 
inspection it becomes clear that this is neither Honneth’s objective nor his methodology. 
Honneth’s normative reconstruction is not a form of immanent-transcendent critique 
(Buchwalter, 2016). Rather, Freedom’s Right is a political compromise with the status quo, 
viewing the market order as expressing, at present, various positive features enabling 
recognition (Thompson, 2016). The distinction in temporality is crucial here: for the Honneth of 
Freedom’s Right these positive aspects of the capitalist order are not latent but active. 
Freedom’s Right seeks to identify the active positives of the market order (Buchwalter, 2016). 
For example, Honneth draws out that implicitly, in the neoliberal market, ‘subjects must 
recognise each other reciprocally, viewing each other as subjects’ (Honneth, 2014b: 46). True, 
Honneth goes on to state that this form of recognition is ‘egocentric’ (2014b: 46), but such a 
caveat is hardly sufficient. Such statements of support for the emancipatory potential of social 
norms of capitalist society, and explicitly of the norms intrinsic to the market order, would simply 
be anathema to classical Critical Theorists such as Adorno. It is hard to deny that the Critical 
Theoretical project, particularly due to Honneth’s influence, is experiencing an expedited change 
in political course. For Critical Theorists remaining attentive to the insights of first- and second-
generation scholarship, Honneth’s project in Freedom’s Right, his magnum opus (Schaub, 2015: 
                                                          
145 This is not to state that Honneth consistently presents such a position. Indeed, as Freyenhagen (2015) rightly 
comments, Honneth’s oeuvre shows a surprising lack of political and theoretical consistency.   
169 
 
108), is foundationally misconceived. The reconstructive project ends up as a bizarre reactionary 
compromise: a non-metaphysical, post-hoc justification of the establishment. Expressed most 
simply, if you take the metaphysics out of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right you are left with an 
infinitely weaker and more reactionary text. To a Critical Theorist more inclined to follow 
Thompson than Honneth, Freedom’s Right is most illuminating not as a work of social theory, 
but as an indication of the domesticated state of contemporary Critical Theory.   
This transition to a ‘domesticated’ Critical Theoretical politics is further evinced by the recent 
collection edited by Deutscher and Lafont (2017), Critical Theory in Critical Times. This text has 
been widely critiqued for lacking a critical political-economy and for failing to adequately 
interrogate the dominant sites of contemporary social domination (Thompson, 2017; Harris, 
2018). While Habermas, arguably the most famous living Critical Theorist, contributed the lead 
paper to this collection, he was primarily concerned with problems of popular sovereignty in 
member states of the European Union. His presentation of the constitutional fix of ‘double 
sovereignty’ derives from the liberal tradition, not left-Hegelianism. Habermas’ analysis was 
absent any of the concerns central to previous generations of Critical Theory: there was no trace 
of ideology-critique, political-economy or interdisciplinarity. To engage in a discussion on the 
sovereignty implications of joining the European Union without the faintest engagement with 
political-economy or ideology is a surreal undertaking for any social theorist. To do so in a book 
titled Critical Theory in Critical Times shows the extent to which the Critical Theoretical project 
has lost sight of its guiding concerns. While Habermas’ paper may be interesting, in keeping with 
much contemporary Critical Theory it fails to offer a penetrating critique of the dominant 
political constellation (Harris, 2018).   
Thompson’s critique thus appears entirely valid: one struggles to see third- and fourth-
generation Critical Theory as posing a radical critique of neoliberal capitalism and its attendant 
racial, gendered and anthropocentric dynamics. This thesis seeks to challenge such 
domesticating developments.   
 
The Political Radicalism of a Rejuvenated Social Pathology Diagnosis  
A renaissance in polycentric pathology diagnosing critique offers one route for Critical Theory to 
return to a direct confrontation with the manifold irrationalities of neoliberalism. This thesis 
explicitly supports the broader project of ‘reclaiming’ Critical Theory, that is returning the 
project to its focus on domination, political economy, and the fetters placed on critical thought 
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by capitalist rationalities (Thompson, 2016). Shifting the focus to an open and plural engagement 
with social pathologies helps in this regard for three reasons. 
First, the pathology diagnosing approach marks a return to the philosophical negativity of 
Adorno (Holloway, Matamoros and Tischler, 2009). The process of identifying social pathologies 
is explicitly a critique of the status quo, it is a direct attack on the limitations of the present 
conjecture (Honneth, 2000). Recent commentators have focused on the importance of Adorno’s 
methodological embrace of negativity, how it informed both his politics and his theory (Grollios, 
2017). As first-generation Critical Theorists argued, such an approach is crucial: there is no need 
for a positive engagement to aid progressive praxis (Adorno, 1981). For Adorno, it was 
philosophically and politically imperative to produce a negative critique (Adorno, 1981; 
O’Connor, 2004; Freyenhagen, 2013). Such an approach is in direct contradiction to the 
normative reconstruction which finds increasing favour in the Critical Theoretical academy today 
(Honneth, 2014b, Buchwalter, 2016, inter alia). Rather than identifying the active positives of 
the present, the pathology diagnosing approach returns to engaging with the contradictions and 
impediments to the ‘actualisation’ [Verwicklichung] of a more rational society (Bowie, 2013).  
Second, a broader pathology diagnosing approach returns the analytical focus to the 
structural irrationalities of the political economy and their deforming impact on both 
consciousness and social life. Through an examination of pathological social dynamics, the 
manifest irrationalities of the capitalist economy are laid bare (Harvey, 2017). As I argued in 
Chapter Three, it was Rousseau’s Discourse on Political Economy where such framings of social 
pathology were first clearly outlined. Recall that Thompson’s (2016) critique of contemporary 
Critical Theory is that it has lost its connection to its radical forebearers and thus sits once 
removed from a progressive engagement with political economy.146 Reincorporating a framing 
of social pathology from Rousseau’s Discourse of Political Economy seems an apposite response 
to such a concern.    
Third, the focus on social irrationality, integral to all framings of social pathology, and explicit 
in the pathologies of reason approach, serves to radically undermine the neo-Idealist paradigm, 
which ascribes a universal commonality, and a primacy, to the essential critical capacities of all 
subjects (McNay, 2008; Thompson, 2016). Engaging with the plurality of framings of social 
pathology advocated for in this thesis underscores how the cognitive capacities of the social 
subject are not constant and universal, but are multiply-mediated, impacted by historical and 
                                                          
146 Beyond Critical Theory, in his introduction to Marx, Capital and the Madness of Economic Reason, Harvey has 
commented on the need for progressive social and political theorists to engage directly with Marx’s political 
economy. 
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institutional developments.147 Explicitly in contradiction with neo-idealism, the left-Hegelian 
focus on pathologies of reason insists that the social subject manifests the rational potential of 
the given social world. Consciousness is not a gift granted by the social body to the subject after 
standardised dyadic recognition relations have taken place. Rather, Marx’s (1961) Copernican 
insight was that our capacity for critical cognition, which is a crucial antecedent for the capacity 
to grant recognition, is determined by the conditions of the social world, which are subject to 
historico-cultural variation.   
With Fromm’s framing of pathological normalcy the neo-Idealist tenet that the subject’s 
cognition exists isolated from broader social-structural influences is further discredited. I thus 
submit that a return to a direct engagement with diagnosing the full breadth of social 
pathologies serves to radically destabilise the neo-Idealist paradigm due to the intrinsically 
‘social’ nature of the social pathology framework.  
While leading Critical Theorists are increasingly finding an accommodation with neoliberal 
capitalism, a broader framing of social pathology diagnosis, as advocated in this thesis, offers a 
possibility for resistance.   
 
Restating the Central Social Theoretical Thesis  
The core argument presented in this project is that the ‘domesticating’ unifocal recognition 
approach to conducting pathology diagnosing social critique must be transcended. Social theory 
which is limited to either the pathologies of recognition framing, or to Zurn’s recognition-
cognitivist approach, is philosophically unjustifiable, social-theoretically myopic, and politically 
impotent. In contrast, a broader, ‘polycentric and multilateral’ (Fraser and Honneth, 2001: 209) 
pathology diagnosing endeavour offers the potential for a powerful engagement with the 
dominant forms of institutionalised social irrationality and the equally pathological 
deformations of consciousness which perpetuate them. Such an analysis is impossible within the 
dominant Honnethian recognition framing which monopolises contemporary social pathology 
scholarship.  
This primary submission has been developed throughout the thesis. Chapter One argued that 
pathology diagnosing social critique is a social-theoretically and philosophically justifiable means 
of conducting social criticism. The importance of ‘recognition’ to social theory was outlined, 
drawing out its distinct concerns with subjectivation, consciousness and intersubjective praxis. 
                                                          
147 Eder (1985) takes this further, speaking of broader ‘collective learning processes’ which have their attendant 
pathologies.  
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Honneth’s radicalisation of recognition was presented, however the continuing divergence in 
concerns between social pathology and recognition was underscored. 
The second chapter offered a critique of the dominant Honnethian Critical Theory of 
Recognition by bringing Thompson’s The Domestication of Critical Theory into dialogue with 
earlier critiques forwarded by McNay and Fraser. By engaging with critiques of recognition from 
across traditional disciplinary boundaries, I argued that the contemporary recognition paradigm 
has fundamental social-theoretical, political and philosophical weaknesses. Three central 
concerns of this analysis returned as motifs throughout the thesis: (a) the philosophical 
inadequacy of a neo-Idealist approach to the social world (from Thompson); (b) the dangers of 
championing a theoretical approach over and beyond its relevance to the context (from McNay), 
and, (c) a direct scepticism of any theorist who offers a form of critique which necessitates a 
‘monist’ or unifocal perspective (from Fraser).  
Chapter Three outlined how this restrictive recognition theoretical account has come to 
dominate social pathology scholarship. I argued that the framings of ‘recognition’ and ‘social 
pathology’ were fused by the Jyväskylä School’s ‘pathologies of recognition’ approach to social 
theory and social research. I pointed to Honneth’s framing of ‘misdevelopments’ as indicative of 
further attempts to restrict pathology diagnosing social critique, and to explicitly displace capital 
critique. Most importantly, I presented the increasingly prevalent ‘recognition-cognitive’ 
understanding of social pathology outlined by Zurn. I demonstrated how Zurn’s framing, like the 
‘pathologies of recognition’ approach, problematically excludes all non-recognition based 
understandings of social pathology. Further, I outlined how Zurn’s radical cognitivism places 
further restrictions upon these already all-to-narrow parameters. It is only ‘second-order 
disconnects’ which should be understood qua social pathologies for Zurn. Such a framing is seen 
as restrictive even by those who otherwise advocate a recognition-theoretical model 
(Freyenhagen, 2015; Laitinen, 2015).  
Having outlined the limitations of the dominant approach to engaging with social 
pathologies, the next three chapters sought to reconstruct efficacious framings of social 
pathology which have been displaced by the recognition-theoretical turn.  
Chapter Four argued that a considered engagement with Rousseau discloses multiple, 
distinct framings of social pathology which transcend the recognition orthodoxy. It was 
particularly gratifying to discover such resources within Rousseau’s work because Rousseau has 
been presented as the recognition theorist par excellence (Neuhouser, 2008). In Rousseau’s 
analysis it is the foundational breach of the monological self-relation that led to the tragic loss 
of humankind’s natural innocence. Yet, even for Rousseau, ‘the father of recognition’, a 
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recognition optic, unaccompanied by alternate pathology framings, is of limited utility. I was 
thus pleased to locate numerous framings of social pathology that are anathema to a recognition 
perspective throughout Rousseau’s work.  
My fifth chapter presented the pathologies of reason approach. I argued that despite the 
philosophical complexity and the contested nature of the pathologies of reason perspective, 
there remains a real utility to this framework which is excluded by the recognition turn. This 
chapter reconstructed five different approaches to diagnosing pathologies of reason, seeking to 
draw out the shared understanding of reason in operation. Despite diverging philosophical 
convictions, all approaches presented shared a central dynamic and hold to an understanding 
of reason as ‘thick’ and ‘social’. The chapter concluded by underscoring the utility of the 
pathologies of reason perspective, while furthering the argument that the restrictive 
‘recognition-cognitive’ paradigm needs to be displaced. 
Chapter Six presented the social theoretical infrastructure, and the substantive content, of 
Erich Fromm’s diagnosis of ‘pathological normalcy’. The chapter provided a sympathetic 
reconstruction of Fromm’s framework, arguing that, when properly grasped, Fromm offers a 
valuable, consistent, and much needed, psychoanalytic-sociological dimension to discussions on 
social pathology. Having demonstrated the coherence and utility of Fromm’s approach, this 
chapter once again served to demonstrate its exclusion from the dominant restrictive 
recognition-derived orthodoxy.  
My seventh chapter argued that a reconfigured engagement with recognition could form 
part of a broader pathology diagnosing infrastructure. The chapter started by retracing the 
limitations of the dominant recognition paradigm which must be overcome for recognition 
insights to form part of a more inclusive Critical Theory. I then presented the utility harboured 
by the recognition approach that could potentially be extracted. In contrast to the dominant 
recognition framework which focuses on pathologically denied recognition, I argued that the 
true utility of the recognition approach lies as a means of engaging with pathological demands 
for recognition. From this perspective, a recognition approach is useful in that it presents a 
means of engaging with ideologically interpellated actors, whose claims for recognition reflect 
broader, pathological power relations dominant in the social order. The chapter thus argued 
that a cautious engagement with the recognition order has utility in that it can reflect the 
subject’s petrification within ideology, and, therefore, offers an important entry point for 
engaging with the pathologies of the social world as part of a broader Critical Theoretical project.  
Through the analysis developed across these seven chapters this thesis has argued that the 
dominant approach to engaging with social pathologies is problematically restrictive and 
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philosophically unjustifiable. There are clearly many alternate framings of social pathology 
which offer utility to the Critical Theorist which are displaced by the exclusively recognition-
derived approach to social pathology. This thesis thus functions as an intervention, seeking to 
challenge the dominant approach to social pathology scholarship, and, through doing so, seeks 
to contribute to the project of fighting back against the domestication of Critical Theory.  
 
Conclusion  
Critical Theory has lost perspective. It has retreated from the critique of capital and is 
increasingly mired in abstracted analytic philosophy, liberal-democratic theory, and neo-
Idealism. In contrast, with a broader pathology diagnosing framework, Critical Theorists might 
once again have the tools to engage with the project’s formative concerns: the critique of 
instrumental rationality, domination, and the ideological artifice which obscures comprehension 
of extractive and irrational dynamics. I submit that a polycentric pathology diagnosing 
framework, as advocated for in this thesis, can offer the foundations for timely social theoretical 
and social research contributions to this endeavour. The ability to diagnose social pathologies is 
an essential precondition for Critical Theorists being able to conceptualise and to challenge 
pressing manifest social irrationalities. The dominant recognition-derived framework is 
impotent, an obstacle to potent Critical Theoretical analysis. A turn to a broader engagement 
with pathology diagnosing social theory offers a means of combatting these developments. This 
thesis is thus submitted as one contribution among many to the project of transcending the 
domesticated state of contemporary Critical Theory.  
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